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Voorwoord 
 
 
Het schrijven van een voorwoord voor mijn proefschrift vind ik eigenlijk niet gemakkelijk. De tijd 
vloog de laatste maanden zo voorbij dat er weinig ruimte was voor enige romantische reflectie. Mijn 
doctoraat liet me niet los, soms tot grote ergernis, maar met de nodige wilskracht heb ik uiteindelijk de 
afwerking volbracht. 
 
De beslissing om doctoraatsonderzoek te verrichten en te volharden is een weerspiegeling van de 
persoon die ik ben. Aan energie ontbrak het me nooit, hetgeen de nodige intensiteit gaf aan de dingen 
die ik dagdagelijks deed. Deze energie stuwde mij naar hoogtepunten, maar evengoed naar 
dieptepunten. Een overvloed aan energie bewerkstelligde bij momenten innerlijke chaos, hetgeen zo 
nu en dan uitmondde in sluimerende angst en moeite om mijn werk los te laten. Dit heeft echter niet 
verhinderd dat ik mijn onderzoek altijd graag heb gedaan. 
 
De eerste jaren van mijn doctoraat waren bijzonder interessant, want dan kon ik af en toe uit pure 
nieuwsgierigheid een paper tot in de puntjes uitpluizen. Uiteraard werd na verloop van tijd alles meer 
functioneel: je leest in functie van de papers die je aan het schrijven bent, en er is geen tijd meer voor 
zijwegen. De onderzoeksfocus sluit zich, en je denkt in termen van publiceerbare artikels. Je wordt 
kritischer, ook met betrekking tot de alledaagse werkelijkheid. Er overviel me dan ook wel eens een 
gevoel van absurditeit; zeg maar de vraag ‘waar zijn we mee bezig?’. Ik leerde te relativeren en alles 
niet nodeloos moeilijker te maken. En eigenlijk betekent dit een stap verder in het leven. Je laat 
immers zo irrelevante zaken, die je alleen maar beroven van je vrijheid, los. 
 
In dit voorwoord wens ik een aantal mensen te bedanken. 
 
Bijzondere dank gaat uit naar mijn promotor prof. dr. Koen Schoors en naar mijn copromotor prof. dr. 
Michel Tison, elk voor hun bijdrage en ondersteuning bij de totstandkoming van dit doctoraat. Zowel 
Koen als Michel schonken veel vertrouwen. Koen deelde altijd zijn doordachte economische visie mee 
en creëerde ruimte voor onderzoeksvrijheid. Dit laatste deels omdat hij wist dat ik eigenzinnig ben. 
Samen met Koen reed ik ook de eerste ‘Ronde van België’, met als eindstreep de Rechtbanken van 
Koophandel, om zo de toelating voor de dataverzameling te verkrijgen. Dit werd in belangrijke mate 
mede gerealiseerd dankzij de reeds bestaande contacten van Michel in de rechtswereld.  
Dank aan Peter, met wie ik een tweede en nog langere  ‘Ronde van België’ heb gereden. Gewapend 
met zwaar materieel hebben we vele gerechtelijke dossiers tot ons gemaakt, die we daarna elk met 
onze achtergrond, geanalyseerd hebben.  
Bijzondere dank gaat ook uit naar prof. dr. Cynthia Van Hulle voor de belangrijke suggesties tijdens 
mijn laatste doctoraatsjaar. Dit hielp me om de kwaliteit van dit proefschrift te verhogen. Dank ook 
aan prof. dr. ir. Sophie Manigart voor de vele concrete aanbevelingen, die de verdere uitdieping van 
mijn proefschrift stimuleerden.  
 
   v 
   
 
Graag had ik mijn trouwste bureaugenoot Alexei willen danken voor zijn spontane hulp bij 
methodologische vragen. Daarnaast waakte hij mee over het op peil houden van het werktempo in ons 
bureau en aanhoorde hij mijn geklaag en gezaag in moeilijkere tijden.  
Dit laatste trof niet alleen Alexei, maar tevens Peter, en de vrienden die er altijd waren voor mij. In het 
bijzonder wens ik dan ook Ingrid, Nicolaes, Sarah, Kristof, Karolien, Valerie en Tiny te bedanken 
voor de aangename momenten die we samen gedeeld hebben, en voor alles wat jullie me hebben 
bijgebracht over het leven. Naast mijn hoogtepunten, hebben jullie ook mijn dieptepunten moeten 
trotseren.  
Tot slot van dit voorwoord wens ik ook mijn ouders, Georges en Rosita, en mijn twee broers, Jan en 
Jeroen, te bedanken voor hun steun in de afgelopen jaren. Doorzettingsvermogen wordt bovendien 
mede bepaald door opvoeding en is een noodzakelijke eigenschap om een doctoraat te kunnen 
schrijven. 
 
 
Al leek het schrijven van een voorwoord mij eerst een moeilijke taak, toch heb ik dit graag 
geschreven, 
 
Bart 
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Beknopte Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
 
Het onderwerp van dit doctoraatsonderzoek is een economische analyse van het gedrag van 
schuldeisers bij de reorganisatie van ondernemingen in moeilijkheden. Dit schuldeisergedrag wordt 
geanalyseerd aan de hand van een dataset van ondernemingen die een reorganisatie doorvoeren onder 
de Belgische Wet Gerechtelijk Akkoord. Deze wet voorziet in een rechtbankgestuurde 
onderhandelingsprocedure tussen de onderneming en haar schuldeisers met als doel een 
reorganisatieplan uit te werken om ondernemingen met tijdelijke moeilijkheden te vrijwaren van een 
faillissement.  
 
Een eerste bijdrage beschrijft en analyseert de reorganisatiepraktijk van kleine ondernemingen in 
moeilijkheden. De goedgekeurde afbetalings- en herstelplannen laten toe een gestructureerd inzicht te 
verwerven in de sanering van de schuldstructuur. Deze schuldstructuur bestaat gemiddeld voor 75% 
uit vervallen en niet-gewaarborgde schulden, i.e. hoofdzakelijk handelsschulden en niet-betaalde 
belastingen en sociale bijdragen, en voor 25% uit gewaarborgde bankschulden. Het zwaartepunt bij de 
uitvoering van het afbetalingsplan ligt bij de terugbetaling van niet-gewaarborgde schulden, met 
bijzonder hoge terugbetalingpercentages aan handelscrediteuren in vergelijking met internationale 
studies. Daarnaast dienen veelal omvangrijke schulden aan de fiscale en parafiscale administraties te 
worden afgelost. De haalbaarheid van de overeengekomen schuldaflossingen hangt in sterke mate af 
van de mogelijkheid tot het genereren van positieve operationele kasstromen tijdens de planuitvoering. 
Externe financieringsbronnen, zoals bijkomend krediet en kapitaal, zijn immers schaars voor kleine 
ondernemingen onder gerechtelijk akkoord. We argumenteren dat de haalbaarheid van de 
kasstroomprojecties bijzonder onzeker is, en tonen aan dat deze projecties systematisch overschat 
worden. Niet onverwacht wordt dan ook 50% van de onderzochte ondernemingen failliet verklaard 
binnen de twee jaar na goedkeuring van het plan. 
 
In een tweede bijdrage analyseren we de schulddynamiek in de aanloop naar het gerechtelijk akkoord, 
eveneens voor kleine ondernemingen. We vinden dat ondernemers meer handelskrediet aanwenden ter 
financiering van hun verlieslatende ondernemingsactiviteit tijdens de preconcordataire fase (i.e. de 
periode vóór de aanvraag van het gerechtelijk akkoord). In het bijzonder blijken leveranciers met extra 
krediet over de brug te komen bij ondernemingen met een uiterst benarde liquiditeitspositie ten 
gevolge van zowel bedrijfsverliezen als een contractie van de bankschulden. In de literatuur werd 
recent gewezen op de wil van leveranciers om bijkomend krediet te verschaffen aan een onderneming 
in moeilijkheden, om zo diens overlevingskans te vergroten en een waardevolle handelsrelatie in stand 
te houden. Verder vinden we dat ondernemers systematisch overheidsschulden opstapelen in de 
aanloop naar het gerechtelijk akkoord, en dit door verschuldigde belastingen en sociale bijdragen niet 
te betalen. Deze werkwijze laat toe schuldeisers die noodzakelijk zijn voor de 
ondernemingscontinuïteit, zoals leveranciers en financiële instellingen, te betalen. Het gebruik van 
overheidsgeld als informeel financieringsmiddel voor ondernemingen in moeilijkheden wordt 
onbetwist in de hand gewerkt door de beperkte aansprakelijkheid van ondernemingsbestuurders voor 
niet-betaalde belastingen en sociale bijdragen naar Belgisch recht (i.e. de aansprakelijkheidsregels van 
vóór de zomer van 2006). Een internationale vergelijking leert dan ook dat het percentage aan 
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onbetaalde overheidsschulden veel hoger is in België dan in andere landen met strengere 
aansprakelijkheidsregels zoals de Verenigde Staten van Amerika en Canada.  
 
Het gedrag van financiële instellingen onder de Wet Gerechtelijk Akkoord wordt geanalyseerd in een 
derde hoofdstuk. Binnen de literatuur blijkt er een consensus te bestaan dat schuldeisers die over 
degelijke waarborgen op hun vorderingen beschikken, in casu financiële instellingen die beschikken 
over voldoende (zakelijke) zekerheden op bedrijfsactiva, een faillissement verkiezen boven een 
rechtbankgestuurde reorganisatie (de zogeheten liquidatievoorkeur). Financiële instellingen die over 
voldoende zekerheden beschikken, hebben immers weinig te verliezen bij een faillissement. 
Bovendien is veelal elke poging tot minnelijke reorganisatie voorafgaand aan het gerechtelijk akkoord 
al stuk gelopen. Financiële instellingen met afdoende gewaarborgde schuldvorderingen beschikken 
bijgevolg over een geloofwaardige optie tot liquidatie van de ondernemingsactiva, die resulteert in 
aanzienlijke onderhandelingsmacht. We vinden dan ook dat deze schuldeisers strengere 
terugbetalingeisen met betrekking tot de openstaande bankschuld opleggen. Meer specifiek vinden we 
dat afdoende gewaarborgde bankschulden volledig worden opgeëist tijdens de planuitvoering (in 
principe binnen de 18 maanden na de plangoedkeuring). 
Daarnaast vinden we dat ondernemingen in moeilijkheden frequent bedrijfsactiva verkopen. De 
opbrengsten ervan worden toegekend aan gewaarborgde banken, omdat deze veelal over zakelijke 
zekerheden op het geheel van de bedrijfsactiva beschikken. Goedgewaarborgde financiële instellingen 
blijken bovendien op een gedwongen verkoop van ondernemingsactiva aan te sturen. 
 
In een laatste deel van het proefschrift analyseren we diverse aspecten van het schuldeisergedrag en de 
schuldstructuur op de faillissementskans voor een onderneming met een goedgekeurd plan. De impact 
van operationele rentabiliteit en de beslissingsvrijheid van rechtbanken onder de Wet Gerechtelijk 
Akkoord (‘judicial discretion’) op de slaagkansen van een reorganisatie wordt eveneens geanalyseerd. 
We gebruiken ‘survival analysis’ om onze belangrijkste bevindingen verder uit te diepen. 
Ten eerste vinden we dat ondernemingen gefinancierd door financiële instellingen met afdoende 
gewaarborgde schuldvorderingen een hogere kans hebben op faillissement. De Wet Gerechtelijk 
Akkoord kent immers bijzondere macht toe aan bepaalde gewaarborgde schuldeisers, zoals een 
onvoorwaardelijk opeisingsrecht van hun schulden 18 maanden na de goedkeuring van het betalings- 
en herstelplan. De bovenvernoemde liquidatievoorkeur (zie bijdrage 3) van goedgewaarborgde 
schuldeisers kan bijgevolg worden uitgeoefend.  
Ten tweede blijken ondernemingen met veel opgestapelde belasting- en sociale schulden een hogere 
kans op faillissement te hebben. De reden daartoe is onder meer dat overheidsschulden feitelijk 
volledig dienen te worden afgelost tijdens de planuitvoering, wat een zware belasting inhoudt op de 
gegenereerde kasstromen na plangoedkeuring.  
Tot slot stellen we vast dat ondernemingen met een beter preconcordatair operationeel resultaat een 
lagere kans hebben op faillissement, en deze bevinding blijft behouden na controle voor potentiële 
inefficiënties ten gevolge van schuldeisergedrag en rechterlijk gedrag.  
Introduction, Summary and Conclusions 
 
The object of this dissertation is an analysis of creditor behavior in distressed firms that reorganize 
under Belgian court-supervision. Section 0.1 compares the Belgian reorganization procedure with its 
counterpart procedure Chapter 11 in the United States, and emphasizes their substantial differences. 
This section further gives a short introduction to the literature, including the latest developments, and 
focuses on the role of creditors in court-supervised reorganization proceedings. Section 0.2 presents 
the outline of this dissertation and previews our results and contributions to the literature. Policy 
implications and directions for further research are discussed in respectively section 0.3 and 0.4 of this 
introduction. 
 
0.1. Orientation and motivation 
 
Court-supervised reorganization versus bankruptcy-liquidation. Most bankruptcy systems consist 
of both a liquidation and reorganization procedure. Under a liquidation procedure, i.e. Chapter 7 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code, a distressed business ceases its operations. A trustee sells all of the 
firm’s assets and distributes the proceeds according to the absolute priority rule (APR), whereby 
creditors and shareholders are paid in predetermined order: secured debt is served first, than unsecured 
claims, and finally common stock. Under the reorganization procedure, i.e. Chapter 11, management 
representing the equity holders agree with creditors on a reorganization plan under court-supervision, 
which allows to continue the business operations, in principle as independent company. In Chapter 11, 
the bargaining process can result in deviations from the APR. An alternative to court-supervised 
reorganization is informal reorganization, or workout, whereby debt renegotiations take place out-of-
court.  
 
Many European countries have a conceptually similar dual bankruptcy system consisting of both a 
liquidation and reorganization procedure. Our analysis in this dissertation is restricted to the 
functioning of court-supervised reorganization procedures, and focuses on creditor behavior in 
distressed firms seeking court protection. We further restrict our analysis to distressed firms 
attempting to reorganize under Belgian court-supervision. The Belgian reorganization law enacted in 
1997 came into force on January 1st 1998, and is called the “Law on Judicial Composition” (LJC). 
This law aims the preservation of viable operations by means of a process of court-supervised 
financial restructuring.  
 
Table 1 gives statistics on the yearly number of petition filings for bankruptcy-reorganization (LJC) 
and for bankruptcy-liquidation in Belgium. The number of businesses seeking court protection under 
the LJC has clearly fallen since its introduction, and dropped with approximately 50% between 1998 
and 2006 (from 180 to 91 cases). The yearly number of bankruptcy-liquidation cases is around 6000 to 
7000. The number of yearly petitions for bankruptcy-reorganization scaled by total bankruptcies (both 
LJC and liquidation cases) averages 1.73% (with standard deviation of 0.57). Table 1 also shows that 
more than half of the LJC firms fail, i.e. are transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation, within 15 months 
after filing a petition for court protection. The Belgian failure rates are however quite similar to these 
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reported in Morrison (2007), who analyzes small privately held businesses, comparable to the typical 
judicial composition firms. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics on bankruptcy-reorganization (court-supervised reorganization – Law on 
Judicial Composition / LJC) and bankruptcy-liquidation in Belgium. 
Data include both sole proprietorships and corporations. Failure consists in transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation 
during the LJC. 
 Bankruptcy -reorganization Bankruptcy-liquidation 
Year Number of filings for 
bankruptcy-reorganization 
Failure within 5 
months 
Failure between 5 and 
10 months 
Failure between 
10 and 15 months 
% of failures after 
15 months 
Number of filings for  
bankruptcy-liquidation  
1998 180 54 (30.0%) 47 (26.1%) 10 (5.6%) 61.7 %(111/180) 6825 
1999 169 58 (34.3%) 46 (27.2%) 8 (4.7%) 66.3% (112/169) 7009 
2000 140 44 (31.4%) 22 (15.7%) 10 (7.1%) 54.3% (76/140) 6857 
2001 151 44 (29.1%) 38 (25.2%) 13 (8.6%) 62.9% (95/151) 6973 
2002 130 30 (23.1%) 26 (20.0%) 14 (10.8%) 53.8% (70/130) 7111 
2003 99 23 (23.2%) 24 (24.2%) 5 (5.1%) 52.5% (52/99) 7664 
2004 98 20 (20.4%) 14 (14.3%) 10 (10.2%) 44.9% (44/98) 7984 
2005 82 - - - - 7908 
2006 91 - - - - 7558 
Source: Graydon NV and Ooghe & Van Wymeersch (2006) 
 
We calculated a bankruptcy-reorganization rate of 1.73%. Couwenberg (2001) finds a ratio of 28% in 
the U.S. (with standard deviation of 5.2), 14% in the U.K., 20% in France, and of 0.2% for Germany1.  
 
A direct comparison of the Belgian and American reorganization ratio suggests that Belgian firms rely 
at least 15 times less on bankruptcy-reorganization compared to their American counterparts. We 
however disfavor this comparative approach because bankruptcy systems differ around the world. In 
the U.S., bankruptcy-liquidation (Chapter 7) is not used that frequently, which lowers the denominator 
of the U.S.-ratio., and ultimately results in a very high share of bankruptcy-reorganization in total 
bankruptcies. Therefore, it might be better to compare the number of liquidations and reorganizations 
with the total number of active firms in a nation’s wide economy. We show in table 2 that only around 
1 out of 825 American businesses filed in 1998 for bankruptcy liquidation in the U.S. (Chapter 7 - 1 
out of 1.131 firms in 2005), while it is around 1 out of 100 firms in Belgium. The main reason for the 
low number of Chapter 7 cases in the U.S. is that the American debtor needs to pay fees to the U.S. 
bankruptcy court for the delivered bankruptcy services. This creates an incentive for the insolvent 
American debtor to opt for out-of-court liquidation. 
 
U.S. firms can rely on two procedures to reorganize their business under court-supervision, namely on 
Chapter 11 and on Chapter 13. Non-incorporated firms (i.e. sole proprietorships) with limited levels of 
debt file for Chapter 13, while larger firms (including non-incorporated ones) file for Chapter 11. The 
Chapter 13 procedure is largely ignored in literature. Our calculations in table 2 show that 1 American 
                                               
1
 The average U.S. bankruptcy-reorganization rate is estimated over the period 1980-1996; July 1997 to June 
1998 for the U.K.; 1986-1993 for France; 1992-1998 for Germany. 
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business out of 2.947 filed for Chapter 11 in 1998, and that 1 firms out of 1.476 filed for Chapter 11 or 
Chapter 13. We calculate that only 1 out of 3.876 Belgian firms filed for a judicial composition in 
Belgium (in 1998). These findings indicate that the likelihood an American firm seeks court protection 
is 32% (Chapter 11) to 163%2 (Chapter 11 + Chapter 13) higher than this of a Belgian firm. In 2005, 
the respective likelihoods increase, and are respectively 90% (Chapter 11) and 242%3 (Chapter 11 + 
Chapter 13). Notwithstanding the fall in the petition filings for the LJC, the 2005-likelihoods are not 
that high as the filings for bankruptcy-reorganization did equally drop in the U.S.  
 
Employers’ federations and politicians argue in popular media that failure rates for LJC firms are 
towering and that the number of petition filings is too low. They more generally argue that the LJC 
stays far beyond expectations. Proposals to reform the LJC are currently introduced and debated in 
parliament. Our comparative data analysis however gives a less pessimistic view on the functioning of 
the Belgian reorganization law.  
 
Table 2: Comparative statistics: bankruptcy-reorganization and bankruptcy-liquidation in Belgium and 
the U.S. 
Data include both sole proprietorships and corporations. American bankruptcy data are obtained from reports of 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts4. Belgian bankruptcy data are based on reports of Graydon 
NV and on Ooghe & Van Wymeersch (2006). 
 1998 2005 
 Belgium U.S. Belgium U.S. 
Number of filings for bankruptcy-liquidation  6.825 25.811 (Chapter 7) 7.908 23.313 (Chapter 7) 
Number of filings for bankruptcy-reorganization 180 (LJC) 7.222 (Chapter 11) 
7.200 (Chapter 13) 
82 (LJC) 5.776 (Chapter 11) 
4.649 (Chapter 13) 
Total number of firms in nation-wide economy 697.687* 21.287.904** 710.252* 26.375.632** 
     
     
Bankruptcy-liquidation to number of firms 6.825 to 697.687 
 1 to 102 
25.811 to 21.287.904 
 1 to 825  
7.908 to 710.252 
 1 to 90   
23.313 to 26.375.632 
1 to 1.131 
     
Bankruptcy-reorganization to number of firms 
(LJC for Belgium and Chapter 11 for U.S.) 
180 to 697.687 
 1 to 3.876 
7.222 to 21.287.904 
 1 to 2.947 
82  to 710.252 
 1 to 8.662 
5.776 to 26.375.632 
1 to 4.566 
     
Bankruptcy-reorganization to number of firms 
(LJC for Belgium and both Chapter 11 and 
Chapter 13 for U.S.) 
180 to 697.687 
 1 to 3.876 
14.422 to 21.287.904 
1 to 1.476 
82 to 710.252 
 1 to 8.662 
10.425 to 26.375.632 
1 to 2.530 
     
     
* Source: FPS economy, SME’s, independent professions and energy. 
**   Source: U.S. Census bureau. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2
 (3.876 / 2.947) = 1.32 ; i.e. 132% - 100 % = 32% | (3.876 / 1.476) = 2.63 ; i.e. 263% - 100% = 163 % 
3
 (8.662 / 4.566) = 1.90 ; i.e. 190% - 100 % = 90% | (8.662 / 2.530) = 3.42 ; i.e. 342% - 100% = 242 % 
4
 Amercian bankruptcy data of 1998 are based on table F-2 U.S. Bankruptcy Courts – Business and Non-business Cases 
Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, during the 12-month period ending March 1999 (Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts). Amercian bankruptcy data of 2005 are based on table F-2 U.S. Bankruptcy Courts – Business and 
Non-business Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, during the 12-month period ending September 2005 
(Administrative Office of the United States Courts).  
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Phases of bankruptcy-reorganization. Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) argue that Chapter 11 has three 
distinct identifiable phases: from filing to plan (phase 1), from plan to confirmation (phase 2), and 
from confirmation to closure (phase 3). The debtor must file a reorganization plan to determine the 
new financial structure of the distressed business within 120 days of bankruptcy filing. This period is 
usually extended upon the debtor’s request, and the creditor right to optionally file a plan after 120 
days is only rarely exercised. Only 22% of their mainly small sample cases spent less than 120 days 
between petition filing to plan submission, and the average time of phase 1 is 6.9 months (median is 
5.07 months -  see table 3). The second phase is almost entirely under the control of creditors and the 
court. All creditor claimants are classified in different classes, such as secured creditors, priority 
unsecured creditors (e.g. tax administration), nonpriority unsecured creditors (e.g. trade creditors) , 
and equity holders. When a class is not fully satisfied, it is regarded as impaired and permitted to vote 
on the plan. Plan confirmation requires approval of each impaired creditor class. Within each class of 
impaired creditors, a majority vote requires that 50% of the creditors vote in favor of the plan, and that 
they represent two thirds of the total value of claims. Bris et al. consider the length of the second phase 
as a proxy for the difficulty in the bargaining process as the plan needs to be approved by all impaired 
classes with majority rule5. This second phase averages 7.5 months (median is 5.13). The third phase 
‘from confirmation to case closure’ is only rarely mentioned in literature. According to Bris et al. 
(2006), the length of the third phase reflects case complexity, and is dedicated to plan implementation 
and to the disbursement of fees to professional experts. Their regression analysis does not provide a 
clear insight in the dynamics and length of this third stage. Our view from reading the literature is that 
phase 3 is used as a first step in the asset distribution among claimants (including the first installment 
payments), and deals with the alteration of business statutes and contracts. This third stage averages 
7.97 months (median is 5.7 months). The number of observations reported in table 3 on the distinct 
phases reveals that around 70 % of the firms submitting a plan result in confirmation and subsequent 
implementation, i.e. 139 divided by 199. Warren & Westbrook (2007) consistently find that around 65 
to 70% of the debtors proposing at least a draft of plan ultimately results in plan confirmation. 
 
The 139 firms that emerge from chapter 11 (in bold in table 3) are further analyzed in Baird, Bris and 
Zhu (2007). These 139 firms subsequently execute their confirmed (and implemented) plan, without 
any court-supervision or protection anymore. There is not a maximum time on plan execution during 
the post-bankruptcy period. We often refer to this post-bankruptcy period as ‘post-chapter 11 period’, 
or simply as ‘post-confirmation period’6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5
 Although the court can use a “cram down” to confirm the plan over the objections of impaired creditors (and 
save time), no court used this in their sample. 
6
 As noted earlier, the third phase ‘from plan confirmation to implementation’ is often not considered in 
literature. Therefore, we do not use the term ‘post-implementation stage’. 
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Table 3: Length of time spent in Chapter 11 phases. 
Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) distinguish three distinct Chapter 11 phases: from filing to plan (phase 1), from plan 
to confirmation (phase 2), and from confirmation to case closure (phase 3). Length of time spent in phases is 
expressed in months. 
 
  
From filing to plan 
submission 
From plan submission to 
confirmation 
From confirmation to 
closure  
Mean 6.9 7.5 7.97 
Median 5.07 5.13 5.70 
St. dev. 7.70 6.77 7.20 
Min 0 0.9 0 
Max 44.3 36.7 42.27 
No. of 
observations 
199 147 139 
Source: Bris, Welch & Zhu, 2006 
 
Figure 1 compares Chapter 11 with the Belgian LJC. The two Chapter 11 phases “from filing to plan” 
(phase 1) and “from plan to confirmation” (phase 2) are the core of many court-supervised 
reorganization procedures including the Belgian one. Under the LJC, both pre-confirmation phases 
(phase 1 and phase 2) may only take on 6 to 9 months together, which is clearly shorter than the 
similar Chapter 11 phases averaging 14.4 months together (median 10.2 months – see table 3). The 
execution of the confirmed plan, including plan implementation (i.e. the third Chapter 11 phase), takes 
place during an initial period of maximum 24 months under supervision of the judges and their 
appointed examiner. This sharply contrasts with the U.S., where Chapter 11 firms emerging with 
confirmed plan are not subject to any court-supervision7.  Plan execution in the U.S. is not regulated 
by the Chapter 11 procedure, and is argued to take place during the post-chapter 11 period (i.e. post-
bankruptcy period).  
 
The Belgian court-supervised plan execution period is initially fixed at exactly 24 months for 96% of 
the cases with confirmed plans (see further). During this fixed period, the court and creditors can 
however decide to prolong the court-supervised period with a maximum of 12 months. In case of 
prolongation, a new plan needs to be established because the confirmed initial plan is only drafted for 
a period of 24 months. A prolongation of the court-supervised post-confirmation period occurs in 
approx. 10 % of the cases (see further). We refer to the period of maximum 24 months with optional 
prolongation of 12 months as the ‘court-supervised post-confirmation period’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7
 Before August 1, 1991, the Chapter 11 debtor was required to file post-confirmation reports detailing its 
progress toward plan consummation (see Jensen-Conkl
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Figure 1: Phases of Chapter 11 and the judicial composition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 provides data on the LJC for a sample of firms with confirmed plans between January 1, 1998 
and June 30, 2004. Approximately 306 plans were confirmed in this period with one of the 23 regional 
Belgian Bankruptcy Courts. Our sample is restricted to all confirmed reorganization plans submitted to 
17 of those Bankruptcy Courts. This amounts to 190 reorganization plans or 62% of the population of 
confirmed plans. Corporations and sole proprietorships submitted respectively 125 and 65 plans 
(125+65 = 190). Blocks of closely related corporations jointly submitted five out of those 125 plans8. 
We further distinguish small and large corporations by means of pre-bankruptcy assets. These assets 
exceed € 5.000.000 for large corporations. 
 
Panel A of table 4 shows the time spent in the pre-confirmation period of the LJC (including phase 1 
and phase 2 of Chapter 11) is around 7 months for all types of firms. The distressed firm is expected to 
execute the confirmed plan under court-supervision during a period of maximum 24 months. Panel B 
of table 2 shows that approximately 50% of the distressed firms end in bankruptcy-liquidation during 
this period (cases marked in bold). The court-supervised period without prolongation takes 24 months 
for 16 out of 18 large corporations, for 103 of 107 small corporations, and for 64 of 65 sole 
proprietorships9. If firms survive the initial post-confirmation period of maximum 24 months, the 
debtor can request a prolongation of maximum 12 months. In this case a new plan is established and 
confirmed because the initial confirmed plan is only drafted for a period of maximum 24 months. The 
court and the unsecured creditors need to confirm the prolongation and the modified plan. Panel C of 
table 2 shows that the court-supervised period is extended for 5 large corporations, 11 small 
corporations and 7 sole proprietorships. Panel D shows that respectively 2 large corporations and 1 
small firm end in bankruptcy-liquidation during the prolonged court-supervised post-confirmation 
period (also marked in bold). In sum, panel E shows that respectively 55.6%, 49.5% and 50.8% of the 
large corporations, small corporations and sole proprietorships fail during the court-supervised post-
                                               
8
 Five blocks of incorporated firms file jointly a plan. Those blocks respectively consist of 9, 4, 2, 2, and 2 
corporations. 139 corporations (120+9+4+2+2+2) are subsequently involved with the 125 plans. 
9
 Two large corporations were supervised for 9 and 8 months. 4 small corporations were supervised for 13, 12, 7 
and 6 months, and 1 sole proprietorship was supervised for 3 months. 
 
Filing to plan submission 
(approx. 5 to 7 months) 
Plan submission to 
confirmation (approx. 
5 to 8 months) 
Plan confirmation to case 
closure (approx. 6 to 8 
months) 
Chapter 11 phases 
Post Chapter 11: plan execution without 
court-supervision 
   From filing to plan confirmation 
Pre-confirmation stage of 6 to 9 months Court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months 
      with optional prolongation of 12 months 
The Belgian law on judicial composition  
TIME 
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confirmation stage (including optional prolongation). Panel F corrects the failure rates by excluding 
the (few) liquidation schemes (respectively 3, 1 and 4).  
 
Less is however known about what happens after Chapter 11 case closure, i.e. during the post-
confirmation stage or the post-bankruptcy period. Our view from reading the literature is that data on 
the post-bankruptcy period are hard to collect in the U.S. (see Morrison, 2007; Bris, Welch and Zhu10, 
2006; Baird, Bris & Zhu, 2007). One reason for this might be that unviable firms do usually rely on 
out-of-court liquidation to dismantle their assets instead of liquidating under bankruptcy (Chapter 7). 
These out-of-court liquidations, which are in principle voluntary, are however not officially registered. 
The scant literature on post-confirmation failures mainly consists of a relatively old study of Jensen-
Conklin (1992), who sheds light on plan consummation in a sample of mainly small corporations. Out 
of her 45-case study of firms emerging from Chapter 11, she finds that 58% consummated their plan. 
11 of her 45 plans are liquidation schemes, which are for the large majority successfully executed (but 
likely imply liquidation). 50 % of the remaining 34 going concern plans are consummated, and did not 
result in an overall liquidation. American and Belgian post-confirmation failure rates tend to be 
comparable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10
 Bris et al (2006) write ‘we try to track the firms after Chapter 11 exit’. 
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Table 4: The time spent under the Law on Judicial Composition and failure (transfer to bankruptcy-
liquidation – marked in bold) during the court-supervised post-confirmation period.  
 Large corporations Small Corporations Sole proprietorships 
Panel A: time spent in pre-confirmation stage    
Mean 7.02 6.52 6.53 
Median 6.77 6.27 5.93 
St. dev. 1.59 2.23 1.88 
Min 4.17 1.77 2.3 
Max 9.4 12.43 9.8 
Total firms 18 107 65 
    
Data on court-supervised post-confirmation stage (panel B until F) 
   
Panel B    
Number of firms failing during the court-supervised post-
confirmation period of maximum 24 months 
8 52 33 
Number of firms not failing during the court-supervised post-
confirmation period of maximum 24 months 
10 55 32 
Total firms 18 107 65 
 
   
Panel C: Number of firms not failing during the court-supervised 
post-confirmation period of at maximum 24 months . . . 
   
. . and with additional prolongation of maximum 12 months 5 11 7 
. . and without additional prolongation of maximum 12 months 5 44 25 
Total firms 10 55 32 
    
Panel D    
Number of firms failing during the prolonged court-supervised post-
confirmation period of maximum 12 months 
2 1 0 
Number of firms not failing during the prolonged court-supervised 
post-confirmation period of maximum 12 months 
3 10 7 
Total firms 5 11 7 
    
Panel E    
Number of failures during court-supervised post-confirmation 
period (including optional prolongation) 
10 53 33 
Number of firms 18 107 65 
Failure rate during the court-supervised post-confirmation period 
(including optional prolongation) 
55.6 % 49.5 % 50.8 % 
    
Panel F    
Number of failures during court-supervised post-confirmation 
period (including optional prolongation) for firms with going 
concern plans 
8 53 30 
Number of firms with going concern plans 15 106 61 
Failure rate during the court-supervised post-confirmation period 
(including optional prolongation) for firms with going concern plans 
53.3% 50.0% 49.2% 
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Short introduction to literature and new developments. Bankruptcy costs involved with large 
Chapter 11 corporations have been a popular study object during the last decades. Expected 
bankruptcy costs affect the optimal corporate capital structure11. Specifically, if bankruptcy costs are 
substantial, it may be argued that at some point the expected value of these costs outweighs the tax 
benefit derived from increasing leverage, and the firm will have reached its optimum capital structure 
point (see e.g. Morris, 1982 and Altman, 1984). Using a sample of 19 bankrupt large companies, 
Altman (1984) provides empirical insight in both direct and indirect bankruptcy costs. Direct costs 
include legal, accounting, filing and other administrative costs. Altman defines indirect bankruptcy 
costs as the lost profits that a firm can be expected to suffer due to significant bankruptcy potential. He 
argues that management of distressed firms often spends a great deal of time as well as money to shore 
up the confidence in their businesses as a continuing entity. Altman finds total bankruptcy costs of 
about 12 % to 16 % of firm value12. The evidence on direct costs is rather extensive (e.g. Warner, 
1997; Lubben, 2000; LoPucki and Doherty, 2004). Bris, Welch & Zhu (2006) argue that some authors 
consider Chapter 11 costs to be high, while others consider the opposite. Next to bankruptcy costs, 
violations of APR rules in large Chapter 11 cases have been considerably analyzed (see e.g. Franks 
and Torous, 1989; Weiss, 1990), and the continuation bias of judges is investigated by Weiss and 
Wruck (1998)13.  
 
The traditional view of Chapter 11 reorganizations is that managers or equity holders, or both, control 
the reorganization process, which results in concessions from creditors in the form of deviations from 
absolute priority. This is made possible by debtor-friendly features of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code14 and 
because judges are passive or biased in favor of continuation (see e.g. Morrison, 2007, for references 
to legal analysis in this respect). During the last years however, and especially with large firms, the 
traditional focus on the debtor in control has shifted away to the creditor in control, and specifically by  
senior and secured creditors (see e.g. Ayotte & Morrison, 2008; Baird, Bris & Zhu, 2007). Much of 
this creditor control is exercised by pre- and post petition secured lines of credit imposing strict 
conditions to the debtor’s business. It is now argued that this creditor control induced the dramatic 
increase of the proportion of Chapter 11 cases resulting in piece-meal liquidation or in a going concern 
sales (see Baird & Rasmussen, 2003; LoPucki, 2003). 
 
Another new development is the emerging interest among academics in small business bankruptcies in 
Chapter 11. After all, the very large majority of Chapter 11 cases consist in small firms (see Warren & 
Westbrook, 1999). Baird and Morrison (2005) argue that the typical Chapter 11 case is a small 
business that has few, if any, specialized assets. It is organized around the owner-operator's human 
capital and can be (and usually is) reassembled by the owner at low cost. Morrison (2007) finds that 
the widely suspected continuation bias that allows firms to linger under court protection is either 
absent or empirically unimportant in a sample of mainly small firms. Baird, Bris and Zhu (2007) show 
that the tax collector is the central figure of small Chapter 11 cases. In this dissertation, we restrict 
                                               
11
 See Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) on capital structure and the cost of capital. 
12
 The time spent in Chapter 11 by unviable firms is also often regarded as a noisy proxy for indirect bankruptcy 
costs as assets could already have been put to a better use in the hands of a third party (see further). 
13
 Our short literature overview is non-exhaustive. 
14
 See Franks and Sussman (2005) for an empirical analysis of the creditor-friendly U.K.-system. 
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most of our analysis to small firms seeking court protection under the LJC, and we pay much attention 
to the role of tax and social security authorities (in conjunction with entrepreneurial behavior), as they 
are equally central players under Belgian court-supervised reorganization. In addition, a unique 
subsample of natural persons seeking to preserve their sole proprietorship is explored, and fills a gap 
in literature. 
 
Secured and unsecured creditors. Our research papers included in this dissertation primarily analyze 
creditor behavior as creditors play a decisive role in reorganization proceedings, although we do not 
neglect the conjunction with entrepreneurial behaviour. From a comparative law perspective, secured 
and unsecured creditors are almost always treated differently in reorganization procedures. While 
unsecured creditors vote by a certain majority on a plan, thereby binding the minority, secured 
creditors vote individually on a plan that alters their contractual rights. 
 
Specifically theory suggests that secured creditors might oppose a debtor’s court-supervised 
reorganization because their incentives are skewed towards liquidation over reorganization (see 
example given Bulow & Shoven, 1978; White, 1989; Kordana et. al, 1999) because the expected loan 
repayment under reorganization is lower than the loan recovery under immediate liquidation. If the 
reorganization succeeds, well-secured creditors receive only part of the appreciation of the firm’s 
value, while they bear the brunt of the depreciation of the firm’s value if the reorganization fails. This 
argumentation is in line with the traditional debt-equity conflict described in Jensen & Meckling 
(1976). Empirical evidence on the relation between secured creditors (typically banks in Europe) and 
the reorganization process is very limited. Bergström et al. (2002) find that highly secured banks 
oppose plan confirmation of small firms under Finnish reorganization, and very recently, Ayotte and 
Morrison (2008) analyzed the behavior of senior secured creditors in large Chapter 11 companies. 
From a welfare point of view, if secured creditors liquidate a viable firm, a so-called type II error (see 
White, 1994) occurs. The presumed liquidation preference of secured creditors is analyzed in this 
dissertation using multiple research settings (including its impact on asset sales and on the loan 
renegotiation between debtor and secured creditor). 
 
Unsecured creditors (mainly trade creditors) typically bear the burden of firms attempting to 
reorganize under court-supervised reorganization. Common practice is drastic debt forgiveness on 
unsecured claims, resulting in omnipresent deviations from absolute priority favoring the debtor. (see 
Fisher & Martel for Canada, 1994; Sundgren for Finland, 1998, and Bris et al. for the U.S., 2006). 
This type of APR deviation is widely accepted because expected proceeds under bankruptcy-
liquidation are typically close to zero, and especially for small firms. Despite APR violations, the 
unsecured creditors are likely to benefit if court-supervised reorganization works well - together with 
the entrepreneur-  and they suffer the loss if it works poorly (see Baird et al., 2007). Notwithstanding 
the practice of debt reduction, the repayment of unsecured debt may still impose a severe burden on 
the post-confirmation cash flows, which might even impede successful plan execution. In this 
dissertation, we identify the effect of unsecured debt on successful plan execution, and we determine 
the pre-bankruptcy origins of the levels of accumulated unsecured debt (including unpaid tax and 
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social contribution claims). Our pre-bankruptcy analysis allows formulating policy recommendations 
to mitigate excessive levels of unsecured debt at the moment of procedure initiation. 
 
Bankruptcy documents. During the last years, American bankruptcy courts started to make their past 
cases available on the ‘Pacer’ service. Pacer is short for Public Access to Court Electronic Records, 
and provides full-text source for bankruptcy documents. Academics started to construct extensive 
datasets on bankruptcy by hand coding data from the bankruptcy documents. The access to Pacer 
clearly facilitated research on small Chapter 11 cases, which resulted in the recently published studies 
of Morrison (2007) and of Bris, Welch & Zhu (2006). 
 
Our Belgian dataset is equally distilled from bankruptcy documents enclosed in the judicial records of 
17 (out of 23) regional Belgian bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy documents include petition filing, 
reorganization plan, voting tables, creditor correspondence, financial reports of the court-appointed 
examiner, etc. A pacer-like service was unfortunately not available in Belgium, and we were forced to 
scan the judicial records. Data were subsequently hand coded to construct our dataset on the Law on 
Judicial Composition. This dataset is further complemented with financial statement data provided by 
private data vendors Graydon NV (Graydon-database) and Bureau van Dijk (Belfirst DVD’s). Bank 
data obtained by intermediation of the Central Corporate Credit Register of the National Bank of 
Belgium finally supplements our dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction, Summary, and Conclusions 
 
 0.12 
0.2. Outline, empirical results, and contributions to the literature 
 
This dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter gives descriptive statistics on the 
rehabilitation process of small firms under court-supervision, and offers a first view on the functioning 
of the Belgian court-supervised reorganization procedure. The data reported in chapter 1 are analyzed 
in detail in the remaining chapters. In chapter 2, we analyze the debt dynamics of small corporations 
that reorganize under court-supervised reorganization, and especially the dynamics that take place 
during the pre-bankruptcy period. First, government administration is found to act as lender of last 
resort in the running up to petition filing. Small firms systematically accumulate payable tax and social 
contribution claims during the pre-bankruptcy period by not transferring them to the respective 
administrations. This frees cash flows to settle the claims of creditors more essential to business 
continuation, i.e. these claims of trade creditors and financial institutions. Second, we find that 
entrepreneurs demand more trade credit during the pre-bankruptcy period to finance their loss-making 
business, and suppliers are willing to provide this credit. As in Peterson and Rajan (1997), cash flow is 
found to precede trade credit in the pecking order of distressed firms, and this after controlling for the 
firm’s access to bank financing. Our findings on the pre-bankruptcy dynamics offer arguments to 
understand the debt rearrangements under court-supervised reorganization by way of debt deferral and 
forgiveness. These financial restructuring measures are at the heart of any reorganization plan 
proposed during the bankruptcy-reorganization process. Chapter 3 analyzes bank debt restructuring 
under Belgian court-supervised reorganization. Like in many European countries (Davydenko & 
Franks, 2008) financial institutions are typically well-secured, and this is equally the case for our 
bank-financed sample cases. Literature suggests that banks and secured creditors are biased towards 
liquidation instead of reorganization (Bergström et al, 2002; Bris et al., 2006). Compared to Chapter 
11, the effects of a secured bank’s liquidation preference might be persistent under the LJC because 
this law is biased in favor of secured creditors15. Specifically the LJC gives the debtor far less power to 
enforce a rescheduling or deferral of secured bank debt during the post-confirmation stage than the 
more debtor-friendly Chapter 11 legislation in the U.S. (section 1129 of the American Bankruptcy 
Code). We find that the bank’s liquidation preference is reflected in the renegotiated loan conditions 
between debtor and banks. Specifically secured banks with higher collateralization renegotiated higher 
loan repayments during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months, which is in line 
with the literature on non-cooperative bargaining with outside options16 (Osborne and Rubinstein, 
1990). Chapter 4 analyzes both the distressed firm’s likelihood of failure and the time spent before 
transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation during plan execution. We specifically revisit our previous findings 
on creditor behavior and the likelihood of successful plan execution. After controlling for potential 
inefficiencies due to creditor behavior, we find that more profitable corporations are less likely to fail. 
This suggests that the LJC procedure is relatively efficient, at least in our sample of small 
corporations. Finally, using a unique subsample of individual debtors seeking to preserve a sole 
proprietorship, we find that discretionary judicial actions sharply affect the likelihood of failure. 
 
                                               
15
 N. Dewaelheyns and C. Van Hulle (2007) also argue that the Belgian reorganization procedure appears to be 
mainly creditor driven. 
16
 The liquidation value of the distressed firm is the secured bank’s outside option if bank credit renegotiations 
fail. 
Introduction, Summary, and Conclusions 
 
 0.13 
Chapter 1: “The Reorganization Practice of Small Firms under Belgian Court-supervised 
Reorganization”.  
 
We analyze the reorganization practice of small corporations under Belgian court-supervised 
reorganization. Data are obtained from the confirmed debtor-proposed plans of firms with pre-
bankruptcy assets less than € 5.000.000. These plans are drafted for a period of exactly 24 months in 
96% of the cases, and need full execution under court-supervision to avoid transfer to bankruptcy-
liquidation. Still, courts and creditors can extend the 24-month execution period for a period of at most 
12 months, and this occurs in 10% of the cases. A prolongation implies that a new plan is drafted and 
confirmed. In this chapter, we restrict our analysis to the initially drafted plans for a 24-month period 
(i.e. for 96% of the cases) to produce summary statistics on expected inflows and scheduled outflows. 
 
The reorganization plans primarily strive to re-establish a sound capital structure by way of debt 
deferral and debt forgiveness. The repayment of rescheduled bank debt amounts less than 20% of total 
outflows (during the 24-month period), while 33% of the outflows are directed to the trade creditors. 
Although trade creditors forgive a substantial part of their debt, their payoff rate of 65%17 is large 
compared to foreign studies. Further, distressed firms are found to accumulate considerable amounts 
of taxes and social contributions during the pre-bankruptcy period, which need to be fully repaid in 
most cases during the 24-month execution period. This results in a lion’s share of 35% for government 
debt in total scheduled outgoing money flows.  
 
We find that few lenders are willing to extend their credit, and that the subscription of new capital is 
marginal. As the access to external funds is constrained, successful plan execution critically depends 
on the distressed firm’s ability to generate internal money flows. Earnings before interests, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) average 76% of total expected inflows. The ability to meet 
cash flow projections is highly uncertain because pre-bankruptcy performance is deeply in red, and 
planned investment expenditures to enhance the efficiency of the business process are absent. Further, 
a comparison of the cash flow projections with the actual ones shows that some firms realized a 
negative actual cash flow, although they targeted a nonnegative amount. This suggests that cash flow 
projections are highly uncertain. Using the method proposed by Hotchkiss (1995), we also find that 
cash flow overstatement is common practice18. Next to the operational cash flows, the proceeds of 
asset sales are the second largest expected inflow averaging 12 % of total inflows.  
 
                                               
17
 Thus, 35% of the trade credit debt is forgiven. 
18
 Our actual cash flows are obtained from the two successive and full fiscal accounts after plan confirmation. 
The first post-confirmation fiscal year however only starts within 12 months after plan confirmation, while cash 
flow projections immediately start after plan confirmation. This results in a time lag between projected and 
actual cash flows of maximum 12 months. Still, it should be noticed that Altman (1984) faced a similar problem 
and that the average time interval between the starting date of the projections and this of the first full fiscal 
account is only around 6 months (the overlapping period between actual and projected flows is thus 18 months 
on average). Our comparative cash flow analysis is reported for the interested reader, but is not further explored 
in this dissertation. 
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If plan execution depends on overestimated and uncertain cash flow projections, it should not be 
surprising that 50% of our sample firms are transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation within two years 
after plan confirmation. This failure rate even mounts to two thirds after five years. Data on failure 
rates for small U.S. firms however fail to present a better picture. Finally, unsecured creditors (mainly 
trade creditors) unanimously approved plans in the large majority of cases. Resistance of unsecured 
creditors, if any, is mostly concentrated with a few trade creditors.  
 
Chapter 2: “Pre-bankruptcy Dynamics and Unsecured Debt”.  
 
The payoff to unsecured creditors is higher than in foreign studies (U.S., Canada, Finland, and Japan). 
The promised repayment percentage to trade creditors is around 65% under Belgian court-supervised 
reorganization, and the high levels of unpaid tax and social contribution claims are only rarely subject 
to debt relief. Sizeable installment payments may however impose a severe burden on the post-
confirmation cash flows, and ultimately affect the reorganization outcome. At least two solutions to 
reduce this burden can be put forward: (1) a reduction of debt repayments to unsecured creditors, 
although this would result in additional APR-violations favoring debtors, and (2) the implementation 
of a mechanism that gives appropriate incentives to mitigate excessive accumulation of unsecured debt 
during the pre-bankruptcy period. The latter remedy demands an investigation of the pre-bankruptcy 
dynamics that give rise to exorbitant levels of outstanding trade and government debt at procedure 
initiation. 
 
We find that small firms systematically accumulate tax and social security claims in the running up to 
the LJC by not transferring payable taxes and social contributions to the respective administrations. 
Specifically firms that need to pay more social contributions (payroll taxes) and indirect taxes (sales 
taxes) almost mechanically accumulate government debt during the pre-bankruptcy period. This 
practice results in an increase of government claims during the pre-bankruptcy period for 70% of our 
sample firms. This sharply contrasts with the pre-bankruptcy behavior of banks expanding their 
lending to only around 30% our sample firms. Our analysis reveals that government debt is more 
likely to expand if trade debt and/or bank debt contract, which suggests that the manager chooses to 
substitute government debt for other types of debt. We cannot reject our hypothesis that government 
administration acts as lender of last resort during the-pre-bankruptcy period. In the U.S., Baird, Bris 
and Zhu (2007) also show that small distressed firms have an incentive not to transfer taxes. They 
show that more than three-quarters of businesses with assets less than $ 200.000 have unpaid tax 
obligations and that these constitute around a quarter of all debt. Our government debt levels are even 
more excessive, and remain considerable with more sizable small corporations, which is not surprising 
as personal liability rules for overdue taxes and social contributions are at best very weak in Belgium, 
and government administration typically acts slowly to overdue payments.  
 
The found mechanical supply effect of government debt results in a percentage of tax and social 
contribution claims of around one-quarter in our sample of small corporations. The government 
administration is often unwilling to forgive debt, officially for legal or judicial reasons, less officially 
because they are likely aware of the pre-bankruptcy debt dynamics, i.e. that they unintentionally 
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played a role of lender of last resort. Specifically the social security administration seems to prefer 
liquidation once it comes to voting on the restructuring plan. This behavior contrasts sharply with this 
of the American tax authorities under Chapter 11 cases. In the U.S., small firms seek Chapter 11 court 
protection because it offers them the best way to deal with the tax collector and avoid personal liability 
for the unpaid taxes. The center of their restructuring is focused on the bargaining between the owner-
manager and the tax collector (see Baird, Bris and Zhu, 2007).  
 
On the one hand, the pre-bankruptcy dynamics allow better understanding the typical negative reaction 
of the tax and social security authority on the LJC. The question however remains why administration 
is so slow to react to overdue payments?  Therefore we suggest the establishment of a mechanism to 
encourage the government administration to collect its overdue debts more actively. A more drastic 
solution, on the side of the entrepreneurs, might be the alteration of personal liability rules to remedy 
this debt accumulation problem. Personal liability rules for taxes and social contributions render the 
access to government debt more costly and therefore urge the entrepreneur to file earlier for court-
supervised restructuring. It must however be noticed that the ultimate effect of more stringent liability 
rules on economic welfare might be harmful (see Fan & White, 2003), because of ex-ante effects on 
entrepreneurship and firm entry. 
 
Entrepreneurial pre-bankruptcy behavior in conjunction with this of trade creditors explains the levels 
of trade credit at the moment of procedure initiation. Entrepreneurs demand more trade credit during 
the pre-bankruptcy period to finance their loss-making business, and suppliers are willing to provide 
this credit. As in Peterson and Rajan (1997), cash flow clearly precedes trade debt in the pecking order 
after controlling for a distressed firm’s access to bank debt financing. This pre-bankruptcy 
phenomenon contributes to the high trade debt percentage of around 40% observed in our sample of 
small corporations. The debt rearrangement typically consists in drastic debt forgiveness of trade 
credit, which results in omnipresent APR deviations disfavoring trade creditors. Since trade creditors 
are often regarded as well-informed creditors (see Peterson and Rajan, 1997), the question is why they 
fall into this trap? First, it could be that trade creditors are not that well informed as traditionally 
argued in literature (see Franks and Sussman, 2005). We find evidence for a one-way substitution of 
trade credit for bank debt in line with Franks and Sussman (2005). This suggests the existence of an 
informational asymmetry between trade creditors and banks, where trade creditors are less-informed 
actors. Second, the most plausible explanation might be that trade creditors have an equity-like stake, 
i.e. a long-run interest in the survival of the distressed firm, and are therefore willing to contribute to 
its recue by providing additional trade credit or by extending the maturity of existing trade credit (see 
Cunat, 2007). We conclude that trade creditors are at least partially responsible for the accumulated 
trade credit, which offers an additional argument to rationalize debt reduction during court-supervised 
procedures.  
 
Finally, using unique data provided by intermediation of the Central Corporate Credit Register of the 
National Bank of Belgium, we observe that banks do not withdraw more funds during the pre-
bankruptcy period when the distressed firm is ultimately liquidated during the post-confirmation stage. 
We see two possible reasons for this. First, banks may be not that well informed about the distressed 
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firm’s survival likelihood, but this is unlikely given our earlier findings of a one-way substitution of 
trade credit for bank debt. Second, banks may have a liquidation preference, which results in a credit 
contraction irrespective of the firm’s rescue prospects. Our findings imply a weak or empirically 
unimportant relationship between a bank’s expectation on the survival likelihood of (heavily) 
distressed firms and the bank’s decision to contract its lending supporting the liquidation preference 
hypothesis. From a methodological point of view, our findings show that endogeneity concerns due to 
correlation between the probability of reorganization/liquidation and pre-bankruptcy changes in capital 
structure (see e.g. Morrison and Ayotte, 2008) are limited in our sample of small corporations. 
 
Chapter 3: “Bank Debt Restructuring under Belgian Court-Supervised Reorganization”. 
 
The renegotiation of the pre-distress lending contract between debtor and secured bank creditor is at 
the core of any reorganization process, and especially in European bank-based systems. Contract 
renegotiation of secured debt under the LJC takes place within a relatively debtor-unfriendly 
framework as Belgian debtors cannot rely on the same legal instruments to enforce secured debt 
deferral or rescheduling during the post-confirmation stage as US debtors filing for Chapter 11 
(section 1129 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code). The most striking example of creditor friendliness under 
the Belgian code is that secured creditor can always regain their liquidation rights 18 months after plan 
confirmation19, if they did not compromise with the debtor in pre-confirmation bargaining. The 
presumed liquidation preference of secured creditors in conjunction with the Belgian unfriendly code 
is expected to put the debtor in a weak, and even defensive, bargaining position, and especially when 
the creditor is well secured. If banks are well secured, she bargains with a credible liquidation option 
at hand (see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990). 
 
Our main research objective is to analyze the impact of a bank’s liquidation preference on the 
renegotiated loan repayment fraction. This fraction amounts to the renegotiated principal installments 
payments (as reported in the initially drafted 24-month plans) scaled by bank debt exposure at the 
moment of plan confirmation. Theory suggests that secured creditors are more likely to oppose a 
debtor’s reorganization if their collateral has a higher liquidation value. Bergström et al. (2002) 
consistently find that highly secured banks oppose plan confirmation under Finnish court-supervised 
reorganization. 
 
We find that secured banks succeed in renegotiating higher loan repayment fractions during the post-
confirmation period if they have higher liquidation values. Controlling for a distressed firm’s expected 
going concern value, for the bank’s private information on the debtor’s viability, discretionary judicial 
actions, and bank strategies, we cannot reject our main hypothesis that higher liquidation values of 
collateral result in higher renegotiated loan repayment fractions. More specifically secured banks with 
higher liquidation values of collateral are less willing to accept anything less than a full loan 
repayment.  
 
                                               
19
 Under the LJC, an agreement between debtor and secured creditor is not necessary for plan confirmation. 
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Next to the determinants of the renegotiated loan repayment, we also analyze the likelihood of planned 
asset sales (as reported in the confirmed plans) in our sample of mainly small distressed firms. Asset 
sales are planned to take place for more than one third of our cases, and the sales proceeds constitute 
the second largest money inflow during plan execution. First, the likelihood of asset sales depends on 
the distressed firm’s asset structure, as some assets are more redeployable than others. Real estate is 
most frequently disposed, and firms with more machinery (which are not necessarily the larger firms) 
frequently liquidate inventories, machinery, and other assets. Possibly, firms with more machinery use 
the court-supervised reorganization to sell specialized assets to avoid fire sales under bankruptcy-
liquidation due to illiquid markets (see Shleifer & Vishny, 1992). Second, we find some evidence that 
well-secured banks require asset sales. More generally, banks are generously repaid by the proceeds of 
asset sales. Third, we investigate the effects of industry conditions on asset sales of small firms. 
 
Although receivables are commonly regarded as very redeployable assets, we find no clear evidence 
of their disposal to a third party (factoring). It is common practice in Belgium that receivables are 
simply collected by the entrepreneur under supervision of the appointed examiner, and that the 
collection proceeds are used to repay banks and other creditors. However, if the debtor does not sell 
assets to repay its loans, banks rely on pledged receivables to insist on a higher renegotiated loan 
repayment. 
 
In sum of chapter 3, we find that the collateral’s liquidation value is far more important for the 
outcome of loan renegotiation than the legal form of the collateral. The only exception to this general 
finding might be personal guarantees, used to pledge assets outside the distressed firm (i.e. private 
wealth). Our proxies for a distressed firm’s continuation value do also not matter for the loan 
renegotiation, which suggests again the existence of a secured creditor’s liquidation preference. 
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature in two ways. First, empirical research dealing with bank 
behaviour during court-supervised procedures is very sparse. Second, we find that contract 
renegotiation critically depends on liquidation values, which supports the incomplete contract 
literature on financial contracts (see e.g. Hart & Moore, 1994, 1998; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Bolton 
and Scharfstein, 1996; Berglof & Van Thadden, 1994).  
 
Chapter 4: “The role of Firm Viability, Creditor Behavior and Judicial Discretion in the Failure 
of Distressed Firms under Court-supervised Restructuring: Evidence from Belgium”. 
 
Many studies show that firms emerging from Chapter 11 are liquidated during the post-Chapter 11 era 
(see e.g. Hotchkiss, 1995, Bris et al., 2006; Morrison, 2007), although a comprehensive analysis of the 
shut-down decision does not exist (and certainly not for small firms). We analyze the likelihood of 
bankruptcy-liquidation during the Belgian court-supervised post-confirmation stage. To some extent, 
our analysis reveals information on so-called type I errors (unviable firms are allowed to reorganize) 
made during the pre-confirmation selection process. Therefore, we additionally analyze whether 
unviable firms accepted for plan execution are liquidated as fast as possible. It should be recognized 
that if unviable firms linger under court supervision before transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation, both 
direct administrative costs and indirect resource allocation costs increase. The latter cost implies that 
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the distressed firm’s assets could already have been put to a better use in the hands of a third party. 
Many critics of the Chapter 11 reorganization process typically argue that unviable firms are not 
liquidated in a timely manner (see e.g. Franks & Torous, 1989; Bris et al., 2006; Morrison, 2007; 
Denis & Rodgers, 2007).  
 
First, we find that pre-bankruptcy economically distressed firms are more likely to fail during the 
court-supervised post-confirmation and do so more quickly, which indicates that the Belgian 
procedure may be a relatively effective filter of viable firms, at least in a sample of small corporations.  
 
Second, bank-financed distressed firms that provided much collateral are more likely to fail. This 
finding is not surprising within the context of the (secured) creditor-friendly Belgian code described in 
chapter 3. We found that secured banks with higher liquidation values of collateral are less willing to 
accept anything less than a full loan repayment. Notwithstanding the bank’s full loan call, the debtor 
may still obtain plan confirmation from the judge and the unsecured creditors. If confirmation of these 
plans takes place, the high loan repayment clearly imposes a severe burden on the post-confirmation 
cash flows undermining successful plan execution. In addition, if the debtor fails to meet the bank’s 
loan repayment request, the secured bank is entitled to seize and sell assets 18 months after plan 
confirmation. We conclude that the heavy burden on the post-confirmation cash flows and the looming 
threat of asset seizure results in the higher likelihood of bankruptcy-liquidation for cases with well-
secured banks.  
 
Third, we find that firms with more due government debt have a higher likelihood to fail during the 
court-supervised post-confirmation period, which is consistent with Canadian findings (Fisher & 
Martel, 1995). This is not unexpected since a ‘mixture’ of legal rules, jurisprudence and reorganization 
practice require that prioritized government claims are fully repaid during the court-supervised post-
confirmation stage, and thus impose a severe burden on the cash flows.  
 
Finally, using a unique subsample of sole proprietorships (non-incorporated firms), we find that 
judicial discretion affects the likelihood of failure of these firms during the post-confirmation period. 
Specifically more active screening by judges and the judicial appointment of more experienced 
examiners leads to lower failure rates. In addition we find that proprietorships with more employees 
are very robustly more likely to survive during the post-confirmation period, which suggests that the 
LJC acts as an instrument to preserve employment with small businesses. Discretionary judicial 
actions do however not play a role in our sample of small corporations (incorporated firms).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction, Summary, and Conclusions 
 
 0.19 
0.3. Policy implications 
 
Theory suggests that secured creditors might oppose a debtor’s court-supervised reorganization and 
that their incentives are more skewed towards liquidation over reorganization (see e.g. Bulow and 
Shoven, 1978; White, 1989; Kordana and Posner, 1999). If secured creditors push for liquidation, 
illiquid markets may result in fire sales (Shleifer & Vichny, 1992). In this case, the distressed firm’s 
value has not been maximized, as the firm’s liquidation value is lower than its expected reorganization 
value. This practice results in lower recovery rates for unsecured creditors, and the debtor did not 
preserve his job and income.  
 
If a bankruptcy procedure does not generate the largest value available to be divided between secured 
creditors, unsecured creditors and debtor, it does not deliver an ex-post efficient outcome (see Hart’s 
so-called goal 1 for an optimal bankruptcy procedure, 1999). The creditor-friendly LJC tends to be ex-
post inefficient, since we find multiple indications for the thesis that secured banks prefer liquidation 
irrespective of a firm’s going concern value and the bank’s private information. A secured creditor can 
induce liquidation because he is allocated control power during the bankruptcy process. Specifically if 
secured creditors are unwilling to compromise, they can always regain their liquidation rights 18 
months after plan confirmation. We conclude that a secured creditor cannot be fully trusted to 
maximize the value of a distressed firm under the LJC.  
 
A more debtor-friendly LJC procedure is recommended to protect unsecured creditors and debtors 
against the liquidation preference of secured creditors, and this procedure should provide legal 
measures comparable to the forced rescheduling of secured debt in accordance with section 1129 of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The secured creditor is not allowed to exercise his liquidation rights as 
long as the (forced) rescheduled loan repayments are fulfilled. Any violation of the newly closed or 
imposed contract should however result in reconsidering the shutdown/liquidation decision. It is 
evident that secured creditors still receive the net present value of their claim (in principle through 
interest compensation). A straightforward drawback of forced rescheduling might be that debtors of 
unviable firms linger too long under court-supervision/protection – while hoping on the upward 
potential – whereby business value can be destroyed (i.e. an indirect bankruptcy cost). Secured and 
unsecured creditors bear the burden of the depreciation of the firm’s value if the reorganization 
ultimately fails. 
 
Our proposed alteration of the LJC in a more debtor-friendly version weakens the secured creditor’s 
rights. Lowering creditor protection affects ex-ante financial contracting, and the (pre-bankruptcy) 
conditions of credit supply may become more demanding. We however only suggest a small 
adjustment in creditor protection that is unlikely to change the ex-ante financing equilibrium in a 
meaningful way. What is a drastic change in creditor rights? Davydenko and Franks (2008) offer a 
nice empirical insight thereto. Using a unique sample of firms that defaulted on their bank debt in 
France, the U.K. and Germany, they show how large differences in creditor’s rights across countries 
lead banks to adjust their lending and reorganization practices to mitigate costly aspects of bankruptcy 
law. Specifically they find strong evidence on ex-ante effects to creditor-unfriendly aspects of 
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bankruptcy codes. Despite ex-ante adjustments, (ex-post) bank recovery rates in default still differ 
sharply among countries. Their findings impose strong questions on the desirability of the creditor-
unfriendly French bankruptcy code. In France, secured assets are sold below their potential market 
prices to preserve employment, and preferential creditors such as employee wages and bankruptcy fees 
dilute real estate proceeds. Clearly, our policy recommendation only induces a slight alteration (in line 
with the debtor-friendly Chapter 11) of secured creditor’s rights, and would not result in French 
practices. 
 
A recent wave of literature by academics defends contractarian alternatives to Chapter 11, and this by 
allocating all control rights to the secured creditors, i.e. the Secured-Party-in-Possession-doctrine (see 
Ayotte & Morrison for specific references, 2008). During the past decade, secured creditor control did 
effectively come to dominate the Chapter 11 process, at least in large company bankruptcies (see 
previous section). The creditor control through pre- and post-petition secured lines of credit resulted in 
a shift from a debtor-friendly Chapter 11 practice to an debtor-unfriendly one. Still, how can a secured 
creditor be trusted to maximize the value of the firm, especially if appropriate, financial incentives are 
missing?  
 
We further identified an almost ‘mechanical’ supply effect of the tax and social security administration 
acting as lender of last resort during the pre-bankruptcy period. This latter practice is clearly 
objectionable. In addition, excessive levels of government debt adversely affect survival probabilities 
of firms that filed for court-supervised reorganization. One might argue that the perverse effect of the 
access to government debt may be avoided by enacting personal liability rules on unpaid tax and social 
contributions. This would render the option of government debt more expensive and therefore urge the 
entrepreneur to file earlier for judicial composition, with possible positive effects on the reorganization 
outcome. On the other hand, more stringent rules on personal liability may also strengthen the stigma 
on bankruptcy and discourage risk-taking and entrepreneurship.  
 
Fan and White (2003) analyze the effect of debt discharge and exemption levels on entrepreneurial 
activity. They employ a sample of non-corporate bankruptcies, i.e. bankruptcies of sole 
proprietorships, where all debts are personal liabilities of the entrepreneur/owner. If the firm fails, and 
enters bankruptcy (Chapter 7), business and personal debt will be discharged, although the debtor must 
give up personal assets above a fixed exemption level. Those exemption levels are set by states, and 
vary widely. They find that higher exemptions levels make it more attractive for risk-averse 
entrepreneurs to go into business, because less of their assets will be transferred to creditors if they 
fail. Specifically Fan & White find that individuals are more likely to become entrepreneurs if they 
live in states with higher bankruptcy exemptions. Clearly, more stringent rules on personal liability 
turn down entrepreneurial activity. 
 
In 2006, i.e. after our dataset construction, Belgian government enacted relatively stringent liability 
rules for directors not paying taxes and social contributions, and specifically for those involved in 
more than two earlier bankruptcies/liquidations (with due social contributions claims). Our findings in 
chapter 2 show that entrepreneurs involved in earlier bankruptcies indeed accumulate more tax and 
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social contributions during the pre-bankruptcy period, which offers a rationale for the new personal 
liability rule. We however disfavor the introduction of more stringent liability rules, because we fear a 
negative impact on the Belgian level of entrepreneurial activity.  
 
Contrary to the recent legal adjustments on director liability, we suggest the establishment of a 
mechanism to encourage government administration to collect its overdue claims more quickly. The 
following rule could be enacted in this respect: “tax and social contribution claims that were payable 6 
months before petition filing are cancelled”. We hope that this rule suffices to alter the slow collection 
speed of the tax and social security administration. 
  
Should we reform the LJC beyond the previous recommendations? After all, we find that 
economically distressed firms are more likely to fail during the court-supervised post-confirmation 
period and do so more quickly, which is an indication that the LJC functions in a relatively rational 
way (at least in our sample of small firms). This finding is fairly robust, even after control for the 
secured creditor’s impact on post-confirmation failure. We also did not identify harmful discretionary 
judicial actions in our sample of small corporations20. On the other hand, our descriptive analysis in 
chapter 1 gives a rather pessimistic view on rehabilitating small insolvent firms. Plan execution 
critically depends on uncertain and overestimated cash flow projections, budgeted investment 
expenditure is limited, and post-petition financing is the exception rather than the rule. In addition, two 
thirds of the distressed firms are transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation within 5 years after plan 
confirmation.  
 
Our view distilled from the literature is that expectations on small firms attempting to reorganize 
under court-supervision should be realistic. It is most important that reforms are accompanied with 
feasible targets. Otherwise, critics immediately cast doubts on the efficiency of the reformed 
reorganization procedure, which results in an almost irreversible negative perception on the reformed 
law, but also on the firms filing for court protection. Viable firms are unconditionally and unfairly 
marked as inefficient firms, and they subsequently cope with excessive reputation costs. If viable firms 
cannot convince customers (and suppliers) of their rescue prospects and business continuance, the firm 
will face an abnormal fall in its turnover (see Altman on abnormal profit losses, 1984). In sum, 
negative perception increases the likelihood of inefficient liquidation, and after some periods of time, 
(viable) distressed firms will simply avoid court-supervised reorganization, which results in a drop in 
petition filings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20
 In our subsample of sole proprietorships, some judges actively interfere in the bankruptcy process to save 
businesses. We have no direct arguments to be against this judicial behavior.  
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0.4. Directions for further research21 
 
Empirical research on ex-ante and ex-post bankruptcy incentives. Hart (199) argues that an 
optimal bankruptcy procedure should maximize the total value available to be divided between debtor 
and creditors (ex-post goal). First, an optimal bankruptcy law should prevent excess liquidations by 
creditors, which occurs when continuation results in the highest total value, but debt value is higher in 
liquidation. Second, an optimal bankruptcy system provides in managerial incentives to liquidate the 
firm voluntary when creditors fail to discover or facilitate inefficient continuation (see e.g. Berkovitch 
and Israel, 1999). The realization of these two aspects determines the true nature of a bankruptcy code, 
and has been the main theme in the literature. 
 
What do we actually know about the ex-post efficiency of bankruptcy procedures from an empirical 
point of view? On the one hand, we find for the Belgian LJC that well-secured banks may incorrectly 
induce bankruptcy-liquidation, and that the procedure tends to be creditor-friendly. Chapter 11 on the 
other hand traditionally provides a debtor-friendly procedure with a debtor-in-possession regime and 
with broad managerial powers to force secured debt rescheduling in accordance with section 1129 of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The debtor-friendly U.S. regime contributes to prevent excessive 
liquidations by secured creditors, while the drawback is the (presumed) existence of a so-called 
continuation bias, i.e. unviable firms are allowed to linger under court protection. 
 
Our analysis offers new insights in the functioning of the LJC, and suggests that our reorganization 
law is more creditor-friendly than Chapter 11. Davydenko and Franks (2008) offer an excellent 
example of empirical law comparison of the French, U.K., and German bankruptcy code. They focus 
on the effects of differences in creditor’s rights among these three countries to draw inferences on both 
ex-post and ex-ante (see further) effects of a country’s bankruptcy code. Their findings are however 
less detailed compared to studies that focus on a specific legal feature.  
 
Recent and ongoing empirical research (see e.g. Ayotte & Morrision, 2008) on the Chapter 11 
‘practice’ shows that control has shifted from debtor to secured creditor (secured creditor-in-
possession), at least in large Chapter 11 cases. Those recent changes in control are not the result of an 
amendment to the Bankruptcy code and have no single cause, but are rather due to an alteration in 
investor approach (see Adler et al., 2006). Control is exercised through pre-and post-petition lines of 
secured credit. This indicates that the traditional ex-post bankruptcy equilibrium biased in favor of the 
debtor has changed to a creditor-oriented system. Specifically excessive liquidations might be the 
dominant practice in large Chapter 11 cases. Empirical investigations are likely the best method to 
observe this new evolution. 
 
The previous ex-post findings determine ex-ante financing decisions. Many theoretic models analyze 
how payback agreements are designed to persuade an investor to provide the necessary funds to an 
entrepreneur. In determining a firm’s optimal debt capacity to finance projects, Hart & Moore (1998) 
analyze a dynamic model of debt and specifically focus on the creditor’s right to foreclose debtor’s 
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 Our list of suggestions for further research is non-exhaustive. 
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assets in a default state. Aghion and Bolton (1992) study the relation between optimal financing 
decision and the allocation of control rights (including the liquidation right in case of default) to the 
entrepreneur and the investor.  
 
Insolvency regulation determines control/foreclosure rights, which affect financial contracting. In 
Chapter 3 and 4, we analyzed the impact of a specific control rule under the LJC on the reorganization 
practice (loan renegotiation, failure); namely the secured creditor’s right to foreclose on a firm’s assets 
18 months after plan confirmation. Our findings suggest that well-secured banks exercise their 
liquidation right under the relatively creditor-friendly LJC. However, what about the ex-ante effect of 
the Belgian bankruptcy system on financial contracts? In theory, our findings are (ceteris paribus) 
expected to result in relatively less demanding conditions for credit provision. 
 
Further research should certainly analyze the effects of creditor rights (embedded in a bankruptcy 
system) on ex-ante contracting. Again, the study of Davydenko and Franks (2008) is rather unique in 
this respect.  
 
Procedural and self-selection effect. The study of Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) who analyze the costs 
of bankruptcy in Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 11 reorganizations deserves special attention. 
After two decades of research on bankruptcy costs, they were the first to control for endogenous self-
selection in their regression analysis to investigate the determinants of bankruptcy costs. Self-selection 
takes place when some firms choose Chapter 7 and others Chapter 11 as a reaction to the anticipated 
costs. Specifically a probit regression on the choice of procedure (Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11) is 
introduced as first-stage in subsequent ‘treatment’ and ‘Heckman (1979)’ second-stage regressions 
models. In this way, the self-selection effect is separated from the procedural effect. The latter effect is 
strictly due to procedural differences between Chapter 11 and Chapter 7. They conclude that the 
Chapter 11 procedure itself, and not the selection-effect, results in better (reported) asset retention in 
bankruptcy. Another finding is that Chapter 11 takes longer only because the types of firms that 
choose Chapter 11 intrinsically need more time (i.e. the self-selection effect). The research 
methodology of Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) outperforms all previous studies on bankruptcy costs22. 
 
Small firms. An earlier mentioned trend in bankruptcy research consists in profound analysis of small 
business bankruptcies in Chapter 11. After all, the very large majority of Chapter 11 cases are small 
(see Warren & Westbrook, 1999). American researchers conclude that small firms are subject to other 
dynamics (see e.g. Baird, Bris and Zhu, 2007) compared to large corporations. More specifically, the 
role of the tax authority and of unsecured creditors is questioned and analyzed. Outside the U.S., most 
researchers analyzed samples of mainly small business bankruptcies (see studies on Canada and 
Finland). Research on non-U.S. datasets can certainly contribute to the emerging debate on small 
business reorganization.  
 
                                               
22
 It should however be noted that second stage regressions are fairly robust to endogeneity in terms of 
coefficient estimates other than the coefficient estimate of the specific first-stage procedural variable itself (this 
is the case to in Heckman, 1979) 
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Our findings mainly contribute to the existing literature on small distressed firms seeking court 
protection. In this dissertation, we explore the pre-bankruptcy (debt) dynamics of small firms, and 
focus on the behaviour of unsecured creditors, including the tax and social contribution authorities. 
Contrary to the U.S., most of our sample firms are bank-financed, which provides an excellent 
opportunity to analyze bank behaviour.  
 
Judicial discretion. There is a growing interest in the effect of discretionary judicial actions on the 
outcome of distressed reorganizations. Weiss and Wruck (1998) show that in the Eastern Airlines 
bankruptcy asset value dropped over 50% due to an overprotective court that sheltered Eastern from 
creditor action allowed value-destroying operations to continue long after it was clear a shut-down 
decision should be taken. Evans (2003) analyzes the effect of judicial discretion on a small firms’ 
ability to survive Chapter 11 bankruptcy. She finds that a pro-debtor bias leads to higher probabilities 
of reorganization. In the long run however, Chang and Schoar (2006) show that a pro-debtor bias leads 
to increased rates of re-filing and firm shutdown as well as lower post-bankruptcy credit ratings and 
lower annual sales growth up to five years after the original bankruptcy filing. 
 
Chang and Schoar (2006) create an aggregate index to measure judicial bias by 8 types of motions that 
are filed exclusively by the debtor or the creditors, example given the use of cash collateral and the 
lifting of the automatic stay. Unfortunately, we are unable to follow their approach as specific and 
comparable Belgian rules do not exist, or are not formalized. Therefore, we introduce in chapter 4 
proxies for the ‘activity’ rate of judges, which offers an additional dimension of judicial discretion; 
after all, literature frequently refers to the existence of ‘passive’ judges.  
 
Further research on European insolvency procedures. Many European countries reformed their 
rescue procedures during the last decades, and still continue to revise them. The efficiency of these 
reforms, including the coming Belgian one, critically depends on what we know about the functioning 
of court-supervised procedures. European procedures are not blueprints of Chapter 11, and American 
knowledge can therefore not be unconditionally transposed. Therefore, research on the functioning and 
efficiency of European insolvency systems should be further encouraged.  
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Abstract. 
 
We analyze the reorganization practice of small corporations with confirmed plans under Belgian 
court-supervised reorganization. The financial reorganization typically consists of debt 
rearrangement by way of debt forgiveness and debt deferral, and we find that few bank lenders are 
willing to provide new credits. The promised debt repayments during plan execution critically depend 
on the distressed firm’s ability to meet cash flow projection. A comparison of the cash flow projections 
with the actual ones of firms that successfully executed their plan learns that projections are uncertain 
and systematically overestimated. Cash flow overstatement is not surprising as projections sharply 
contrast with the deep-red pre-bankruptcy performance, while investment expenditure allowing an 
improvement in the operational profitability is very limited. Finally, we find that two thirds of the 
distressed firms are transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation within 5 years after plan confirmation.  
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1.1. Introduction. 
 
Little information exists about the reorganization process of small firms under formal reorganization 
proceedings, as academics have been more interested in large Chapter 11 cases involving public listed 
corporations during the past decades. This chapter presents a comprehensive study of small firms 
attempting to reorganize under Belgian court-supervision, and a comparison with other countries like 
the U.S., Finland, Canada, and Japan. Compared to these foreign studies, our analysis offers new and 
additional evidence on the debt composition of small distressed firms, on their pre- and post-
bankruptcy performance, on the feasibility of their cash flow projections, and on the content of their 
debtor-proposed reorganization plans. In Belgium, plans are mostly drafted for a fixed period of 24 
months during which the non-forgiven part of the unsecured claims typically needs to be repaid. In the 
United States, Japan and Finland, the duration of plan execution easily takes more than 5 years 
(Jensen-Conklin, 1992; Eisenberg & Tagashira 1994; Sundgren, 1998). 
 
The debt composition of our distressed small corporations mainly consists of secured bank debt, 
outstanding trade debt, and payable tax and social contribution claims. The reduction of trade credit 
and the rescheduling of secured bank debt is the core of the financial reorganization process that aims 
to rehabilitate insolvent firms. Taxes and social contributions are mostly not forgiven for a variety of 
reasons imposed by legal rules and the jurisprudence. Debt repayments to the tax and social security 
administration and to trade creditors account for around two thirds of the total outgoing flows during 
24-month plan execution, while the rescheduling of bank debt results in a share of less than 20% in 
total outflows. The lion’s share of trade and government debt repayments in total outflows might 
impose a severe burden on the post-confirmation cash flows, especially because uncertain internally 
generated money flows are the main source of financing during plan execution. Specifically the 
expected earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) reported in the 
confirmed plans average 76% of the budgeted inflows during 24-month plan execution, and all are 
non-negative. Cash flow projections sharply contrast with the deep-red operational performance of 
most distressed firms prior to bankruptcy filing, which casts strong doubts on the feasibility of 
projections reported in the debtor-proposed plans, and especially because investment expenditure to 
enhance the efficiency of the business process is limited. Only 18% of our sample firms did budget 
investment expenditure in their confirmed plans. Next to the expected operational cash flows, the 
proceeds of planned asset sales are the second largest inflow averaging 12% of total inflows, and are 
put forward in 24% of the sample cases. Finally, banks are unwilling to provide new credit, although 
capital input (not by banks) is promised to a greater extent in the plans. 
 
Using a subsample of firms not transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation during plan execution, we are 
able to compare a firm’s projected cash flows with its actual cash flows that are realized during the 24-
month execution period. First, we noticed that 15 to 20% of these firms realized negative operational 
results after plan confirmation, although they budgeted a positive result (like all our sample firms). 
This suggests that cash flow projections are highly uncertain. Second, using the method proposed by 
Hotchkiss (1995) to measure cash flow overstatement, we find that overstatement tends to be common 
practice for our small corporations. However, compared to findings of Hotchkiss (1995) for public 
corporations that emerged from Chapter 11, cash flow overstatement is not a Belgian irregularity. 
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Question remains to which extent our findings on small firms seeking their resort to court protection 
are affected by the Belgian legal and judicial system? Comparative analysis throughout this paper 
based on similar data from foreign countries does not provide a univocal answer to this question. We 
compare our findings with these of U.S.-studies of Bris et al.(2006), Morrison (2007) and Baird et al. 
(2007), with Canadian findings (Fisher & Martel, 2004, 1995, 1994), with Finnish results (Sundgren, 
1998), and with Japanese findings (Eisenberg & Tagashira, 1994). Moreover data are often not 
comparable as literature mainly focuses on large publicly traded companies (see e.g. Franks and 
Torous, 1989; Weiss, 1990; Weiss and Wruck, 1998; LoPucki and Doherty, 2004). Although our 
descriptive data analysis sheds a rather dark light on the Belgian court-supervised reorganization 
procedure, Bris et al. (2006) and Morrison (2007) argue that Chapter 11 tends to be a relatively 
efficient procedure for small corporations. Specifically Bris et al. (2006) analyze direct and indirect 
bankruptcy costs under Chapter 7 and Chapter 11, and conclude among many other findings that 
Chapter 11 seems to preserve assets better than under Chapter 7, thereby allowing creditors to recover 
relatively more. Morrison (2007) finds that a continuation bias, which occurs if unviable firms are 
allowed to linger under the protection of courts, is either absent or empirically unimportant. It should 
however be noted that these U.S. studies analyze specific items of procedural efficiency. 
 
The efficiency of a bankruptcy system is often evaluated by the way it allows to liquidate 
economically inefficient firms, through a procedure like Chapter 7, and to reorganize economically 
viable firms, through a Chapter 11-like procedure. This is referred to as the filtering role of a 
bankruptcy system (see White, 1994; Fisher & Martel, 2004). Specifically we employ post-bankruptcy 
failure rates to draw inferences on the efficiency of the Belgian bankruptcy system and on the 
feasibility of the confirmed plans. We find that around two thirds of our sample firms are liquidated in 
bankruptcy within five years after plan confirmation. Our data suggest that the Belgian post-
bankruptcy failure rates are comparable to these of small U.S. firms that emerged from Chapter 11 
(see Morrison, 2007 & Baird et al., 2007). Finally, we find that unsecured trade creditors unanimously 
approved plans in 70% of our distressed sample firms, although the very large majority of these firms 
ultimately fail. Trade creditors may prefer court-supervised reorganization to bankruptcy-liquidation 
because expected liquidation proceeds are typically close to zero for small firms; while the expected 
proceeds in the bankruptcy-reorganization procedure are around 65% (see section 1.4.2).  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 explains the legal framework of the Belgian court-
supervised reorganization. Section 1.3 describes the data, and an extensive descriptive analysis of the 
confirmed reorganization plans is given in section 1.4. Section 1.5 analyses the distressed firms’ pre-
bankruptcy operational performance, and section 1.6 discusses creditor approval of the debtor-
proposed plans. The failure rates after plan confirmation are used as proxy for plan feasibility and are 
reported in section 1.7. Section 1.8 explores the overstatement and uncertainty of cash flows 
projections and section 1.9 concludes. 
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1.2.  Legal Framework. 
 
An insolvent firm can either liquidate or reorganize. In Belgium, liquidation and reorganization are 
regulated by distinct legislations.  The United States Bankruptcy Code makes an equivalent distinction 
between Chapter 7 (bankruptcy-liquidation) and Chapter 11 (bankruptcy-reorganization) within the 
same legislation.  The Belgian reorganization legislation was enacted in 1997, with the objective to 
reduce the number of bankruptcies and to preserve firms with profitable operations by means of a 
process of court-supervised financial restructuring. This legislation is called the Law on Judicial 
Composition (hereafter LJC) and came into force on January 1st 1998.  
 
Figure 1 below illustrates the timing of the Belgian LJC in three stages. In the pre-bankruptcy period 
(stage I), the debtor takes a decision to file for bankruptcy-reorganization or not. The debtor has to file 
with the court where the firm is registered, and the register of the firm must by law be related to real 
activity. The creditor cannot file a petition. The bankruptcy court makes an initial assessment on the 
viability of the distressed firm when a petition is filed. If the court accepts the petition, the debtor 
remains in possession and must draft and confirm a reorganization plan during a six-month exclusivity 
period. The court appoints an examiner who controls the debtor and assists him with drafting the plan1. 
This exclusivity period can be extended by maximum 3 months to deal with bargaining issues. In the 
U.S., Bris et al. (2006) refer to the bargaining period as the Chapter 11-phase ‘from submission to plan 
confirmation’. We define stage II of the Belgian bankruptcy system as the pre-confirmation stage 
consisting of both phases ‘from filing to plan’ and ‘from submission to plan confirmation’. Like in the 
U.S., secured creditors are subject to an automatic stay during the pre-confirmation stage.  
 
At the end of stage II, a meeting of the unsecured creditors votes on the debtor-proposed 
reorganization plan. The unsecured creditors mainly consist of trade creditors and the social security 
administration. A reorganization plan is approved if (i) a majority of unsecured creditors present at the 
meeting vote in favor of the plan, and (ii) the value of the claims voting in favor of the plan represent 
at least 50% of the total value of claims of unsecured creditors present at the meeting. The debts of 
these creditors have to be, in principal, repaid during a maximum period of 24 months, i.e. the court-
supervised post-confirmation stage (see further on this stage – stage III). 
 
Secured creditors do not vote collectively. Their individual approval is obliged when the debtor 
proposes an alteration to their legal entitlements. If the secured creditor and the debtor reach a new 
agreement on the loan repayments, the creditor cannot seize or sell assets during the post-confirmation 
stage as long as the debtor fully complies with this new contract. If on the other hand no agreement is 
reached between both parties, the Belgian legal framework provides the debtor with only one 
alternative, i.e. the deferral of the principal amount of the loan for a maximum of 18 months, on the 
condition that during this period interest is paid. As a consequence, the secured creditor will 
temporarily not be able to seize and sell the pledged assets. The secured creditor will always regain his 
liquidation rights after 18 months. More far-reaching legal measures, comparable to the forced 
                                               
1
 See Hahn (2004) for a discussion on the appointed examiner (trustee) in the U.S. 
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rescheduling of secured debt in accordance with § 1129 U.S. Bankruptcy Code, are not available to the 
debtor.  
 
After the approval by the unsecured creditors and any arrangement with secured creditors (or forced 
deferral), the court confirms2 the plan and the debtor is supposed to fully execute this plan. The plan 
execution takes place during a period of maximum 24 months under supervision of the judges and the 
appointed examiner. Our dataset clearly shows that the court-supervised period is exactly fixed at 24 
months for 96% of the cases. During this fixed period, the court and creditors can however decide to 
extend the court-supervised period with a maximum of 12 months. Upon prolongation, a new plan 
needs to be drafted because the initial confirmed plan is only drafted for a period of 24 months. An 
extension of the court-supervised post-confirmation period occurs in approximately 10% of the cases.  
 
The court-supervised post-confirmation stage can lead to the full execution of the plan or the failure to 
do so. In the latter case, a creditor or the appointed examiner can file a request with the court to revoke 
the judicial composition and the post-confirmation stage. The debtor can do the same if it is clear that 
a full execution or any creditor-approved amendment of the plan is unfeasible. If the court grants the 
request for revocation, it can opt for the conversion of the firm to bankruptcy-liquidation. 
 
Figure 1: Time schedule of the judicial composition (bankruptcy-reorganization). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2
 Because the L.C.J. states that the court ‘can’ confirm the plan, certain courts have assumed the authority to test 
the feasibility of the plan. We are however only aware of a few cases where the Bankruptcy Court refused to 
confirm the plan after unsecured creditor approval.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     TIME  
Pre-confirmation stage 
         6 to 9 months 
            (Stage II) 
      Court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months 
      with optional prolongation of 12 months (Stage III) 
    Pre-bankruptcy period 
(Stage I) 
Petition filed for judicial 
composition by debtor 
Creditors vote on the reorganization proposal, 
and bankruptcy court confirms or rejects 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
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1.3.  Data 
 
1.3.1.    Data sources and sampling procedure 
 
Our dataset consists of information on distressed firms with confirmed reorganization plans under 
court-supervised reorganization in Belgium. Approximately 306 plans were confirmed between 1 
January 1998 and 30 June 2004 with one of the 23 regional Belgian Bankruptcy Courts. Our sample is 
restricted to all confirmed reorganization plans submitted with 17 of those Bankruptcy Courts3. This 
amounts to 190 reorganization plans or 62% of the population of confirmed plans. Corporations and 
sole proprietorships submitted respectively 125 and 65 plans (125+65 = 190). Blocks of closely related 
corporations jointly submit five out of those 125 plans4. The dataset is complemented with mainly 
financial statement data from the Graydon-database and the Belfirst DVD’s, which are respectively 
delivered by the private data vendors Graydon Belgium and Bureau van Dijk.  
 
Our analysis uses a sample of small distressed corporations that confirmed a going concern plan. 
Corporations with total assets exceeding € 5.000.000 are excluded5, which results in a sample of 107 
small corporations. We additionally excluded an incorporated soccer club and one liquidation scheme 
among the small corporations6. Those sample restrictions result in a (preliminary) sample of 105 small 
corporations. In this paper, we do not analyze individual debtors seeking to preserve a sole 
proprietorship under court-supervision  
 
1.3.2. Summary statistics on sample firms 
 
 
The corporations differ by legal form. 51 corporations are non-quoted public limited liability 
corporations (Société Anonyme), 48 are private limited companies (Société Privée à Responsabilité 
Limitée), and 6 incorporated firms have another legal status. Table 1 gives summary statistics sorted 
by legal form. Assets and the number of employees are obtained from the latest annual account prior 
to petition filing, and the liabilities amount to total debt at the start of the court-supervised procedure 
(obtained from bankruptcy documents). The public limited liability corporations are clearly larger than 
the private limited companies. 
 
 
                                               
3
 The involvement of a court in our study was based on the ability to access its bankruptcy data. Both courts with 
few and plenty bankruptcy cases are incorporated in our study. 
4
 Five blocks of incorporated firms file jointly a plan. Those blocks respectively consist of 9, 4, 2, 2, and 2 
corporations. 139 corporations (120+9+4+2+2+2) are subsequently involved with the 125 plans. 
5
 The European Commission defines a small enterprise as companies which employ fewer than 50 persons and 
whose annual turnover or annual balance sheet total does not exceed € 10.000.000. The Belgian Code of 
Company Law defines a small corporation as a company that does not exceed more than one of the following 
thresholds: a staff of 50 persons, a turnover of € 7.300.000 and total assets of € 3.600.000. Our cutoff point to 
distinguish small and large corporations is based on an asset value of € 5.000.000, which lies in between the 
European and Belgian one for assets (respectively € 10.000.000 and € 3.600.000). All firms in the sample 
employ 50 persons or less (see table 1); we have no data on turnover as most of our sample firms do not report 
their turnover as they are not obliged to do so. 
6
 Three large corporations confirmed a liquidation scheme, but are already excluded. 
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Table 1: Firm characteristics sorted by legal form.  
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Public Limited Liability Corporation        
Total Assets (€ 1000) 51 1494 1069 1354 90 4942 
Liabilities (€ 1000) 51 1352 1104 1142 103 4837 
Liabilities / total assets 51 1.1219 0.9745 0.5588 0.3793 3.0206 
Number of employees 51 10.69 6 11.11 1 50 
Private Limited Companies  
Total Assets (€ 1000)   46 523 230 627 21 3015 
Liabilities (€ 1000) 48 443 215 473 19 1848 
Liabilities / total assets 46 1.0935 0.9727 0.5059 0.3665 2.6315 
Employees (No.) 48 4.69 2 6.70 1 28 
 
1.4. A descriptive analysis of the reorganization plans of small firms.  
 
A reorganization plan is drafted for a period of 24 months in 96% of the cases, and should primarily 
strive to re-establish a sound capital structure for the distressed firm. Section 1.4.1. discusses the 
ability to compare Belgian findings with these of foreign studies. Section 1.4.2. shows how distressed 
firms attempt to resolve their financial distress through debt rescheduling. Section 1.4.3. and 1.4.4. 
respectively document the outgoing money flows and inflows during the fixed reorganization period 
of 24 months. The descriptive analysis in the three latter subsections is based on our sample of 105 
small corporations.  
 
1.4.1.    Comparative analysis with foreign studies7. 
 
Using our sample of confirmed plans, we systematically compare our findings with these of foreign 
studies analyzing small firms. Still, sampling differences demand cautious comparison and 
interpretation. Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) analyze a sample of mainly small firms that filed a petition 
for Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 in Arizona and New York during the years 1995 to 2001. Their 
Chapter11-sample includes firms that are converted (to Chapter 7) or dismissed during the pre-
confirmation stage, and firms that emerged from Chapter 11 with (in principle) a confirmed plan.  
Baird, Bris, and Zhu (2007) analyze the same judicial records used in Bris et al. (2006), but they delete 
the converted and dismissed cases. Baird et al. (2007) therefore analyze a sample of confirmed plans, 
while Bris et al. employ a less restricted sample. Baird et al. argue that their sample findings put 
Chapter 11 in a more favorable light than it would appear if they included failures (i.e. conversions 
and dismissals) as well as the successes (i.e. confirmations). Baird et al. fits our sample setting based 
on confirmed plans at the very best. 
 
Our calculations suggest for a confirmation rate of 62% in the sample of Bris et al. (2006). Contrary to 
Bris et al., Warren and Westbrook (2007) show that Chapter 11 confirmation rates are only around one 
third. Still, their findings likely support a plausible explanation for the high confirmation rate in Bris. 
et al. (2006). Warren and Westbrook show that many debtors not even propose a blueprint of a plan 
during the pre-confirmation stage, which typically results in case dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7.  
                                               
7
 We compare our findings with these of American, Finnish, Japanese and Canadian studies on court-supervised 
reorganization. We refer to Couwenberg and de Jong (2008) for an empirical study of the Dutch liquidation-
based bankruptcy system (bankruptcy-liquidation), and more specifically on direct costs and recovery rates for 
small-to medium sized distressed firms. 
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Clearly, our data experience suggests that if no blueprint of the distressed firm’s financial situation is 
available, there is no possibility at all to analyze the respective case because of data limitations. This 
implies that economic analysis is condemned to rely on samples with confirmed plans, or to rely on 
samples with high confirmation rates as in Bris et al. (2006).  
 
Further, Warren & Westbrook find that around 65 to 70% of the debtors proposing at least one draft of 
plan eventually results in plan confirmation. So, if all cases with at least one drafted plan are included 
for analysis, a sample study’s confirmation rate amounts 65% to 70%, which is less or more consistent 
with the confirmation rate of 62% in Bris et al (2006). Fisher & Martel (1994, 1995) analyze 338 
proposed plans submitted by dominantly small Canadian firms, of which creditors have confirmed 
approx. 75%. This suggests that Fisher & Martel were unable to structure data from debtors that did 
not propose a preliminary draft of plan. Sundgren (1998) analyzes 362 Finnish reorganization cases of 
which 28% emerged with a confirmed plan, which is quite equal to the found one third Chapter 11 
confirmation rate in a sample consisting of all reorganization cases (and not only of these with at least 
a draft of plan). The majority of his analysis is however restricted, as expected, to cases with 
confirmed plans. Eisenberg and Tagashira (1994) show that 93% of the proposed plans of small to 
midsized firms are confirmed under Japanese court-supervised reorganization. They were unable to 
structure data about plan and reorganization terms of withdrawn cases (conversions), and most of their 
analysis is thus limited to firms with proposed plans.  
 
In summary of this subsection, we conclude that our findings based on a sample of confirmed plans 
can be compared with these of the above reported studies. 
 
1.4.2. Debt structure and debt rescheduling. 
 
Table 2 shows data on the debt structure and debt rescheduling for a restricted sample of 98 out of 105 
small corporations. Missing data or plans drafted for a period of less than 24 months prevent the use of 
7 plans8. Panel A provides summary statistics on the debt structure at the start of the procedure for 
these 98 confirmed plans. The debt composition mainly consists of secured bank debt, outstanding 
trade credit9 and unpaid government debt like taxes and social contributions. The last column of panel 
A shows that 61 out of 98 corporations rely on secured bank debt financing, and this secured debt has 
a share of 25 % in total debt. Banks are the only creditors providing secured debt to small 
corporations. In the U.S. however, Bris et al. (2006) and Baird et al. (2007) find that secured debt is 
largely provided by other creditors than banks. Unsecured bank debt is a minor debt source in our 
                                               
8
 Three plans are excluded in table 2 because of missing data on specific debt variables. Four other firms 
spending less than 24 months under court-supervision after plan confirmation are also removed. This restricts 
our analysis to firms with a court-supervised post-confirmation stage of exactly 24 months.  
9
 Two remarks have to be made on the outstanding trade credit. First, creditors benefiting from retention of title 
clauses are most likely trade creditors, and their claims are therefore included in the trade credit. Second, due 
employee wages are incorporated in the trade debt because bankruptcy documents do not allow to distinguish 
them from trade claims. Social security contributions regarding the employee wages are included in the 
government debt. Clearly, the continuation decision of distressed firms critically depend on the employees, 
which typically results in paying out wages (but without transferring social contributions to the administration).  
Fisher & Martel (1994) report that only 23% of Canadian plans involve some wage claims; wage claims to total 
liabilities amounts to 0.35% in their sample study. 
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sample, which tends to be the case too in Bris et al. (2006). Trade credit and unpaid tax and social 
contribution claims10 are the main categories of unsecured debt and account for two thirds of total 
liabilities. Owner-debt, i.e. junior unsecured debt provided by owners, directors or group companies, is 
a minor source of debt. Bris et al. (2006) and Baird et al. (2007) find an unsecured debt to total debt 
ratio of respectively 52.36%11 and 49.3% in their sample of Chapter-11 corporations, while the 
Belgian ratio is around 75%. 
 
The share of trade credit in total debt outperforms this of bank debt, as small firms might typically rely 
more on trade credit than on bank debt because of informational asymmetries. Unpaid tax and social 
contribution claims are omnipresent and are clearly larger in Belgium than in other countries. Baird et 
al. (2007) find that only 58% of their distressed firms have undue tax claims12, and their ratio of tax 
claims on total liabilities averages 7.3%. Bris et al. (2006) even notice that the median Chapter 11 tax 
claims are zero in their sample. Their ratio of tax claims on total liabilities depends on the filing 
district. The ratio averages 14% in New York, while only 3% in Arizona. Unpaid Canadian 
government claims average only a few percentages (Fisher & Martel, 1994).  
 
The debt structure reported in panel A is rearranged under court-supervised reorganization. Changes in 
the capital and debt structure, by way of debt deferral, debt forgiveness or debt equity swaps, cannot 
be done arbitrary. Within reasonable limits, bankruptcy law should in principle preserve the Absolute 
Priority Rule (A.P.R). While the A.P.R. is in general fully respected in liquidation procedures, 
deviations occur frequently in reorganization proceedings, depending on the legal framework (see e.g. 
Weiss, 1990). 
 
Deviations from A.P.R. against secured creditors impel their individual consent according to the 
Belgian legal framework13. Debt forgiveness cannot be forced onto these creditors. In panel B we 
report only one case where a secured bank has forgiven debt. Franks and Sussman (2005) identify 
similar tough behaviour on the part of the banks under the U.K. “contractualist” bankruptcy system. 
Deferral of the secured bank’s principal repayments is the ordinary course of action. Panel C reports 
that secured banks and debtor agreed to defer part of the loan repayment until after the court-
supervised period of 24 months for 45 of 61 cases. The postponed repayments account for 69% of the 
due bank credit. The due bank credit consists in the principal bank loan repayments within and after 
the fixed period of 24 months. A mechanism has however been implemented by article 30 L.C.J. to 
defer principal repayments of secured debt for a maximum of 18 months, if no compromise has been 
reached on the debt rescheduling between debtor and the secured creditor14. The secured creditor will 
                                               
10
 Tax and social contribution claims are however served before the claims of ordinary trade creditors in 
bankruptcy-liquidation.  
11
 Bris et al. (2006) and Baird et al. (2007) report a secured debt to total debt ratio of respectively 47.64% and 
50,7%. The unsecured debt / total debt ratio are thus respectively 52.36% and 49,30%.   
12
 Tax claims also include social contributions (payroll taxes) in the United States. 
13
 According to article 30 of L.C.J. a creditor is secured when he possess a mortgage, floating lien or any security 
on real property, including creditors benefiting from retention of title clauses. All tax debt has been given the 
same legal status within the context of reorganization proceeding. Social security contributions are however 
considered unsecured debt.  
14
 The bankruptcy documents are too noisy to notice whether an ‘effective’ agreement between secured banks 
and debtor is reached. 
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however always regain his liquidation rights after 18 months. The debtor is subsequently forced to 
repay the entire bank debt within 18 months after plan confirmation to avoid asset seizure. Sixteen 
(61-45) corporations repay their secured bank debt in full within 24 months most likely after a creditor 
stay of 18 months according to article 30 L.C.J. 
 
Panel B and C respectively report only one reduced unsecured bank claim and even less deferral of the 
loan repayment compared to the cases with secured bank debt. Notwithstanding the risky position of 
unsecured banks, they behave rather tough and unconstructive. This suggests that unsecured bank 
creditors do not favor reorganization as found in Bris et al. (2006) . They argue that pre-bankruptcy 
negotiations did already occur, and that banks (whether secured or unsecured) have already shown 
themselves unwilling to compromise. 
 
According to panel B, trade creditors largely bear the burden of alleviating the debt levels. In 66 of the 
98 cases, trade creditors undergo a debt reduction, averaging 52 % of the face value of the claim. Tax 
and social contributions are less subject to debt forgiveness, and if any, the percentage is lower 
compared to the one of trade credit. The plans clearly show that the social security administration 
forgives debt in most cases, while that tax authorities do most certainly not. The social security 
administration is treated as an ordinary creditor under the Belgian reorganization law, while a 
reduction of the tax claims demands the tax authority’s individual consent.  
 
The initial debtor-proposed plan needs to be executed during a period of maximum 24 months, which 
is fixed at exactly 24 months for 96% of the cases. This implies that the complete repayment of 
unsecured debt (after debt reduction) should be scheduled within this period. If the original plan 
cannot be fully enforced, the debtor can however propose an amendment of the plan, resulting in an 
additional period of maximum 12 months for the execution of this new plan. Conflicting with the 
Belgian reorganization legislation, we however find that a minority of the initially drafted plans 
schedule trade and government debt repayments for a period larger than 24 months. Panel C reports 
that this occurs in 33 cases (33.6%) for trade debt and in 18 cases (18.9%) for government debt. 
 
Our unreported calculations (available on demand) reveal that the promised repayment percentage for 
both unsecured trade and government debt averages 75% (and 77% on median) in our sample of 98 
small corporations. Bris et al. (2006) find that unsecured creditors do only recover about one third to 
one-half of their claims under Chapter 1115. Sundgren (1998) reports an average promised repayment 
of 43% (37% on median) under Finnish reorganization, and shows that the mean (median) repayment 
period to unsecured creditors is 6.1 (5.5) years. A payoff rate to unsecured creditors of 46.9% is found 
under Japanese reorganization (Eisenberg and Tagashira, 1994), and repayment terms of 5.8 years 
(mode is 5.1).  
 
The share of tax and social contribution repayments in total promised payments to unsecured creditors 
is large under Belgian reorganization because these claims are considerable and are only rarely subject 
                                               
15
 Their findings on recovery rates for unsecured creditors are based on effective payments, and may deviate 
from promised payments. 
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to debt forgiveness. Data limitations on foreign recovery rates for tax and social contributions prevents 
a comparison with our Belgian data. The Canadian payoff rates reported in the plans for ordinary 
creditors, which are typically trade creditors, average 44 cents on each dollar of debt (Fisher & Martel, 
1994). Our payoff rate to trade creditors averages 65.12% and 63.31% on median (unreported 
calculations16). Distinct data on trade creditor repayments is missing in the above-mentioned U.S., 
Japanese and Finnish studies. Under the assumption that repayments to prioritized unsecured creditors 
(like the tax administration) are larger than these to trade creditors, the above-reported percentages for 
unsecured creditors are upper bounds for the payoff rates to trade creditors. Thus, trade creditors are 
repaid at most one-third to one-half of their claims in the U.S., 43% in Finland and 46.9% in Japan. 
We conclude that trade creditors fare very well under Belgian court-supervised reorganization, which 
suggests that the procedure is friendly to unsecured creditors. 
 
Table 2: Debt structure at the start of the procedure and debt restructuring.  
Panel A: debt composition of 98 corporations at the start of the procedure  
 Mean Median St. dev. Min Max Number of plans 
with specific debt 
Secured bank debt 0.2499 0.2267 0.2552 0 0.8521 61 
Unsecured bank debt 0.0250 0.0000 0.0860 0 0.4777 11 
Trade debt 0.3977 0.3504 0.2355 0.0445 1 98 
Tax & soc. 0.2718 0.2217 0.2196 0 0.9028 94 
Owner-debt 0.0557 0.0000 0.1447 0 0.6753 23 
Panel B: debt forgiveness 
 
Number of cases with debt 
forgiveness Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
Secured bank debt 1 out of 61 The debt forgiveness is 0.1277 
Unsecured bank debt 1 out of 11 The debt forgiveness is 0.1519  
Trade debt 66 out of 98 0.5179 0.5 0.2179 0.0178 0.9441 
Tax & soc. 21 out of 94 0.2089 0.1967 0.1397 0.0161 0.5883 
Owner-debt 3 out of 23 The debt forgiveness is 0.2, 1 and 1 
Panel C: Postponed repayments (in principal) until after the court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months per type of debt claim 
  Repayment of specific debt after 24 months / Total repayments of 
specific debt within and after 24 months 
 Cases with debt deferral Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
Secured bank debt 45 out of 61 0.6858 0.7315 0.2757 0.0468 1 
Unsecured bank debt 7 out of 11 0.5991 0.5491 0.3387 0.0785 1 
Trade debt 33 out of 98 0.4156 0.3697 0.2116 0.0648 1 
Tax & soc. 18 out of 95 0.3486 0.3581 0.2222 0.0139 0.7737 
Owner-debt 17 out of 23 0.8406 1 0.2867 0.1537 1 
 
Our dataset also suggests a strong bargaining position of the debtor as debt-equity swaps do not occur 
and the reorganization procedure never interferes with the interests of the prepetition shareholders. 
Deviations from A.P.R. in favor of the shareholder are subsequently omnipresent. Even with respect to 
owner-debt, this applies. As Panel B en C of table 2 show, junior owner-debt is only reduced in 3 of 
the 23 cases, although it is frequently deferred. Debt forgiveness on owner-debt might be enforced by 
the introduction of a ‘fair and equitable’- standard. This ‘fair and equitable’-standard implements the 
APR-rule in case a class of creditors rejects the proposed reorganization plan that has been considered 
as unfair (see § 1129 (b)(2)(A) U.S. Bankruptcy Code). Further, the abolishment of the debtor’s 
exclusive right to file a plan and the installment of a creditor’s committee17 to represent unsecured 
creditors may reduce the debtor’s ability to unfairly extract value from creditors. 
 
 
                                               
16
 Our calculations are based on 66 cases with debt reduction and on 32 cases without debt reduction. 
17
 A creditor’s committee is installed in 20% of the cases (45 out of 225) in the study of Bris et al. (2006). 
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1.4.3. Scheduled money flows leaving the distressed firms during plan execution. 
 
Table 3 shows that the scheduled debt repayments reported in the confirmed plans account for almost 
all outgoing cash flows during the court-supervised post-confirmation period of 24 months. The 
repayment of reduced trade and government claims (tax and social contributions) consists in the two 
largest outflows of money. The loan repayment of secured debt (in principal) claims the third largest 
outgoing money flow. The repayment of newly granted credit consists in principal loan repayments 
with respect to additional bank credit accorded after petition filing. Only six firms are granted new 
credit (see section 1.4.4.), and the plans suggest that its repayment is immediately deferred until after 
the fixed period of 24 months18. Interest and financial costs are mostly related to the outstanding bank 
credit, and sometimes to unpaid tax claims, but only rarely to social contribution claims. Only 18 firms 
budgeted investment expenditure during 24-month plan execution, and for these firms, expenditure 
represents less than 10 % of the total outgoing cash flows (unreported calculation). The reorganization 
procedure does seemingly not mitigate the under-investment problem for distressed firms. So-called 
priority debt originated during the pre-confirmation stage for 12 firms. This debt mainly consists of 
unpaid examiner fees, but very rarely of ‘new’ trade credit claims due to goods or services delivered 
during the pre-confirmation stage. Common practice is that trade creditors demand cash payment for 
service.  
 
Table 3: Specific scheduled outgoing money flows during the court-supervised post-confirmation 
stage of 24 months. 
Share of outgoing flows in total scheduled outgoing flows for 98 confirmed plans 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Number of plans with 
specific flows 
Trade debt repayments / outgoing flows 0.3293 0.2777 0.2312 0 0.9686 97 
Government claim repayments / outgoing flows  0.3469 0.3228 0.2222 0 0.9782 94 
Sec. Bank debt repayments in principal / outgoing flows 0.1690 0.0901 0.2029 0 0.8435 54 
Unsec. Bank debt repayments in principal / outgoing flows 0.0190 0 0.0673 0 0.4305 9 
Repayment of newly granted credit / outgoing flows 0.0007 - - - - 1 
Owner-debt repayments / outgoing flows 0.0179 0 0.0780 0 0.651219 10 
Interests and financial costs / outgoing flows 0.0763 0.0377 0.1042 0 0.4927 61 
Investment value / outgoing flows 0.0163 0 0.0444 0 0.3038 18 
Priority debt of pre-confirmation stage / outgoing flows 0.0117 0 0.0416 0 0.2280 12 
Corporation tax during plan execution / outgoing flows 0.0129 0 0.0469 0 0.2585 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
18
 It is very difficult to distinguish the loan repayments of newly granted credit from these of the pre-bankruptcy 
bank credit. It might be that repayments of new credit are subsequently reported under secured or unsecured 
bank debt repayments. Newly granted credit however occurs only with six firms, and the assigned credit 
amounts are limited. Therefore, our results and conclusions drawn from table 3 are still robust. 
19
 The maximum repayment of owner-debt scaled by outgoing flows is 0.6512 (the second largest share of 
owner-debt repayment in total outflows is 0.2673). The debt structure of the respective company consists of 
unsecured bank debt and owner-debt for respectively 47.77% and 47.41%. The firm’s ratio of cash at the start of 
the procedure to total inflows amounts to 41.27%, which is very high for our distressed sample firms (see further 
in panel B of table 4). This non-cash constrained firm was able to enforce a relatively large repayment of its 
owner-debt during plan execution.    
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1.4.4. Expected inflows of distressed firms during plan execution. 
 
Balancing incoming and outgoing cash flows is at the heart of any financial reorganization. If this is 
not the case, the execution of the plan is doomed from the very outset. Further, the speed and amount 
of debt repayments critically depend on the expected incoming cash flows. Table 4 shows data on the 
expected inflows during the plan execution of 24 months for a restricted sample of 97 plans20. 
 
Panel A shows that plan execution during the 24-month period mainly depends on the distressed 
firm’s expected internal money flow generation. Operational cash flows, i.e. earnings before interests, 
taxes, depreciations and amortizations, are the primary source of income, as they average 76% of all 
expected incoming cash flows. A positive EBITDA is expected for 95 distressed corporations, and two 
firms anticipate an EBITDA of zero. Clearly, the distressed nature of our sample firms make these 
expected operational cash flows highly uncertain. Asset sales are put forward in the plans of 23 
corporations. In unreported analysis (available on demand), we noticed that the expected sales 
proceeds are a major source of financing for these 23 firms, as they represent more than half of their 
total incoming cash flows.  
 
The other expected incoming money flows are more limited. Only 6 distressed firms obtain additional 
bank credit facilities, and new capital input (not by banks) is promised in the plans of 26 corporations.  
Our unreported analysis shows that the respective money inputs for these 6 and 26 corporations 
represent on average 26.66% and 21.04% of total expected inflows (respectively 23.06% and 20.87% 
on median). Sandeep et al. (2003) argue that repayment uncertainties are severe with firms filing for 
Chapter 11, and that few lenders are therefore willing to extend the additional loans needed for a 
successful court-supervised reorganization. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code addresses these lending 
disincentives by providing special creditor rights to post-petition loans. These loans are referred to as 
Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing, and the lender providing such financing can get super seniority 
that is not available outside the bankruptcy context. Sandeep et al. (2003) find that DIP financed firms 
are more likely to emerge from Chapter 11 than non-DIP financed firms. DIP financed firms also 
spent less time in Chapter 11, as they are quicker to emerge, but also quicker to liquidate. They argue 
that DIP lenders play a screening role in which they are able to identify distressed firms that are strong 
and likely to emerge, as well as a monitoring role in which the DIP lenders help firms to emerge 
quickly. In Belgium, the absence of a legal framework of Debtor-in-Possession financing may explain 
the limited external money sources during court-supervised reorganization. Still, Sandeep et al. (2003) 
show that small (public) corporations are less likely to obtain DIP financing under Chapter 11, which 
suggests that a DIP financing mechanism might not suffice to extract sufficient external money for our 
small sample corporations. 
 
The category remaining inflows consists of money on frozen accounts, expected claims from legal 
disputes etc. Panel B shows that only 17 firms have any significant cash at plan confirmation. Using 
                                               
20
 Four firms spending less than 24 months under court-supervision after plan confirmation are removed. This 
restricts our analysis to firms with an initial court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months. Four plans 
are equally excluded in table 4 because of missing data on specific inflows.  
Chapter 1. The Reorganization Practice of Small Firms under Belgian Court-supervised Reorganization 
 1.14 
the latest annual accounts prior to petition filing, we noticed that the ratio cash to assets is around 1% 
on median. 
 
Table 4: Specific expected inflows during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months. 
Panel A: shares of specific inflows in total inflows for 97 confirmed plans   
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Number of plans with specific inflow 
EBITDA / total inflows 0.7566 0.8808 0.2799 0 1 95 
Value of asset sales / total inflows 0.1129 0 0.2389 0 1 23 
Amount of granted credit / total inflows 0.0165 0 0.0801 0 0.5677 6 
Amount of capital input / total inflows 0.0636 0 0.1359 0 0.6874 26 
Remaining inflows / total inflows  0.0504 0 0.1511 0 1 20 
       
Panel B: initial money/total inflows for 97 confirmed plans 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Number of plans with specific inflow 
Money / total inflows 0.0441 0 0.1991 0 1.5833 17 
 
 
1.5. Pre-bankruptcy operational performance. 
 
We did show in section 1.4.4. that our small corporations heavily rely on operational cash flows 
(EBITDA) to execute their plans. The question remains to which extent cash flow projections are 
feasible. Panel A of table 5 gives statistics on the actual operational cash flows prior to bankruptcy 
filing as reported in the latest annual account prior to petition filing. We refer to the accounting year of 
this latest fiscal account as Fiscal year -1. Actual EBITDA Fiscal year -1 / assets Fiscal year -1 averages -
5.30%21, and is negative for 43.38% of the sample cases. Cleary, the pre-bankruptcy operational 
performance of our distressed sample firms is poor. 
 
Panel B shows the projected operational cash flows scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets for the first and 
second year after plan confirmation. These years are labeled as respectively Year + 1 and Year + 2. 
Year 1 and Year 2 together represent the 24-month period of plan execution, and do mostly not 
correspond to the post-confirmation fiscal years or to calendar years. If pre-bankruptcy performance in 
panel A is compared with the projected performance in panel B22, we find a large discrepancy between 
actual and projected data. This might cast strong doubts on the ability to meet cash flow projections 
for most of our distressed sample firm. 
 
 
                                               
21
 To ensure a sufficient level of data quality with respect to the pre-bankruptcy data obtained from the financial 
accounts, we did not include corporations for which the time period between the financial statement date and the 
filing date for bankruptcy-reorganization is longer than 18 months (or is missing). Thirteen corporations are 
subsequently removed for the analysis resulting in a sample of 85 out of 98 corporations with cash flow 
projections. Since the court jointly appraises the cases of closely related corporations, the data on the financial 
statements should in principle be aggregated. Simple data aggregation is however not recommended because the 
aggregated data might be incorrect due to intra-group transactions. Consolidated accounts are not available. Two 
plans submitted by closely related corporations are thus excluded from the sample of corporations resulting in a 
final sample of 83 corporations. 
22
 We have no yearly projected cash flows for 15 cases (83-68) because the respective plans did only report a 
single cash flow or repayment capacity amount for the complete 24-month period. For these 15 cases, detailed 
financial schedules allowing a yearly split-up were also not drafted. 
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Table 5: Actual and projected operational cash flows.  
EBITDA is earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations. Fiscal year - 1 refers to data 
obtained from the latest annual account prior to filing for bankruptcy-reorganization. Year + 1 and Year + 2 
represent respectively the first and second year after plan confirmation, and these years together represent the 
plan execution period of 24 months. Projected EBITDA is reported in the confirmed reorganization plans. 
 N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Number of cases with 
negative EBITDA (%) 
Panel A: pre-bankruptcy operation cash flows        
Actual EBIDTA fiscal year –1 / Assets fiscal year –1 83 -0.0530 0.0283 0.3336 -1.36 0.4431 36 (43.38%) 
Panel B: post-confirmation projected cash 
flows 
       
Projected EBITDA year +1 / Assets fiscal year –1 68 0.2882 0.2123 0.2563 0.0125 1.3724 0 (0%) 
Projected EBITDA year +2 / Assets fiscal year –1 68 0.3128 0.2350 0.2615 -0.0097 1.3724 1 (1.5%) 
Projected EBITDA year + 1 & year +2 / Assets fiscal year –1 83 0.5601 0.4440 0.4543 0.0000 2.1700 0 (0%) 
 
1.6. Creditor approval of the debtor-proposed plans. 
 
While unsecured creditors vote by a particular majority on a plan, thereby binding the minority, 
secured creditors vote individually on a plan that alters their contractual rights. If no alteration of their 
rights is proposed, secured creditors, in general, can not vote on the plan and unsecured creditors are 
responsible for the filtering process between viable and unviable firms. Within the Belgian legal 
framework, every plan is appraised at the meeting of the unsecured creditors, consisting of the 
numerous trade creditors and the social security administration23. It is not possible to subdivide this 
group of creditors. Provided that (i) a majority of unsecured creditors present at the meeting votes in 
favor of the plan, and (ii) the claims of voting in favor of the plan represent at least 50% of the total 
claims of the unsecured creditors at the meeting, the plan is accepted by the unsecured creditors. 
 
Table 6 gives summary statistics on the number of trade creditors and their voting behaviour with 
respect to the debtor-proposed plans. Data limitations restrict our sample to 83 out of 105 small 
corporations24. Panel A shows that the number of trade creditors averages 52 (median is 31), which is 
comparable to foreign studies (see e.g. Fisher & Martel, 1994). The voting behavior of unsecured 
creditors might critically depend on the content of the reorganization plan. Example given the absence 
of additional financing, and the lack of planned investment expenditure are easily observable facts, 
and should give the modal creditor-businessman major reasons for concern. According to panel B 
however, we find that trade creditors vote unanimously in favor of the debtor-proposed plan in around 
two thirds of the sample cases. The maximum number of negative votes is 10, and this for a firm with 
114 trade creditors. Panel C shows that the average number of negative votes to total trade creditors is 
2.24% in our 83-case sample. The maximum amounts 15%. We conclude that trade creditors tend to 
behave in a rather passive way25. Specifically, we noticed that an overwhelming majority of trade 
                                               
23
 Trade creditors and the social security administration are treated in an equal way under bankruptcy-
reorganization, although social contribution claims have priority over trade claims in case of bankruptcy-
liquidation. 
24
 The voting tables are often unclear or were not included in the judicial composition record. 
25
 We noticed that the social security administration voted against the plan for 28 of the 83 cases, i.e. in one third 
of the sample firms. This single institutional creditor clearly resists. The Belgian jurisprudence suggests that the 
social security administration favours the liquidation proceedings over reorganization. The social security 
administration has a higher priority than the tax administration in bankruptcy-liquidation, whereas in 
reorganization it votes collectively and the tax administration is treated as a secured creditor. 
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creditors votes by using a pre-format proxy drafted by the representative of the debtor. This 
representative is typically the debtor’s lawyer. 
 
Our data suggests that trade creditors have an overall reorganization preference. Clearly, there might 
be an overwhelming consensus between these creditors that plan confirmation is in their best interest, 
as expected proceeds for unsecured creditors from liquidation are close to zero for small cases (Bris et 
al, 2006; Baird et al, 2007). It could be argued that trade creditors have all too loose if they vote 
against the plan, while they expect at least some payoff if they support the reorganization proposal. 
Trade creditors might therefore pertinently vote in favor of a plan irrespective of the distressed firm’s 
rescue prospects and viability. In this way, trade creditors do not act as effective screeners between 
viable and unviable firms, although they may have valuable information on the rescue prospects of the 
distressed firm. 
 
Table 6: Number of trade creditors and their voting behavior on 83 confirmed debtor-proposed plans. 
 N  
Panel A  Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
Number of trade creditors 83 52.46 31 63.06 7 449 
Panel B       
Unanimous consent on plan approval 53 49.62 29 68.84 7 449 
One negative vote 18 47.56 32 49.69 16 203 
Two negative votes 4 40 43 19.36 17 57 
Three negative votes 3 58 39 50.27 20 115 
Between 4 and 10 negative votes  5 106.8 114 61.60 35 181 
Panel C       
Number of negative votes/number of 
trade creditors 
83 0.0224 0 0.0376 0 0.15 
 
Trade creditors need to have incentives to vote against a plan of an unviable firm. This might demand 
the creation of an incentive mechanism that increases the size of the recovery of unsecured creditors in 
case of bankruptcy-liquidation. This can be achieved through a partial priority rule (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 1996 and 1997) or the fencing of assets for the benefits of unsecured creditors as introduced in 
the U.K. by the Enterprise Act 2002 (Frisby, 2004). The positive effects of these measures are 
however still uncertain (see Richter (2007) for the abolishment of the partial priority rule in the Czech 
Republic). 
 
1.7. Failure rates after plan confirmation. 
 
As shown in the previous sections, successful plan execution critically depends on the ability to 
generate internal cash flows, and this ability is clearly uncertain in a sample of distressed firms. The 
likelihood of successful plan execution is at the very best reflected in the number of transfers to 
bankruptcy-liquidation after plan confirmation for our distressed sample firms. We find that 51 of our 
105 small corporations are transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation during the 24-month plan execution 
period, which implies a yearly failure rate of 25%. This bankruptcy rate for firms with confirmed plan 
overwhelms the Belgian bankruptcy rate of around 1%26. 
                                               
26
 The average Belgian bankruptcy rate is 0.83% during the years 1998 until 2003. A (yearly) bankruptcy rate 
consists in the number of bankruptcies scaled by the number of firms. 
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Using a restricted sample because of data limitations, we find that two thirds of our sample firms end 
in bankruptcy-liquidation five years after plan confirmation. Specifically we employed a restricted 
sample of 85 out of 105 corporations that confirmed their plan between January 1st 1998 and 
December 31th 200227. 55 out of 85 of these corporations were transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation 
within 5 years after plan confirmation. Figure 1 shows that most firms fail during the initial period of 
plan execution of 24 months. 
 
Figure 1: Time to fail after plan confirmation. 
The time to fail is the time spent between plan confirmation and transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation. This figure is 
based on a restricted sample of 55 corporations that were transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation within 5 years 
after plan confirmation.  
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Foreign benchmark data on failure rates are scarce. In a very small sample, Morrison (2007) finds that 
12 of his 27 sample cases leaving Chapter 11 intact did fail after two years or ‘later28’. Baird et al 
(2007) find that at least one third of their sample firms that emerged from Chapter 11 continued as 
independent company after plan confirmation29. Interpreting these results, we conclude that a 
significant part of firms emerging from Chapter 11 afterwards fails30. 
 
Further, the scant literature on post-confirmation failure rates leads to a relatively old study of Jensen-
Conklin (1992), who sheds light on plan consummation in a sample of mainly small corporations. Out 
of her 45-case study of firms emerging from Chapter 11, she finds that 58% consummated their plan. 
It should be noted that 11 of the 45 plans are liquidation schemes, which are almost all successfully 
executed, but of course, imply liquidation of the distressed firm. 50 % of the remaining 34 going 
concern plans are consummated, and did not result in a liquidation of all of the business assets.  
 
In sum of this section, we conclude that both American and Belgian post-confirmation failure rates are 
high for small firms. On the contrary, Fisher & Martel (1999) find that 72% of the confirmed 
proposals under Canadian reorganization are consummated. They conclude that Chapter 11 can learn 
from the Canadian findings. We disagree with Fisher & Martel’s viewpoint because it might be that 
the creditor-friendly Canadian procedure - e.g. there is no automatic stay for secured creditors - self-
selects distressed firm with the best rescue prospects. Firms with less promising rescue prospects may 
                                               
27
 January 1st 2008 is the last update of our dataset. Our reference period between January 1st 1998 and December 
31th 2002 allows noticing the business activity 5 years after plan confirmation. 
28
 A specific reference period is not reported with respect to “later”. 
29
 Baird et al. (2007) did however not report a reference period with respect to their post-bankruptcy failure data. 
30
 For large firms see Hotchkiss (1995) and Kahl (2001). 
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fear liquidation under the too creditor-friendly reorganization procedure, and avoid court-supervised 
reorganization at all. 
 
1.8. The feasibility and uncertainty of cash flow projections. 
 
The cash flow projections may be compared with these realized after plan confirmation to draw 
inferences on their feasibility. The actual operational cash flows (EBITDA) are obtained from the 
accounts representing respectively the first and second full fiscal year of post-confirmation results, and 
these fiscal years are marked as Fiscal year+1 and Fiscal year+2. The cash flow projections however 
enclose the first and second year of plan execution starting immediately after plan confirmation, and 
are marked as the projections of Year+1 and Year+2 (as described in section 1.5). Year+1 and Year+2 
do only rarely correspond with the fiscal years. The time difference between the start of Fiscal year +1 
and plan confirmation (i.e. the start of Year +1) averages 4.66 months in our sample (see further). This 
implies that the 24-month period of plan execution and the 24-month period represented by the fiscal 
years largely overlap, with on average 19.34 months31. Therefore, we directly compare the actual cash 
flows with the projected ones. 
 
Our comparative analysis requires a reduction of our 97-case sample with cash flow projections. First, 
accounting data on the actual EBITDA is largely missing for firms transferred to bankruptcy-
liquidation within 24 months after plan confirmation (similar restriction in the study of Hotchkiss, 
1995; see further). Specifically 46 of 97 firms fail during this period resulting in a useful sample of 51 
firms. Another 17 firms that remain intact during plan execution are excluded because accounting data 
for Fiscal year + 1 and/or Fiscal year 2 is not available32. This results in a final sample of 34 non-
failing corporations during plan execution. 
 
Figure 2.a. plots the actual operational flows and the projected ones. Notwithstanding the non-negative 
projections for all sample cases, we find that five corporations realized a negative operational cash 
flow during plan execution. This suggests that cash flow projections are uncertain. Still, the majority 
of our distressed corporations realizes positive flows as budgeted. Using a sample of public companies 
emerging from Chapter 11, Hotchkiss (1995) finds that around 40% of these firms continue to make 
operational losses after plan confirmation, while we only find a percentage of 15% (5/34 = 0.15). 
Figure 2.b. restricts our sample to these corporations with positive actual flows (29 observations). The 
fitted regression line suggest for a one to one relation between expected and actual flows, as this fitted 
line lies close to the dotted 45° line through the origin. Unreported, we find a positive correlation of 
0.4813 between projected and actual flows.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
31
 Altman (1984) faced a similar problem when comparing actual and projected post-confirmation flows. 
32
 The accounting data for both Fiscal Year +1 and Fiscal Year + 2 are often missing because firms that fail 
shortly after plan execution (see section 1.7) did not anymore publish their accounts. We also excluded a closely 
related group for reasons mentioned before. 
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Figure 2: Projected EBITDA versus actual EBITDA in € 1000. 
 
Both scatters plot the projected EBITDA during the plan execution period of 24 months (year 1 and year 2 after 
plan confirmation) and the actual EBITDA obtained from the accounts representing respectively the first (fiscal 
year + 1) and second full year (fiscal year + 2) of post-confirmation results. Figure 2.a. is based on a sample of 
34 corporations, while figure 2.b. is restricted to 29 firms with positive actual flows. The solid regression line 
adds linear predictions to figure 2.b. The dotted line through the origin (45°line) represents a perfect a one-to-
one relation between expected and actual cash flows.  
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The scatters of figure 2 might be distorted because the yearly accounts for small corporations do not 
allow excluding surplus or short values on asset sales33, while they are not included in our projected 
operational flows34. The best approach might be an actual EBITDA before exceptional results. Figure 
3.a therefore plots the actual cash flow before exceptional result and the projected ones. The findings 
are quite similar compared to figure 2.a. Figure 3.b. restricts the sample to these corporations with 
positive actual flows (27 observations). We find a positive correlation of 0.4782, and the fitted 
regression line suggest a less than one to one relation between expected and actual flows, which 
indicates an overstatement of projections. According to findings of Hotchkiss (1995), overstatement of 
cash flow projections occurs for around 70% of public companies emerging from Chapter 1135. She 
argues that management concerned with the firm’s survival, may need to convince creditors and the 
court that the firm value is high enough to warrant reorganization rather than liquidation.  
 
Our conclusions drawn from our graphical analysis in figure 2.b. and 3.b. are largely determined by 
the cases with large cash flows in € 1000. An outlier for these large cases affects the fitted regression 
lines, and may result in incorrect conclusions on cash flow overstatement. Our graphical analysis 
therefore does not offer the best approach to measure cash flow overstatement. Hotchkiss proposes a 
specific ratio to correctly measure the overstatement of projections. This ratio is (Actual performance 
– Projected performance) / (Projected performance), and performance is defined as EBITDA. Panel A 
of table 7 shows that the median ratio is -0.3650 (and -0.4479 for actual EBITDA before exceptional 
result). The ratio is negative for around two thirds of our firms, and thus implies that most firms 
overstated their projections. Hotchkiss (1995) finds a median ratio of -0.806, and a ratio that is 
negative for 73% of her sample firms. This suggests for less overstatement in our sample. Her findings 
are not biased by measurement error between actual and projected performance (see before). Panel B 
of table 7 however shows that the execution period of 24 months largely overlaps with the period 
represented by the fiscal years (Fiscal year+1 and Fiscal year+2). In unreported regression analysis 
(available on demand), we noticed whether the measurement bias between actual and projected flows 
significantly affects our findings. Specifically we regressed the ratios of panel A on the time difference 
reported in panel B. We find a positive and significant estimate for the time difference on the ratio 
w.r.t. EBIDTA before exceptional result. This ratio therefore needs more than careful interpretation 
because of measurement error. 
 
Further, we did show in section 8 that firms face ongoing risk during plan execution of 24 months, and 
that some firms are still transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation within 2 to 5 years after plan 
confirmation. Panel C shows the ratio of Hotchkiss for 21 corporations that are not liquidated within 5 
years after plan confirmation, while panel D shows the ratio for 5 corporations that did fail between 2 
and 5 years after plan confirmation. As we could not notice the survival status 5 years after plan 
confirmation for 8 of our 34 sample firms36 (because plans were confirmed after December 31th 2002), 
                                               
33
 For small corporations, short and surplus values with respect to asset sales are not separately reported under 
respectively the accounting sections exceptional costs and exceptional income. 
34
 The reorganization plans and bankruptcy documents do also not allow determining the expected surplus or 
short values on asset sales for most cases. 
35
 Hotchkiss (1995) uses a restricted sample of 72 corporations with cash flow projections obtained from 
bankruptcy court documents3 
36
 The plans of 8 out of 34 corporations are confirmed after December 31th, 2002 (see before). 
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our analysis in panel C and D is restricted to 26 cases (21 + 5). The mean and medians reported in 
panel C and D strongly differ. An unreported two-tailed t-test shows that the means significantly differ 
between the failing and non-failing firms. Clearly, firms that fail between 2 and 5 years after plan 
confirmation overstated their projections. In appendix A, we use regression analysis to show that these 
5 failing firms overstated cash flow projections after controlling for measurement error by the time 
difference reported in panel B. 
 
Our analysis strongly points in the direction of cash flow overstatement. This raises the question why 
well-informed creditors like banks do not insist on a downward revision of too optimistic projections? 
Kahl (2002) may provide an answer to this question. If a firm enters financial distress, an important 
problem facing its creditors is to distinguish between economically viable firms and firms that should 
be liquidated. If there is sufficient uncertainty about the distressed firm’s viability, it may be optimal 
for creditors to postpone the liquidation decision and wait for more information about the firm’s 
rescue prospects (see also Baird and Morrison on the timing of a liquidation decision, 2001). 
Specifically Kahl (2002) shows that creditors may want to keep leverage high, and require short-term 
payments so that they can liquidate later if the firm does not improve its performance and reenters 
financial distress. He refers to a ‘controlled liquidation’ strategy in this respect. In our research 
context, overstated cash flows raise the probability of default on creditor payments during plan 
execution, as successful plan execution critically depends on the forecasted cash flows (as shown in 
table 4). A payment default shifts control rights from the entrepreneur to the creditors, which implies a 
reconsideration of the liquidation option. The choice of the bank not to demand a revision of the 
possibly overstated cash flows allows her to postpone the liquidation decision, which is in line with 
the controlled–liquidation strategy. 
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Figure 3: Projected EBITDA versus actual EBITDA before exceptional results in € 1000. 
The scatters plot the projected EBITDA during the plan execution period of 24 months (year 1 and year 2 after 
plan confirmation) and the actual EBITDA before exceptional results obtained from the accounts representing 
respectively the first (fiscal year + 1) and second full year (fiscal year + 2) of post-confirmation results. Figure 
3.a. is based on a sample of 34 corporations, while figure 3.b. is restricted to 27 firms with positive actual flows. 
The solid regression line adds linear predictions to figure 3.b. The dotted line through the origin (45°line) 
represents a perfect a one-to-one relation between expected and actual cash flows.  
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Table 7: Actual performance versus projections. 
The projected and actual EBITDA both encompass a period of 24 months after plan confirmation. The projected 
cash flows enclose the period of plan execution of 24 months starting immediately after plan confirmation (the 
two successive years of the 24-month execution period were previously marked as Year 1 and Year 2). The 
actual operational cash flows are obtained from the accounts representing respectively the first (fiscal year + 1) 
and second full year (fiscal year + 2) of post-confirmation results. Like Hotchkiss (1995), panel A calculates the 
ratio (actual flows – projected flows) / (projected flows) to express cash flow over- or understatement in our 
sample of firms that did not fail during 24-month plan execution. A more negative ratio suggests more 
overstatement in the cash flow projections. Panel B gives data on the time difference in months between the start 
of Fiscal year + 1 and the start of Year + 1, and thus indicates to which extent the plan execution period of 24 
months overlaps with the two successive fiscal years. Panel C restricts our analysis to firms that are not 
transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation within 5 years after plan confirmation, while Panel D shows the results for 
five firms failing between 2 years and 5 years after plan confirmation. Panel C and D are restrcited to 26 cases 
(21+5) as as we could not notice the survival status 5 years after plan confirmation for 8 of our 34 sample firms 
        
 N Mean Median St. dev. Min Max Percentage < 0 
Panel A        
Actual performance – Projected EBITDA / Projected 
EBITDA 
34 -0.1879 -0.3650 1.0945 -2.4876 3.4990 67% (23/34)  
Actual EBITDA before exceptional result – Projected 
EBITDA / Projected EBITDA 
34 -0.5075 -0.4479 0.8707 -2.5288 1.6259 85% (29/34) 
Panel B        
Time difference in months between the start of Fiscal year 
+1 and the start of Year +1 
34 4.66 4.88 3.52 0 11.67  
Panel C        
Actual EBITDA – Projected EBITDA / Projected EBITDA 21 0.2026 -0.1775 1.0078 -0.9381 3.4990  
Actual EBITDA before exceptional result – Projected 
EBITDA / Projected EBITDA 
21 -0.2810 -0.2299 0.6561 -1.7938 1.1929  
Panel D        
Actual EBITDA – Projected EBITDA / Projected EBITDA 5 -0.8704 -0.4720 0.9141 -0.2789 -2.4876  
Actual EBITDA before exceptional result – Projected 
EBITDA / Projected EBITDA 
5 -0.9909 -0.6808 0.9010 -2.5288 -0.2869  
        
 
1.9.  Summary and conclusions. 
 
The reorganization plans of small corporations primarily strive to re-establish a sound capital structure 
by way of debt deferral and debt forgiveness. The repayment of rescheduled bank debt accounts for 
less than 20% of total planned outgoing money flows during the 24-month plan execution, while the 
installment payments on the non-forgiven parts of trade credit average 33% of total outgoing flows. 
Compared to foreign studies, trade creditors fare very well under Belgian reorganization. Further, we 
find very high levels of payable taxes and social contributions accumulated during the pre-bankruptcy 
period, and their repayment has a lion’s share of 35% in total scheduled outflows.  
 
We find that few banks are willing to provide additional credit, and the subscription of fresh capital is 
equally marginal. As our distressed firms have almost no access to external funds, successful plan 
execution critically depends on their ability to generate internal cash flows. Projected operational cash 
flows average 76% of all expected incoming money flows during 24-month plan execution. These 
projections sharply contrast with pre-bankruptcy performance, and a comparison between projected 
and realized cash flows reveals that the cash flow projections are uncertain and systematically 
overestimated (using the method proposed by Hotchkiss, 1995). Cash flow targets might be even more 
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unfeasible because investment expenditures to increase the efficiency of the business process are 
limited. Next to the expected operational cash flows, planned asset sales are the second largest inflow 
averaging 12% of total scheduled incoming money flows during plan execution. 
 
If plan execution depends on overestimated and uncertain cash flow projections, it should not be 
surprising that 50% of our sample firms are transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation within two years 
after plan confirmation. This failure rate even mounts to two thirds after five years. Still, American 
data on failure rates for small firms do not tend to present a better reality. 
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Appendix A. 
 
We regress the proxies for cash flow overstatement of Hotchkiss (1995) on the dummy variable D-
failure in table 1 of this appendix. This dummy equals one if firms did fail between 2 to 5 years after 
plan confirmation (5 cases), and zero if firms are not liquidated 5 years after plan confirmation (21 
cases). The sample is restricted to 26 firms (21+5) on which the post-bankruptcy business status 5 
years after plan confirmation is available; bankruptcy-liquidation or not. We control for measurement 
error by the time difference between the start of Fiscal Year + 1 and the start of Year + 1 (see panel B 
of table 7). We find a negative estimate for the variable D-failure suggesting that firms transferred to 
bankruptcy-liquidation did overstate their cash flow projections. 
 
Table 1 of appendix A: Actual performance versus projections: Did failing firms overestimate their 
cash flow projections? 
The values in brackets are robust t-statistics based on the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance; * / ** / 
*** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
Dependent variable  Actual EBITDA – Projected 
EBITDA / Projected EBITDA 
Actual EBITDA before exceptional result – 
Projected EBITDA / Projected EBITDA 
D-failure=1 if transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation 
between 2 and 5 years after plan confirmation 
-1.2886 
[-2.28]** 
-0.5479 
[-1.44] 
Time difference in months between the start of Fiscal 
year +1 and the start of Year +1 
-0.0596 
[-0.80] 
0.0448 
[0.96] 
Intercept 0.5111 
[0.97] 
-0.5202 
[-2.11]** 
   
R-squared 0.1979 0.1853 
F-statistic 2.79* 1.69 
Number of observations 26 26 
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Abstract. 
 
We analyze the impact of pre-bankruptcy dynamics on the levels of unsecured debt at the start of 
bankruptcy procedures, using a unique sample of small distressed firms that reorganize under Belgian 
court-supervision. These firms rely on trade credit if banks withdraw their lending prior to 
bankruptcy. Apparently trade creditors are willing to finance a distressed firm’s shortfall in cash flow 
during this period. They also accumulate unpaid taxes and social contributions in the running-up to 
bankruptcy reorganization, pushing the government administration in the unintended role of lender of 
last resort. These findings suggest that pre-bankruptcy dynamics strongly affect the debt structure at 
the moment of initiation of the procedure and in this way the ultimate outcome of the restructuring 
process.  
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2.1. Introduction. 
 
Unsecured debt constitutes more than half of the debt of distressed firms attempting to reorganize 
under Chapter 11, and more than 60% of the debt of firms liquidated in Chapter 7 (see Bris et al., 
2006). Unsecured debt mainly consists of trade credit and government debt, like unpaid taxes and 
social contributions (see Baird et al. on government debt, 2007). The goal of our study is to analyze 
the impact of pre-bankruptcy dynamics on the levels of government debt and trade credit at the start of 
bankruptcy procedures. We specifically investigate the pre-bankruptcy dynamics for a sample of firms 
that eventually obtain a confirmed reorganization plan under Belgian court-supervised reorganization.  
 
The literature provides insights into how creditor and entrepreneurial dynamics prior to bankruptcy 
affect the distressed firm’s debt structure in formal bankruptcy procedures. In a subsample of 
distressed small to medium sized UK firms that eventually are liquidated, Franks and Sussman (2005) 
find that banks rarely expand their credit, while trade creditors are more willing to provide. For every 
pound sterling that the bank has withdrawn, the trade creditors have put in on average £0.50. This 
creditor behavior thus results in a substitution of trade credit for bank debt in the running up to 
bankruptcy, and affects the levels of trade credit at the start of a bankruptcy procedure. Baird et al. 
(2007) show that unpaid sales taxes and payroll taxes account for a substantial part of unsecured debt 
for Chapter-11 firms, and especially for small firms. They argue that entrepreneurs of small distressed 
firms have fewer incentives to transfer sales taxes and payroll taxes in the running up to bankruptcy.  
 
We find that entrepreneurs demand more trade credit during the pre-bankruptcy period to finance their 
loss-making business, and suppliers are willing to provide this credit. As in Peterson and Rajan (1997), 
cash flow clearly precedes trade debt in the pecking order. In the line of Cunat’s analysis (2007), it 
could be argued that trade creditors have an equity-like stake in a customer’s business as long as the 
value of their relationship is higher than the cost of helping in the survival of the distressed firm by 
providing additional trade credit or by extending the maturity of existing trade credit. This equity-like 
stake of trade creditors in the distressed firm may explain why trade creditors are willing to finance a 
shortfall in cash flow. Cunat (2007) indeed finds that trade credit is more prevalent when firms 
experience a liquidity shock1 that may threaten their survival. Also, trade creditors might be willing to 
finance a shortfall in cash flow because they have an advantage over financial institutions in the 
assessment of their customer’s creditworthiness. Our finding that cash flow precedes trade debt in the 
pecking order is robust to controlling for a distressed firm’s access to bank financing. Since Franks 
and Sussman (2005) find that bank debt is substituted by trade credit in the running up to bankruptcy, 
we specifically analyze the impact of pre-bankruptcy bank behavior on the trade debt levels at the start 
of the procedure. We find that if banks contract their lending during the pre-bankruptcy period, 
distressed firms rely on trade credit to finance a shortfall in cash flow, while this is not the case under 
a bank credit expansion. This suggests that entrepreneurs run on the trade creditors to solve severe 
liquidity problems instigated by both a bank credit contraction and a lack of internal profit generation. 
                                               
1
 In Cunat’s analysis, a firm is defined to have a liquidity shock if the total amount of cash and bank deposits 
scaled by assets drops by more than 10% (that is 10% of the assets of the firm) or if dividends are cut. 
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This pre-bankruptcy dynamic strongly contributes to the high trade debt percentage of 38.8% observed 
in our sample firms.  
 
Firms that need to pay more social contributions (payroll taxes) and indirect taxes (value added tax, 
i.e. sales tax) systematically accumulate overdue government debt in the running up to filing for 
bankruptcy. This almost mechanical supply effect of government debt results in a government debt 
percentage of 26.1% in our sample. This is not surprising in the Belgian context where (a) payroll 
taxes and sales taxes are considerable (b) personal liability rules for overdue taxes and social 
contributions do not exist, and (c) the government administration typically acts slowly to overdue 
payments. More general, we observe that government claims increase for 69.7% of our sample firms 
in the running up to bankruptcy-reorganization, while banks only expand their lending for around 30% 
of our sample firms. Trade creditors expand their credit in 46.1% of the cases. Further analysis reveals 
that government debt is more likely to expand if trade debt and/or bank debt contract, which suggests 
that the manager chooses to substitute government debt to satisfy the claims of creditors more 
essential to business continuation, like trade creditors and banks. We cannot reject our hypothesis that 
the tax and social security administrations star as passive lenders of last resort during the pre-
bankruptcy period.  
 
Our analysis allows us to draw inferences on how well banks and trade creditors are informed about 
the distressed firm. Using unique data provided by intermediation of the National Bank of Belgium, 
we observe that banks do not withdraw more funds during the pre-bankruptcy period when the 
distressed firm is ultimately liquidated during the post-confirmation stage. This might suggest that 
banks are not so well-informed as commonly argued, or alternatively, that banks are well-informed, 
but contract their lending irrespective of a firm’s rescue prospects because they have a liquidation 
preference (see Franks and Sussman, 2005; Bergström et al, 2002). Although trade creditors are 
generous providers of finance, they do not supply trade credit blindly to firms demanding it. Trade 
creditors are less eager to supply trade credit to entrepreneurs involved in earlier bankruptcies (in other 
boards than this of our distressed sample firm), suggesting that the reputation of the debtor does play 
an important role. Finally, as previously noticed, we find that trade creditors provide more credit in the 
running up to filing for bankruptcy-reorganization when banks contract their lending and the 
distressed firm experiences low cash flows. This suggests a one-way substitution of trade credit for 
bank debt in line with Franks & Sussman (2005), and might indicate the existence of informational 
asymmetry between trade creditors and banks.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the data. In section 2.3, we provide a detailed 
overview of the debt composition at the start of the procedure for our distressed sample firms. Section 
2.4 gives basic insights in pre-bankruptcy debt dynamics. The levels of trade credit at the start of 
bankruptcy-reorganization and the impact of pre-bankruptcy dynamics on these levels are analyzed in 
section 2.5. Section 2.6 deals with government debt. Section 2.7 discusses the debt restructuring of 
unsecured debt as reported in the confirmed reorganization plans, and links with the found pre-
bankruptcy dynamics. Section 2.8 concludes. 
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2.2. Data 
 
2.2.1.     Data sources and sampling procedure. 
 
Our dataset consists of information on distressed firms with confirmed reorganization plans under 
court-supervised reorganization in Belgium. Approximately 306 plans were confirmed between 
January 1, 1998 and June 30, 2004 with one of the 23 regional Belgian Bankruptcy Courts. Our 
sample is restricted to all confirmed reorganization plans submitted to 17 of those Bankruptcy Courts. 
This amounts to 190 reorganization plans or 62% of the population of confirmed plans. Corporations 
and sole proprietorships submitted respectively 125 and 65 plans (125+65 = 190). Blocks of closely 
related corporations jointly submitted five out of those 125 plans2. The dataset is complemented with 
financial statement data from the Graydon-database and the Belfirst DVD’s, which are delivered by 
the private data vendors Graydon Belgium and Bureau van Dijk respectively.  
 
We analyze a sample of small distressed corporations that submitted a going concern plan. We exclude 
corporations with total assets exceeding € 5.000.000, which leaves a sample of 107 small corporations. 
We additionally exclude an incorporated soccer club and one liquidation scheme among the small 
corporations3. After these restrictions we retain 105 small corporations in the sample. Our dataset is 
complemented with financial statement data prior to petition filing for bankruptcy-reorganization. To 
ensure a sufficiently high quality of the financial statement data, we do not include corporations for 
which the time period between the financial statement date and the filing date for bankruptcy-
reorganization is longer then 18 months. This removes another 14 corporations, resulting in a sample 
of 91 corporations.  
 
Since the court jointly appraises the cases of closely related corporations, the data on the financial 
statements should be aggregated. Simple data aggregation is not recommended though, because of 
intra-group transactions and consolidated accounts are not available. Plans submitted by closely 
related corporations are therefore excluded from the sample of corporations resulting in final sample 
of 89 corporations4.  
 
2.2.2.     Sample firms. 
 
The corporations differ by legal form. 45 corporations are non-quoted public limited liability 
corporations (Société Anonyme), 41 are private limited companies (Société Privée à Responsabilité 
Limitée), and 3 incorporated firms have another legal status. Table 1 gives summary statistics sorted 
by legal form. Total liabilities are measured at the initiation of the procedure, i.e. 6 to 9 months before 
plan confirmation. The public limited liability corporations are clearly larger than the private limited 
companies. The sole proprietorships are small (based on the comparison of the liabilities). Our sample 
                                               
2
 Five blocks of incorporated firms file jointly a plan. Those blocks respectively consist of 9, 4, 2, 2, and 2 
corporations. 139 corporations (120+9+4+2+2+2) are subsequently involved with the 125 plans. 
3
 Three large corporations confirmed a liquidation scheme, but are already excluded. 
4
 Three groups were already removed before because total group assets were larger than € 5.000.000 . 
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firms are less underwater compared to those in Bris et al. (2006), likely because we use a sample of 
confirmed plans like in Baird et al. (2007). 
 
Table 1: Firm characteristics sorted by legal form.  
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Public Limited Liability Corporation        
Pre-bankruptcy total Assets (€ 1000) 45 1472 1069 1365 90 4942 
Employees (No.) 45 10.22 6 10 1 37 
Liabilities (€ 1000) 45 1343 1104 1142 103 4873 
Liabilities/pre-bankruptcy assets 45 1.1395 0.9788 0.5650 0.3793 3.0206 
Private Limited Companies  
Pre-bankruptcy total Assets (€ 1000)   41 509 235 620 21 3015 
Employees (No.) 41 5.05 2 7.15 0 28 
Liabilities (€ 1000) 41 463 311 481 18.54 1848 
Liabilities/pre-bankruptcy assets 41 1.1080 0.9742 0.4975 0.3665 2.6315 
 
 
2.3.  The debt structure at the moment of initiation of the procedure 
 
Panel A of table 2 shows that bank debt and trade credit are the main sources of finance in our sample 
of 89 small corporations and that the latter source dominates the former on average5. Only 58 of the 89 
distressed sample firms have secured bank financing at all at (the moment of) procedure initiation. 
Due taxes and social claims also constitute a considerable debt mass, while junior-subordinated 
owner/director debt6 is not a frequent source of finance. Panel B shows that trade creditors remain the 
main providers of external funds even for the 68 cases with bank debt (both secured and unsecured)7. 
Remarkably, in both panel A and B distressed firms rely heavily on tax and social contributions as a 
source of finance (more than 20% in both panels). Unpaid government claims are omnipresent and 
seem larger in Belgium than in other countries like the U.S. or Canada. Bris et al. state that median 
Chapter 11 tax claims are zero in their sample. Their ratio of tax claims8 on total liabilities depends on 
the filing district. The ratio averages 14% in New York, while it is only 3% in Arizona. Using a 
sample of confirmed plans, Baird et al. (2007) report a percentage of 7.3%. Unpaid Canadian 
government claims average only a few percentages (Fisher & Martel, 1994).  
 
Panel C of table 2 reports that almost 90% of bank debt is covered by a fixed and/or floating charge. 
These securities provide a contractual liquidation right contingent on default. A fixed charge is a 
security in real estate. A floating charge is a security on machinery and working capital such as 
                                               
5
 Two remarks have to be made on the outstanding trade credit. First, creditors benefiting from retention of title 
clauses are most likely trade creditors, and their claims are therefore included in the trade credit. Second, due 
employee wages are incorporated in the trade debt because bankruptcy documents do not allow to distinguish 
them from trade claims. Social security contributions regarding the employee wages are included in the 
government debt. Clearly, the continuation decision of distressed firms critically depends on the employees, 
which typically results in paying out wages (but without transferring social contributions to the administration).  
Fisher & Martel (1994) report that only 23% of Canadian plans involve some wage claims; wage claims to total 
liabilities amounts to 0.35% in their sample study. 
6
 Owner/director debt includes credit provided by group companies. 
7
 See Rajan and Zingales (1995) for an analysis of the capital structure for a sample of large listed companies of 
the G-7 countries. Those companies are on average not distressed, and their accounts payable to assets amounts 
approx. 15 %.  
8
 Tax claims include social contributions in the U.S. Government debt in our study refers to both tax and social 
contributions. 
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receivables and inventory. This high degree of collateralization is comparable to other European 
countries (see Davydenko and Franks for the U.K., France and Germany, 2008). In our sample, 
multiple bank situations occur in only 16 of 89 cases9, implying that securities are often concentrated 
in the hands of a single bank.  
 
Table 2: Debt composition of distressed sample firms as reported in the approved reorganization plans. 
 
Panel A shows the debt structure of our 89 small corporations at the start of the procedure. In panel B, the 
sample firms are restricted to 68 firms with (secured and unsecured) bank debt. Panel C provides data on loan 
securities. These securities provide a contractual liquidation right contingent upon default. A fixed charge is a 
security in real estate. A floating charge is a security on mainly working capital.  
Panel A: Debt structure at the initiation of the procedure 
 Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Number of plans 
with specific debt 
Secured bank debt 0.2577 0.2288 0.2510 0.0000 0.8521 58 out of 89 
Unsecured bank debt 0.0238 0.0000 0.0839 0.0000 0.4777 10 out of 89 
Trade debt 0.3884 0.3482 0.2351 0.0445 1.0000 89 out of 89 
Tax & Social Contributions 0.2610 0.2110 0.2124 0.0000 0.9028 86 out of 89 
Owner-Directors 0.0691 0.0000 0.1602 0.0000 0.6753 24 out of 89 
Panel B: Debt structure of bank-financed firms 
 Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Number of plans 
with specific debt 
Secured bank debt 0.3373 0.3276 0.2357 0.0000 0.8521 58 out of 68 
Unsecured bank debt 0.0311 0.0000 0.0949 0.0000 0.4777 10 out of 68 
Trade debt 0.3413 0.3144 0.1891 0.0445 0.9726 68 out of 68 
Tax & Social Contributions 0.2267 0.1891 0.1706 0.0000 0.6672 66 out of 68 
Owner-Directors 0.0636 0.0000 0.1507 0.0000 0.6753 19 out of 68 
Panel C: Collateral rights     
Number of bank-financed firms 
with . . . 
   
Both a Fixed and floating charge 36      
Only a Fixed charge 1      
Only a Floating charge 21      
No security 10      
Total bank-financed firms 68 (36 + 1 + 21 + 10)    
       
Personal guarantee (in addition 
to other securities) 
13      
 
In figure 1, we plot trade credit against bank debt. Both bank debt and trade credit are expressed as a 
share of total debt at procedure initiation. The figure suggests that, although trade credit and bank debt 
are substantial lending sources, other sources of debt remain significant. Compared to Franks and 
Sussman (2005), who indicate that bank debt and trade credit are dominant sources of lending 
especially for small firms, the debt structure in our sample of small distressed companies is more 
disperse (i.e. more observations are relatively far removed from the diagonal). Most observations 
deviate from the diagonal because of outstanding tax and social contributions claims. Some 
observations away from the diagonal are additionally characterized by owner debt (marked with a 
triangle).  
 
 
                                               
9
 2, 3 and 4 banks are involved with respectively 12, 3 and 1 corporations. 
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Figure 1. Bank debt and trade credit as a proportion of firm’s total debt (inspired by Franks and Sussman, 2005). 
The figure shows bank debt and trade credit as a proportion of total debt at the start of the procedure. Total debt 
includes bank debt, trade credit, outstanding tax and social contributions and owner debt. Each point represents a 
single company. Firms with owner debt are designated with a triangle.  
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2.4. Pre-bankruptcy debt dynamics 
 
As mentioned before, Franks and Sussman (2005) offer an interesting insight in the pre-bankruptcy 
dynamics between trade creditors and banks for a subsample of U.K. firms that are ultimately 
liquidated in bankruptcy. Specifically the dynamics are analyzed during a distressed firm’s stay in a 
bank’s ‘business support unit10’ (BSU) before the transfer to bankruptcy. They find that banks rarely 
expand their credit during the pre-bankruptcy period, while trade creditors are more willing to provide 
their credit. This section offers a basic insight in the pre-bankruptcy debt flows between trade creditors 
and banks in our sample, but equally takes into account government administration as a creditor. 
 
We calculate pre-reorganization debt flows as difference between the volume of debt reported in the 
reorganization plan and the volume of debt reported in the latest annual account prior to court-
supervised reorganization. If we consider trade debt, bank debt and government debt flows in both 
directions, i.e. positive or negative, we can distinguish 8 debt flow combinations in table 3. Only 6 
cases had no bank debt reported in both the latest annual account and in the petition filing at the 
moment of procedure initiation (i.e. the 6 ‘status quo’ cases in table 6)11. Table 3 shows the frequency 
of these pre bankruptcy debt flow combinations. Government debt expands for 62 of the 89 firms, 
which is not surprising given the absence of personal liability for unpaid taxes and social 
contributions. In 24 cases (27% of the sample, category 3) banks and trade creditors withdraw their 
lending while the government debt expands. 
                                               
10
 The objective of the ‘BSU’ is to turn around the company and ‘send it back to branch’, though the rescue 
process may also end in bankruptcy. 
11
 21 cases have no bank debt at the moment of procedure initiation (see section 2.3). 6 of those 21 cases had no 
bank debt reported in the latest annual account prior to bankruptcy-reorganization, while 15 cases did repay the 
bank credit during the pre-bankruptcy period.  
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Table 3: A classification of pre-bankruptcy debt flows. 
This table shows the frequency of the various combinations of pre-bankruptcy debt dynamics based on the credit 
flow signs of trade credit, bank debt and government debt during the pre-bankruptcy period. We calculate credit 
flows during the pre-bankruptcy period as difference between the volume of debt reported in the reorganization 
plan and the volume of debt reported in the latest annual account prior to petition filing for court-supervised 
reorganization. 
GROWTH1-2  GOVERNMENT DEBT 
Contraction Expansion 
GROWTH1-2 TRADE DEBT GROWTH1-2 TRADE DEBT 
 
Contraction Expansion Contraction Expansion 
Row Total 
Contraction 
CAT 1 
7 
CAT 2 
7 
CAT 3 
24 
CAT 4 
15 
53 (59.6%) 
 
Expansion 
 
CAT 5 
2 
CAT 6 
8 
CAT 7 
13 
CAT 8 
7 
30 (33.7%)  
GROWTH1-2  
BANK 
DEBT 
Status quo 
CAT 9 
1 
CAT 10 
2 
CAT 11 
1 
CAT 12 
2 
6 (6.7%) 
Column Total 10 (11.2%) 17 (19.1%) 38 (42.7%) 24 (27.0%) 89 (100%) 
 
Calculations in Panel A of table 4 show that government debt is more likely to expand if banks 
contract their lending (73.6% vs. 69.7%) and if trade creditors reduce their outstanding debt (79.2% 
vs. 69.7%). If both trade and bank creditors contract their lending, the probability of a government 
expansion is 77.4% (D.1 in panel A). The probability of government debt expansion drastically drops 
if bank and trade creditors are more eager to supply credit in the running up to petition filing (D.2 to 
D.4 in increasing order of trade and bank creditor’s willingness to supply credit). Our analysis 
suggests that managers of distressed firms choose to substitute government debt for other debt sources. 
Specifically entrepreneurs may accumulate overdue taxes and social contributions to settle the claims 
of creditors more essential to business continuation, like trade creditors and financial institutions. 
 
Panel B of table 4 shows that banks expand their lending in respectively 33.7% during our above 
defined pre-bankruptcy period, while trade creditors expand their outstanding claims for 46.1% of the 
cases. Trade creditors are seemingly more willing to provide credit compared to banks. The rationale 
therefore might be their equity-like stake in the distressed firm. Franks and Sussman (2005) find for 
U.K. distressed firms that banks tend to contract their debts at the same time as trade creditors expand 
theirs. Table 4 does not provide support for a substitution of trade credit for bank debt (as discussed by 
Franks and Sussman), nor support for the opposite substitution. Bank debt contracts to the detriment of 
other debt sources in 15 cases (16.9% in category 4), while trade debt contracts to the detriment of 
other debt sources also in 13 cases (14.6% in category 7). A comparison of the probabilities of trade 
credit expansion in panel B and C in table 4 shows that trade credit is not more expanded if banks 
contract (46.1% vs. 41.5%), nor do banks extend their lending more if trade creditors contract (33.7% 
vs. 31.3%). We analyze the substitution effect of trade credit for bank debt in more detail in section 
2.5. 
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Table 4: Unconditional and conditional probabilities of debt expansion  
This table employs the rule of Bayes to calculate unconditional and conditional probabilities of debt expansion  
Description of debt dynamic Likelihood 
Panel A  
A.   Probability (Government debt expansion) 69.7% 
  
B.  Probability (Government debt expansion | bank debt contraction) 73.6% 
  
C.  Probability (Government debt expansion | trade debt contraction) 79.2% 
  
D1.  Probability (Government debt expansion | bank and trade contraction) 77.4% 
D2.  Probability (Government debt expansion | bank and/or trade contraction) 75.7% 
D3.  Probability (Government debt expansion | bank and/or trade expansion) 66.1% 
D2.  Probability (Government debt expansion | bank and trade expansion) 46.7% 
  
Panel B  
Probability (Bank debt expansion) 33.7% 
Probability (Trade debt expansion) 46.1% 
Panel C  
Probability (Bank debt expansion | trade debt contraction) 31.3% 
Probability (Trade debt expansion | bank debt contraction) 41.5% 
Panel D  
A. Firms liquidated in bankruptcy during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage (44 of 89)  
Probability (Bank debt expansion | trade debt contraction) 24.0% 
Probability (Trade debt expansion | bank debt contraction) 41.9% 
B. Firms that remain intact during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage (45 of 89)  
Probability (Bank debt expansion | trade debt contraction) 39.1% 
Probability (Trade debt expansion | bank debt contraction) 40.9% 
 
More specifically, Franks & Sussman (2005) find that banks rarely extend their lending to companies 
that ultimately fail, while trade creditors do (see above). In our sample, 44 out of 89 firms ultimately 
fail during plan execution and are transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation12. Failure occurs if the plan 
cannot be fully executed during the court-supervised post-confirmation period that is fixed at 24 
months in most cases13. Panel D provides some evidence that banks tend to extend less credit when 
trade credit shrinks and firms ultimately fail during plan execution. 
 
 
 
                                               
12
 Unlike in the U.S., unviable firms are almost exclusively liquidated in bankruptcy, including firms with all 
assets encumbered by liens. 
13
 Our dataset shows that the court-supervised plan execution period is initially fixed at 24 months for 98% of the 
cases, and at less than 24 months for the remaining 2% of the cases. During this post-confirmation period, the 
court and creditors can however decide to extend the court-supervised period with a maximum of 12 months. 
Upon prolongation, a new plan needs to be drafted because the initial confirmed plan is only drafted for a period 
of maximum 24 months. An extension of the court-supervised post-confirmation period occurs in approximately 
10% of the cases. Our analysis of failure in panel D of table 4 takes into account transfer to bankruptcy-
liquidation during both (1) the initial court-supervised plan execution period of maximum 24 months and (2) the 
optional court-supervised period of prolongation of maximum 12 months.  
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Table 5 provides unique data on the bank credit flow of 51 firms (out of 61 cases with bank debt) 
during a 12-month pre-bankruptcy period14. The data are obtained by intermediation of the Central 
Corporate Credit Register of the National Bank of Belgium. The flows are calculated as the difference 
between the bank debt at procedure initiation and the bank debt 12 months before filing for 
bankruptcy-reorganization, scaled by this latter bank debt level. The loan is reduced by 7.12% on 
average and by 16.37% on median. The bank reduces its lending in 37 cases and expands it in 14 
cases, which gives an expansion probability of around 30% (similar as in panel B of table 4). Table 5 
also gives statistics by splitting the sample in firms that ultimately fail (25 firms), and those that 
remain intact during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage (26 firms). Although banks seem to 
withdraw more of their outstanding credit in the running up to judicial composition if the firm 
ultimately fails than if it survives, the means of both samples do not differ significantly. These 
findings clearly suggest that banks withdraw their funds in the running up to judicial composition, 
although they do not withdraw more funds when the distressed firm is ultimately liquidated. This 
seems to be evidence of a banks’ liquidation preference (see Franks & Sussman, 2005)15. 
 
Table 5: Bank credit flow during 12-month pre-bankruptcy period.  
This table gives information on the bank debt contraction (-) and expansion (+) in percentage during a 12-month 
pre-bankruptcy period for 51 of 68 bank-financed firms. Statistics are equally reported for a sample split of firms 
that ultimately fail during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage (which takes on 24 months in most 
cases), and those that remain intact. 
Pre-bankruptcy bank credit flow (Data available for 51 of 61 bank-financed firms) 
 Number Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Pre-bankruptcy credit flow 51 -7.12% -16.37% 57.20 -100% 287.2% 
Sample split:       
Flows for failing firms 25 -10.28% -18.74% 71.59 -100% 287.2% 
Flows for non-failing firms 26 -4.08% -14.04% 39,99 -46.72% 116.28% 
 
 
2.5. Trade credit and pre-bankruptcy dynamics. 
 
2.5.1.  Trade debt theories and the pecking order theory for distressed firms. 
 
There is a large theoretical literature that employs incomplete contract theory to analyze various 
aspects of the capital structure of the firm. This literature studies for example the trade-off between 
debt and equity, the type of financial claim, the maturity of debt, and the number of creditors16, but 
does not address other debt classes like trade debt and government debt. Peterson and Rajan (1997) 
give a fairly complete overview of the existing trade debt theories. First, suppliers may have an 
advantage over financial institutions in the assessment of their customers’ creditworthiness and the 
enforcement of due trade debt. Second, trade creditors may have an equity-like stake in the distressed 
                                               
14
 Data are obtained by intermediation of the Central Corporate Credit Register of the National Bank of Belgium. 
Missing cases are largely due to small credits (< € 25.000), which are not reported in the register.  
15
 If we assume that non-failing firms have any growth options, Myers’ debt overhang model (1977) might offer 
an alternative explanation for the relatively large bank contraction in our subsample of non-failing firms. 
Specifically banks might contract significant parts of their loan in the running-up to bankruptcy-reorganization to 
minimize underinvestment problems under court-supervised reorganization.  
16
 See e.g. Hart & Moore, 1994, 1998; Bolton & Scharfstein, 1996; Berglöf & Von Thadden, 1994. 
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firm, which encourages them to take more risk and contribute to the rescue17. It seems to us that the 
implicit equity stake of trade creditors becomes more persistent when they fear a drastic fall in their 
sales when the business of their customer would be closed. Third, the accumulation of trade debt may 
reduce transaction costs, example given if firms postpone payments on trade debt obligations to settle 
them periodically18. Finally, trade credit can be used as a tool for price discrimination because it 
changes the effective price of goods. The financial advantage theory, the equity-stake theory and the 
price discrimination theory offer explanations for the supply of trade debt, while the transaction cost 
theory explains the demand for trade debt.  
 
In addition, Peterson and Rajan (1997) argue that the demand of trade credit may also be driven by 
arguments from the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984). The classical pecking order theory predicts a 
sequence for financing decisions: firms finance new investments first with internal funds, then with 
safe debt, then risky debt and finally with outside equity. Adverse selection costs (due to information 
asymmetries) and transaction costs of issuing risky debt and equity securities induce this hierarchy. 
Internal funds have no adverse selection problem, while both debt and equity require an adverse 
selection risk premium. Debt demands a lower risk premium than equity. The nature of the financing 
sequence of the pecking order theory results in a minimization of the adverse selection premiums and 
transaction costs1920. Specifically Peterson and Rajan (1997) argue that internal funds precede trade 
debt in the pecking order. They find that each additional dollar of profits lowers the demand for trade 
credit by 23 cents21.  
 
Peterson and Rajan (1997) find that cash flow precedes trade debt in the pecking order in a sample of 
small firms, of which are 90% owner-managed. Outside equity is not issued by these small firms, 
implying that the model of Myers and Majluf (1984) based on informational asymmetries between 
existing and prospective shareholders is not appropriate to explain the found pecking order sequence. 
The trade creditor’s equity-like stake and their advantage over financial institutions in the assessment 
of their customers’ creditworthiness may however explain why trade creditors are willing to finance a 
shortfall in cash flow. We formulate our first hypothesis as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1.: Cash flow precedes trade debt in the pecking order for distressed firms. 
 
The term ‘pecking order’ in hypothesis 1 refers to the financing sequence implied by specific trade 
debt theories rather than by the model of Myers and Majluf (1984).  
 
                                               
17
 This argument for trade credit supply to distressed firms is put forward in Cunat (2002) and Franks and 
Sussman (2005). 
18
 See also Rajan & Zingales (1995) on the transaction cost and financing advantage theories. 
19
 The empirical literature on the pecking order theory especially focuses on the financing decisions of public 
quoted American firms; we refer to Helwege and Liang (1996), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and Frank and 
Goyal (2003) in this respect. 
20
 See Barclay et al. (2006) and Manigart and Van Acker (2007) on capital structure and high growth ventures. 
21
 Peterson and Rajan (1997) appropriately argue that cash flow rather than profits is the correct variable to test 
the pecking order theory. 
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Peterson and Rajan (1997) find that a firm’s ability to generate cash internally decreases its demand 
for trade credit, and this after controlling for the firm’s access to credit from financial institutions. We 
will therefore define various proxies to control for the firm’s access to bank debt in the empirical 
sections.  
 
Special attention will be devoted to the impact of a contraction or expansion of the bank credit during 
the pre-bankruptcy period on the provision of trade credit. If banks contract their lending in the 
running up to bankruptcy filing, this reveals that the marginal cost of financial distress exceeds any 
benefits of bank debt financing in the classical tradeoff decision; i.e. the bank debt capacity of the 
distressed firm has been reached22. Specifically a bank credit contraction deteriorates the liquidity 
position of the distressed firms during the pre-bankruptcy period, which might force entrepreneurs to 
rely more on trade debt to finance a bank credit reduction. Our basic analysis of the pre-bankruptcy 
debt dynamics in panel B and C of table 4 does however not point in this direction as bank debt is not 
substituted for trade credit during the pre-bankruptcy period. Still, under a bank credit contraction, an 
additional liquidity constraint due to a shortfall in internally generated cash might increase the use of 
trade credit. In the opposite case of a pre-bankruptcy bank credit expansion, the distressed firm’s bank 
debt capacity is not fully exhausted as banks are still willing to provide additional credit. This bank 
credit expansion improves the distressed firm’s liquidity position, and entrepreneurs are expected to 
resort less on trade credit to finance a shortfall in internal funds. Hence our second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: If banks contract their lending, distressed firms with low cash flows rely more on trade 
credit. 
 
2.5.2.  Empirical results. 
 
2.5.2.1.  Does cash flow precedes trade debt in the pecking order? 
  
In table 6 below, we provide estimates of a simple reduced form model in the spirit of Petersen and 
Rajan (1997) that links the level of trade debt to both demand and supply factors. Trade debt is 
measured at the start of the procedure, and normalized by pre-bankruptcy assets. All specifications 
indicate a significantly negative effect of size (Log of total assets). This suggests the presence of a net 
demand effect, where larger firms have more access to other financing sources (due to limited 
                                               
22
 We refer to Lemmon and Zender (2007) for an empirical study of the classical pecking order theory of Myers 
(1984) after controlling for a firm’s debt capacity. They argue that the debt capacity of a distressed firm is 
reached if the costs of financial distress curtail further debt issues. According to Lemmon and Zender (2007), the 
combination of debt capacity and the pecking order theory suggests that the costs of adverse selection are 
dominant for “low to moderate” leverage levels but that tradeoff-like forces become primary motivators of 
financing decisions at “high” levels of leverage. Those so-called tradeoff-like forces refer to the tradeoff theory 
(that competes with the pecking order theory) to explain the financing decisions of firms in modern corporate 
finance literature. The tradeoff theory of capital structure predicts that firms choose their mix of debt and equity 
to balance the benefits and costs of debt. Tax benefits of borrowed money and the control of free cash flow 
problems are argued to increase the use of debt, while the costs of financial distress and conflicts between debt 
holders and equity provides firms with incentives to limit their debt financing. A value-maximizing firm equates 
benefit and costs at the margin. At high levels of leverage, the costs of financial distress typically curtail further 
debt issues. Lemmon and Zender (2007) argue that the use of debt capacity makes it more difficult to distinguish 
between the pecking order theory and the tradeoff theory.  
Chapter 2. Pre-bankruptcy Dynamics and Unsecured Debt 
                                                                                                                        2.13 
informational asymmetries) and therefore make less use of trade debt. Peterson & Rajan (1997) argue 
that large firms demand less trade credit because they have less growth opportunities. Public limited 
liability firms (D-PLLC) tend to hold more trade debt in all specifications. This suggests that these 
more transparent firms have better access to trade debt, which is evidence of a net supply effect. The 
level of current assets on its books (current assets excluding cash/assets) is clearly related to trade debt 
levels, although its significance is specification sensitive. At first glance, this finding points out that a 
firm’s demand for short-term financing depends on its short-term assets, and will be further discussed 
in this section. Hart & Moore (1994) and Diamond (1991) present rationales for firms matching the 
maturity of assets and liabilities. The age of firms (Log of firm age) does not affect the level of trade 
debt.  
 
To verify whether the supply of trade credit depends on financial health and on the capacity to 
generate internal money flows, we introduce a number of financial indicators. If we find that trade 
debt is positively related to financial health, we have support for the financing advantage theories 
(suppliers lower their trade credit for heavily distressed firms). If we find that trade debt is negatively 
related to financial health and internal money flow generation, the net demand effect of the pecking 
order formulated in hypothesis 1 dominates. In specification 1 we introduce profitability (net 
profits23/assets). The negative coefficient suggests that the higher demand of trade debt by distressed 
firms dominates the effect of lower supply by the suppliers.  In specification 2 we substitute cash flow 
(cash flow/assets) for profitability as a measure of internal money flow generation. Again we find a 
strongly significant negative relation, supporting the earlier conclusion that more distressed firms 
demand more trade debt. This finding suggests that trade debt is higher in the “pecking order” than 
internally generated cash. The estimated cash flow coefficient of -0.2972 implies that each additional 
euro of loss in cash flow increases the demand for trade credit by around 30 cents (idem in terms of 
our variable net profits/assets – specification 1).  
 
Aspects of both economic and financial distress drive the variables net profits/assets and cash 
flow/assets. Earning before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) is commonly 
used as a proxy to investigate the degree of economic distress, as it does not reflect differences in debt 
structure (see Hotchkiss, 1995). This operational cash flow variable is scaled by assets and introduced 
in specification 3. Its estimate is only 1.63 standard deviation away from zero and the explanatory 
power of the model drops considerably, suggesting that both economic and financial distress, rather 
than only the former type of distress, drive the level of trade credit in the pre-bankruptcy period. 
 
A well-known proxy for financial health is the score of a failure prediction model (see e.g. Altman, 
1968; Ohlson, 1980). We use Altman’s Z”-score developed for non-publicly traded firms (see Altman, 
1993), which as an adjusted version of his initial Z-score for large publicly held corporations. 
Compared to the original Z-Score model, the revised Z”-Score model replaces the market value of 
equity by its book value and eliminates the variable Sales/assets. Specification 3 substitutes the Z”-
score for cash flow, and we consistently find a negative estimate for the Z”-score.  
 
                                               
23
 Net profit before taxes. 
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Specification 5 confirms our previous main findings after controlling for respectively industry effects. 
Industry dummies are defined as follows: wholesale (23 cases), retail (15 cases), manufacturing (13 
cases), hotels and restaurants (9 cases), construction (8 cases), and other industries (21 cases). Other 
industries are the omitted category.  We find that manufacturing firms have significantly lower levels 
of trade debt24. 
 
Peterson & Rajan (1997) include proxies for a firm’s credit availability and the relationships with 
financial institutions in their trade credit models. Firms with large unused lines of credit and with 
strong bank lending relationships demand less trade credit. The relationship with financial institutions 
has however no effect on the supply of trade credit. Our previous findings on the pecking order might 
critically depend on the distressed firm’s access to bank financing, especially in the bank-based 
European credit system.  
 
Specification 6 therefore adds the variable Ex-ante leverage defined as total debt/assets, as a painfully 
high debt ratio might constrain a firm’s access to external finance (see Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 
1999). Specification 7 controls for the distressed firm’s access to bank debt financing by the variable 
Ex-ante bank debt (bank debt scaled by assets). ‘Ex-ante’ explicitly refers that the variables Ex-ante 
leverage and Ex-ante bank debt are obtained from the latest annual account prior to bankruptcy-
reorganization filing. Those variables do not affect the demand for trade credit and previous findings 
remain robust. The drawback of specification 6 and 7 might be endogeneity concerns. 
 
Cunat (2007) finds that trade credit use is higher in firms with low levels of collateralizable assets as 
firms with more land and fixed assets have more access to other financing sources. He finds that the 
economic effect of his collateral variable measured as the book value of land and fixed assets to total 
assets is particularly strong. In our sample, we find that bank debt is heavily collateralized (see section 
2.4). We show in table 1 of appendix A that the ratio of the book value of land and buildings to total 
assets is a very good predictor of outstanding bank credit. Specification 8 therefore introduces the 
variable Land and buildings on total assets as a proxy for a firm’s access to bank financing. A 
significant negative coefficient is found with a relatively large coefficient. The difference between the 
first and third quartiles of our collateral variable is 0.2874 (0.31 in Cunat), which translates into an 
expected reduction in trade credit use of 7.87% (4.03% in Cunat). In specification 8, the variable 
Current assets excl. cash/assets is replaced by two specific variables on current assets:  
Inventories/assets and Receivables/assets. This allows avoiding the simultaneous introduction of the 
relatively highly correlated variables Current assets excl. cash/assets and Land and buildings/assets. 
The variables Inventories/assets and Receivables/assets are not significant and the latter has even a 
negative sign. This suggests that Current assets excl. cash / assets in specification 1 to 7 was largely 
driven by the collateral variable (likely idem in the study of Peterson and Rajan). Specification 9 
replaces cash flow for Z”-score in specification 8 and controls for industry effects. After controlling 
                                               
24
 As additional robustness check, we controlled for the time difference between the moment of procedure 
initiation and the date of the latest annual account. Our findings remain intact (also in the government debt 
models of section 2.6). 
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for a distressed firm’s access to bank debt and industry effects, we find that each additional euro of 
loss in cash flows increases the demand for trade credit by around 25 cents. 
 
Specification 10 and 11 are two-stage least squares regressions with the variable Bank debt at 
procedure initiation/assets as instrumented variable. The instrumental variables are discussed in 
appendix A, and include (1) the collateral variable Land and buildings/assets, (2) a proxy for the 
variability in the business returns25 (firms with stable cash flows have more access to bank credit) and 
(3) the dummy variable Debt personally guaranteed. The coefficient of the variable Bank debt at 
procedure initiation/assets is marginally significant in specification 10, and becomes insignificant after 
controlling for industry effects in specification 11. One euro of additional bank debt at procedure 
initiation results in an expected reduction of trade credit use of around 35 and 33 cent in respectively 
specification 10 and 11. 
 
Still, trade creditors do not supply trade debt blindly to any firm that demands it. In specification 12 
we enrich the supplier’s information set with information about the management of the distressed firm. 
We tracked down the involvement of members of the executive board in earlier bankruptcies in 
Belgium (Previous bankruptcies) and the experience of the executive board of the distressed firm on 
the boards of other Belgian firms (Management experience). The former variable counts earlier 
bankruptcies in which the board of directors has been involved as a director2627, while the latter counts 
all positions on boards ever held by members of the distressed firm’s board. The results indicate that 
trade creditors supply less trade debt to firms whose managers have more bankruptcies on their slate. 
                                               
25
 We use the industry’s variation in profit margin as proxy for the variability in the business returns. The 
industry’s variation in profit margin consists in the industry average of the standard deviation of the operating 
profit margin over the last 3 fiscal years prior to petition filing. This variable is based on variation in profit 
margin within businesses over time (i.e. non cross-sectional). 
26
 If a firm goes bankrupt two years after management dismissal, we consider the dismissed manager responsible 
and count it as an involvement in a previous bankruptcy. In Belgium, from a legal point of view, replaced 
managers even remain responsible for three years after their discharge. 
27
 The variables Previous bankruptcies and Altman’s Z-score can be considered as proxies for the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. 
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Table 6:  Determinants of Trade credit/Total assets.  
The dependent variable Trade Credit/Total Assets is the firm’s trade credit at the start of the procedure scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets. The variables L(total assets) and 
L(Firm Age) are logarithms of respectively pre-bankruptcy total assets and firm age. The variable D-Public Limited Liability Corporation amounts one when the firm is a 
Public Limited Liability Corporation, and zero otherwise. The variables Net Profits/assets, Cash flow/assets, EBITDA/assets and Altman’s Z”-score for non-publicly traded 
corporations are proxies for the distressed firm’s internal money flow generation and financial health, and those variables are obtained from the latest annual account prior to 
the filing for bankruptcy-reorganization. Ex-ante leverage and ex-ante bank debt are respectively total debt/assets and bank debt/assets equally obtained from the pre-
bankruptcy account. The variable Land and buildings/assets is used as collateral proxy (like in Cunat, 2007) and determines the firm’s access to external bank financing. Land 
and buildings/assets, Current assets excl. cash/assets, Inventories/assets, and Receivables/assets are obtained from the latest annual account prior to bankruptcy-reorganization. 
The variable Bank debt at procedure initiation/assets is instrumented using a simplified bank debt model described in appendix A (specification 6 of table 1 of appendix A). 
The variables Previous Bankruptcies and Management Experience respectively amount to the number of earlier bankruptcies (of other Belgian firms) in which the board of 
directors has been involved, and their number of past and current management positions in the board of other Belgian firms. The values in brackets are the robust t-statistics: * 
/ ** / *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec.4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10 Spec. 11 Spec. 12 
Financial health and internal money flow generation             
Net profits / assets -0.2960 
[-1.97]* 
           
Cash flow / assets  -0.2972 
[-2.44]** 
   
 
   -0.2471 
[-1.97]* 
-0.2945 
[-2.77]*** 
-0.2526 
[-2.27]** 
 
EBITDA / assets   -0.2513 
[-1.63] 
         
Altman’s Z”- Score    -0.02475 
[-2.71]*** 
-0.0223 
[-2.40]** 
-0.0192 
[-2.05]** 
-0.0223 
[-2.61]** 
-0.02308 
[-2.28]** 
   -0.0211 
[-2.18]** 
Access to external funds             
Ex ante Leverage      0.0669 
[0.79] 
      
Ex-ante bank debt / total assets       -0.0554 
[-0.41] 
     
Land and buildings / total assets (collateral)        -0.2739 
[-1.73]* 
-0.2960 
[-1.57] 
  -0.2675 
[-1.81]* 
Bank debt at procedure initiation / assets            -0.3479 
[-1.67]* 
(instrum.) 
-0.3335 
[-1.20] 
(instrum.) 
 
Controls             
L(Total Assets) -0.1126 
[-3.63]*** 
-0.1004 
[-3.74]*** 
-0.1256 
[-3.27]*** 
-0.0818 
[-2.46]** 
-0.0820 
[-2.34]** 
-0.0776 
[-2.22]** 
-0.0855 
[-2.76]*** 
-0.0826 
[-2.41]** 
-0.0874 
[-2.98]*** 
-0.0946 
[-3.32]*** 
-0.0945 
[-3.37]*** 
-0.0968 
[-2.66]*** 
D-Public Limited Liability Corporation 0.1438 
[1.67]* 
0.1389 
[1.61] 
0.1645 
[1.94]* 
0.1170 
[1.40] 
0.1671 
[2.03]** 
0.1717 
[2.07]** 
0.1851 
[2.18]** 
0.1337 
[1.60] 
0.1980 
[2.34]** 
0.1541 
[1.79]* 
0.2083 
[2.47]** 
0.1103 
[1.44] 
L(Firm Age) -0.0265 
[-0.61] 
-0.0403 
[-0.97] 
-0.0187 
[-0.40] 
-0.0443 
[-1.02] 
-0.0654 
[-1.36] 
-0.0070 
[-1.50] 
-0.0655 
[-1.38] 
-0.0222 
[-0.49] 
-0.0399 
[-0.90] 
-0.0422 
[-1.05] 
-0.0604 
[-1.34] 
-0.0028 
[-0.06] 
Current assets excl. cash/ assets 0.2028 
[1.64] 
0.1390 
[1.12] 
0.1750 
[1.46] 
0.2889 
[2.33]** 
0.2321 
[1.85]* 
0.2343 
[1.87]* 
0.2294 
[1.88]* 
     
Inventories / assets        0.2040 
[0.94] 
0.0237 
[0.09] 
0.1468 
[0.66] 
0.0723 
[0.28] 
0.1493 
[0.74] 
Receivables / assets        -0.0419 
[-0.19] 
-0.2651 
[-1.13] 
-0.1841 
[-1.10] 
-0.2623 
[-1.24] 
-0.0717 
[-0.32] 
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Continuation of table 4 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec.4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10 Spec. 11 Spec. 12 
             
Debtor profile             
Previous Bankruptcies            -0.0896 
[-2.49]** 
Management Experience            0.0118 
[1.01] 
Industry dummies NO NO NO NO YES YES YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Intercept 0.9393 
[5.07]*** 
0.9427 
[5.43]*** 
1.0605 
[5.02]*** 
0.7491 
[3.78]*** 
0.8709 
[4.05]*** 
0.7804 
[3.14]*** 
0.8415 
[4.12]*** 
0.8819 
[4.52]*** 
1.0995 
[6.78]*** 
1.1044 
[7.22]*** 
1.2109 
[6.79]*** 
0.9648 
[4.88]*** 
             
No. of observations 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
R-squared 0.2750 0.3107 0.2497 0.3499 0.3872 0.3901 0.3922 0.3461 0.3840 0.3099 
(Centered 
R2)  
0.3675 
(Centered 
R2) 
0.3889 
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2.5.2.2. The effect of pre-bankruptcy bank behavior. 
 
If banks contract their lending during the pre-bankruptcy period, we expect that distressed firms rely 
more on trade credit to finance a shortfall in cash flow than is the case under a bank credit expansion. 
This expectation is expressed in hypothesis 2, and is tested in well-defined subsamples of distressed 
firms that face either a pre-bankruptcy contraction of their bank credit or a pre-bankruptcy bank credit 
expansion. The data on the pre-bankruptcy debt dynamics described in section 2.4 are used to define 
these subsamples. 
 
A first sample split is based on a comparison between the last available accounting data and the bank 
debt reported in the plan, which reveals that banks reduced their credit for 53 cases, while additional 
credit was provided for 30 cases (see table 3). In panel A of table 7 and in the 53-case subsample with 
bank debt contraction, we find that trade credit is negatively and significantly related to the internal 
money flow generation of the distressed firm. A positive but insignificant estimate for the internal 
funds variables is found in the subsample with bank debt expansion cases. These findings suggest that 
cash flow precedes trade debt in the pecking order if banks reduce their bank credit, while this pecking 
order sequence is not found under bank credit expansions. We cannot reject hypothesis 2. 
 
A second sample split relies on data provided by intermediation of the National Bank of Belgium (see 
table 5). These data reveal more detailed information on the exact size of the bank debt contraction 
during a 12-month pre-bankruptcy period, but for a more limited number of firms. If banks contract a 
significant part of their credit, the distressed firm is expected to face severe liquidity problems, and 
may run on the trade creditors if cash flows are low. We noticed that banks contract their lending 
during a 12-month pre-bankruptcy period for 37 out of 51 cases (we have data on 51 cases – see 
section 2.4). The median pre-bankruptcy contraction (-22.8%) is employed as cut-off point to define a 
subsample with large contractions (18 out of 37) and one with small contractions (19 out of 37). In the 
subsample with large bank credit contractions, we find a large and significant estimate for the internal 
fund proxies, which suggests that cash flow precedes trade debt in the pecking order for firms coping 
with heavy liquidity constraints.  Positive but insignificant estimates for the internal fund variables are 
found in the subsample with small bank credit contractions. Again, hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. 
 
Our analysis shows that entrepreneurs rely on trade credit to solve liquidity problems caused by both a 
bank credit contraction and a shortfall in internally generated cash flow. This is evidence in favor of 
the existence of a one-way substitution of trade debt for bank credit if distressed firms face a shortfall 
in internally generated cash. We are however not able to analyze the effect of internal money flow 
generation on the levels of bank debt in a subsample of trade credit contraction during the pre-
bankruptcy period, because of data limitations. Therefore, we cannot reject the possibility that the 
substitution might run in both directions. 
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Table 7: The effect of pre-bankruptcy bank behavior on the levels of trade credit. 
The dependent variable Trade Credit/Total Assets is the firm’s trade credit at the start of the procedure scaled by 
pre-bankruptcy assets. In panel A, we expect that firms with a low cash flow rely more on trade credit under a 
bank credit contraction. A comparison between the last available accounting data prior to petition filing and the 
bank debt reported in the plans reveals that banks reduced their credit for 53 cases, while additional credit was 
provided for 30 cases (see also in table 3). Panel B employs data provided by intermediation of the National 
Bank of Belgium to define subsamples with large and small bank credit contractions during a 12-month pre-
bankruptcy period. If banks contract a significant part of their credit, the distressed firm is expected to cope with 
severe liquidity problems, which might result in a run on the trade credit if cash flows are low. A credit 
contraction occurs with 37 firms (out of 51 cases on which we have data), and the median contraction is used as 
cut-off point to define a subsample with large contractions (18 cases) and one with small contractions (19 cases). 
The values in brackets are the robust t-statistics:* / ** / *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
Panel A Bank credit contraction Bank credit expansion  
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 
Internal funds         
EBITDA / assets -0.3334 
[-3.05]*** 
  -0.3220 
[-3.03]*** 
0.1811 
[0.97] 
  0.1667 
[0.93] 
Net profits / assets  -0.1996 
[-2.99]*** 
   0.1568 
[0.77] 
  
Cash flow / assets   -0.2627 
[-2.06]** 
   0.1667 
[0.76] 
 
Controls         
L(total assets) -0.0987 
[-2.98]*** 
-0.0963 
[-3.02]*** 
-0.0927 
[-2.94]*** 
-0.0913 
[-2.95]*** 
-0.0925 
[-3.17]*** 
-0.0937 
[-2.88]*** 
-0.0935 
[-2.85]*** 
-0.0534 
[-1.54] 
Previous bankruptcies -0.0489 
[-1.61] 
-0.0486 
[-1.54] 
-0.0536 
[-1.72]* 
-0.0521 
[-1.69]* 
-0.0846 
[-2.24]** 
-0.0866 
[-2.10]** 
-0.0861 
[-2.09]** 
-0.0656 
[-1.93]* 
Land and buildings / assets 
(bank debt collateral) 
   -0.1876 
[-1.36] 
   -0.3512 
[-1.57] 
Intercept 1.0619 
[4.62]*** 
1.0020 
[4.58]*** 
1.0028 
[4.64]*** 
1.0422 
[4.66]*** 
1.0045 
[4.17]*** 
1.0373 
[3.50]*** 
1.024 
[3.57]*** 
0.8260 
[3.77]*** 
Number of obs. 53 53 53 53 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.3185 0.2913 0.2848 0.3300 0.1428 0.1413 0.1405 0.1883 
Prob > F 0.0032*** 0.0034*** 0.0112** 0.0073*** 0.0037*** 0.0033*** 0.0029*** 0.0041*** 
 
  
Panel B Large bank credit contraction Small bank credit expansion  
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 
Internal funds         
EBITDA / assets -0.6609 
[-4.18]*** 
  -0.6890 
[-4.11]*** 
0.1307 
[0.96] 
  0.1288 
[0.90] 
Net profits assets  -0.6306 
[-2.26]** 
   0.0153 
[0.15] 
  
Cash flow / assets   -0.5738 
[-5.41]*** 
   0.0550 
[0.51] 
 
Controls         
L(total assets) -0.1014 
[-3.82]*** 
-0.0670 
[-2.06]* 
-0.0753 
[-3.61]*** 
-0.1078 
[-3.81]*** 
-0.1258 
[-3.54]*** 
-0.1228 
[-3.16]*** 
-0.1252 
[-3.25]*** 
-0.1229 
[-3.81]*** 
Previous bankruptcies 0.0193 
[0.83] 
0.0380 
[1.10] 
0.0216 
[1.21] 
0.0195 
[0.84] 
-0.0773 
[-3.65]*** 
-0.0732 
[-3.57]*** 
-0.0752 
[-3.58]*** 
-0.0752 
[-3.02]*** 
Land and buildings / assets 
(bank debt collateral) 
   0.1799 
[0.89] 
   -0.0290 
[-0.28]** 
Intercept 1.03337 
[6.11]*** 
0.7138 
[3.43]*** 
0.8079 
[5.79]*** 
1.0473 
[5.96]*** 
1.2238 
[4.59]*** 
1.1936 
[4.01]*** 
1.2171 
[4.13]*** 
1.2095 
[4.78]*** 
Number of obs. 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 
R-squared 0.6918 0.5208 0.7481 0.7099 0.5701 0.5486 0.5531 0.5714 
Prob > F 0.0024*** 0.1342 0.0003*** 0.0075*** 0.0007*** 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0021*** 
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2.6.  Government debt and pre-bankruptcy dynamics. 
 
2.6.1.    The access to government debt. 
 
Government debt consists mainly in payroll taxes and value added taxes (sales tax). Income taxes are 
less important as the large majority of our distressed firms do not generate profits. Firms that pay a 
higher payroll, add more value, and book more profit are ceteris paribus expected to pay more taxes 
and contributions to the government. Given this higher flow of tax payments, these firms have a higher 
access to government debt in times of distress since they can always finance themselves by not paying 
what they owe the government. In the U.S., Baird et al. (2007) argue that small distressed firms have 
less incentives to transfer sales taxes and payroll taxes in the running up to bankruptcy. This practice 
of accumulating payable taxes and social contributions might be very persistent in Belgium as 
entrepreneurs and managers are not personally liable for overdue tax and social contributions, which 
might result in an almost mechanical supply effect of government debt. Hence our third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: If firms have a higher payroll and add more value, they have a higher access to 
government debt. 
 
In table 8 we provide estimates of a simple reduced form model of government debt. Government debt 
is measured at the initiation of the procedure and scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets.  
 
In specification 1 we control for the mechanical supply effect by introducing payroll costs scaled by 
assets (payroll costs/assets). Payroll costs/assets is positively related to government debt and is highly 
significant. This strongly suggests that firms with considerable payroll have more access to 
government debt by not transferring payroll taxes to the social security administration. These payroll 
costs contribute to the firm’s added value to the extent that they are incorporated in the price of the 
goods and services delivered by the distressed firm. The more added value, the more value added tax 
(VAT – sales tax in Europe) that needs to be transferred to the tax administration, and the more 
opportunity to accumulate government debt. Specification 2 introduces Added value28 excluding 
payroll costs/assets to fully control for a firm’s added value. After exclusion of payroll costs from the 
gross added value of the firm’s business operations, the nominator mainly consists of operating profit 
(or loss) and the value of depreciations and amortizations on business assets. In line with our supply 
considerations, we expect a positive coefficient for Added value excluding payroll costs/assets, as 
more added value results in more access to government debt (value added tax). We find an 
insignificant coefficient. As Added value excl. payroll costs/assets is closely related to profitability 
(note that its correlation with Net profits/Assets is 0.9094), the found negative estimate suggests that 
the supply effect (due to VAT) may be dominated by an opposite demand effect: more profitable firms 
may have higher access to government debt (as they pay more income tax), but they need it less and 
the latter effect dominates the former. Specification 3 substitutes Net profits/Assets for Added value 
                                               
28
 Definitions of added value differ. We employ gross added value of the business operations (see further). 
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excl. payroll costs/assets. The coefficient is again not significant, which suggests a mixed supply and 
demand effect29.  
 
In specification 1 to 3, we identified that the levels of government debt are driven by a mechanical 
supply effect of payroll and sales taxes, and we cannot reject hypothesis 3. Still, entrepreneurs that 
behave rational will not use government debt unnecessarily. After all, penalties and increments on 
non-transferred or unsettled taxes and social contributions are high in Belgium. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that firms finance long-term projects with government debt. Still, it could be that distressed 
firms ‘demand’ government funds to finance the current assets (inventories for example) that are 
essential to temporary business continuation. Specification 4 till 12 show that the level of current 
assets (current assets excluding cash/assets - including the variable on Inventories/assets in 
specification 10 to 12) is positively related to the government debt levels, although not significantly. 
We can therefore not exclude the existence of a net-demand effect for government claims during the 
pre-bankruptcy period to finance short-term projects. 
 
Notwithstanding the mechanical supply effect, entrepreneurs may only demand government debt to 
finance a shortfall in cash flow, and will avoid arrears on government debt if they generate sufficient 
cash. This entrepreneurial behavior reduces the amount of penalties and increments on unpaid taxes 
and contributions. Our fourth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Cash flow precedes government debt in the pecking order of distressed firms.  
 
Specifications 4 to 7 add proxies for the distressed firm’s internal money flow generation. The ability 
to generate money flows does not affect a distressed firm’s access to government debt. Specifications 
8 to 11 introduce our previously defined proxies for a firm’s access to external finance and bank debt 
as controls to test hypothesis 4, but without any relevant results. The collateral variable (Land and 
buildings/assets) and the instrumented variable Bank debt at procedure initiation/assets do also not 
affect the coefficients of the internal money flow variables, and do even not affect the level of 
government debt30.  
 
In contrast to hypothesis 4, we find no evidence that entrepreneurs demand government debt to finance 
their loss-making business. In addition, the estimate of Payroll costs/Assets remains unaffected after 
controlling for a firm’s ability to generate cash flows and its access to credit from financial 
institutions, which suggests a persistently mechanical supply effect of government debt. 
 
                                               
29
 The found estimate for Payroll costs/assets suggests the presence of a mechanical supply effect of government 
debt. However, if firms have more payrolls, they might be less profitable, and demand more government debt to 
finance their loss-making business (the correlation between Payroll costs/assets and Net profits/Assets is -
0.3194). After controlling for this demand effect by Net profits/assets in specification 4, we find that the 
coefficient estimate of Payroll costs/assets remains unchanged, which confirms our earlier conclusion on the 
dominant supply effect of government debt measured by Payroll costs/assets.   
30
 In unreported regression analysis (available on demand), we also noticed that our findings are robust to 
industry effects. 
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Finally, in specification 12 we control for the reputation and the experience of the distressed firm’s 
management by introducing the variables on previous bankruptcies and management experience (see 
previous section for details). Managers with an existing bankruptcy record clearly accumulate more 
government debt during the pre-bankruptcy period. The significantly negative coefficient for 
management experience may indicate that more experienced managers are cautious not to harm their 
business reputation by accumulating arrears on government debt. This behavior is sensible in the 
Belgian context. Although the absence of personal liability rules offers the opportunity to exploit the 
government as a lender of last resort, this business tactic is not without cost. Belgian credit scoring 
models employed by banks and large trade creditors routinely use arrears on government debt as one 
of the main predictors of imminent failure31. It is hardly surprising then that experienced managers 
avoid arrears on their government debt if they can. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
31
 The models sold by market leader Graydon for example use arrears on government debt as a central variable in 
their models.  
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Table 8: Determinants of Government debt/total assets. 
The dependent variable Government Debt/Total Assets is the firm’s government debt at the start of the procedure scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets. The variable Payroll 
costs/assets, Added value excl. payroll costs/assets, Net Profits/assets, Cash flow/assets, EBITDA/assets, and Altman’s Z”-score for privately held firms are obtained from the 
latest annual account prior to the filing for bankruptcy-reorganization. Ex-ante leverage and ex-ante bank debt are respectively total debt/assets and bank debt/assets equally 
obtained from the pre-bankruptcy account. The variable Bank debt at procedure initiation/assets is instrumented using a simple bank debt model described in appendix A 
(specification 6 of table 1 of appendix A). We refer to table 6 with respect to the other independent variables. The values in brackets are the robust t-statistics:* / ** / *** 
significant at 10% / 5% / 1%.  
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10 Spec. 11 Spec. 12 
Supply of government debt             
Payroll costs /assets  0.4435 
[4.19]*** 
0.4396 
[3.92]*** 
0.4544 
[3.95]*** 
0.4476 
[3.79]*** 
0.4308 
[3.65]*** 
0.4374 
[3.74]*** 
0.4277 
[3.98]*** 
0.4237 
[4.03]*** 
0.4042 
[3.51]*** 
0.4121 
[3.48]*** 
0.4122 
[3.72]*** 
0.4725 
[4.91]*** 
Added value excl. payroll costs / assets  -0.0164 
[-0.19] 
          
Financial health and internal money flow 
generation 
            
Net profits/assets   0.0280 
[0.32] 
0.0316 
[0.33] 
        
Cash flow/assets     
 
-0.0320 
[-0.42] 
    -0.0454 
[-0.53] 
-0.0459 
[-0.55] 
-0.0391 
[-0.52] 
EBITDA/assets      0.0046 
[0.05] 
      
Altman’s Z”- Score       -0.0026 
[-0.50] 
0.0035 
[0.36] 
-0.0027 
[-0.50] 
 -  
Access to external funds             
Ex-ante leverage 
 
       0.1265 
[0.80] 
    
Ex-ante bank debt/assets         -0.1113 
[-0.91] 
   
Land and buildings / assets (collateral)          -0.0806 
[-0.66] 
 -0.1364 
[-1.13] 
Bank debt at procedure initiation / assets           -0.0914 
[-0.66] 
(instrum.) 
 
Debtor profile             
Previous Bankruptcies            0.0713 
[3.00]*** 
Management Experience            -0.0214 
[-3.81]*** 
Controls             
L(Total Assets) -0.0841 
[-4.70]*** 
-0.0841 
[-4.70]*** 
-0.0846 
[-4.63]*** 
-0.0848 
[-3.34]*** 
-0.0804 
[-3.44]*** 
-0.0831 
[-3.48]*** 
-0.0786 
[-3.09]*** 
-0.0744 
[-3.30]*** 
-0.0737 
[-2.90]*** 
-0.0789 
[-2.92]*** 
-0.0819 
[-3.31]*** 
-0.0629 
[-2.74]*** 
D-PLLC    0.0176 
[0.23] 
0.0049 
[0.07] 
0.0121 
[0.17] 
0.0026 
[0.04] 
0.0182 
[0.24] 
0.0023 
[0.03] 
0.0051 
[0..08] 
0.0081 
[0.13] 
0.0790 
[1.17] 
Current Assets excl. cash/ assets    0.1293 
[1.20] 
0.1247 
[1.18] 
0.1309 
[1.20] 
0.1401 
[1.25] 
0.1322 
[1.12] 
0.1096 
[0.91] 
   
 
Inventories / assets          0.1074 
[0.62] 
0.1233 
[0.80] 
0.1132 
[0.76] 
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Continuation of table 5 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10 Spec. 11 Spec. 12 
             
             
Receivables / assets          0.0012 
[0.01] 
0.0076 
[0.04] 
0.0296 
[-0.16] 
             
Industry dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Intercept 0.6817 
[5.36]*** 
0.6822 
[5.36]*** 
0.6879 
[5.23]*** 
0.6083 
[3.90]*** 
0.5849 
[3.95]*** 
0.5962 
[4.05]*** 
0.5625 
[3.41]*** 
0.4003 
[1.99]** 
0.5938 
[3.32]*** 
0.6382 
[4.49]*** 
0.6690 
[4.62]*** 
0.5472 
[4.25]*** 
             
No. of observations 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
R-squared 0.3536 0.3540 0.3547 0.3691 0.3698 0.3678 0.3706 0.3896 0.3772 0.3666 0.3724 
(Centered 
R2) 
0.4567 
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2.6.2. Government administration as lender of last resort. 
 
Government debt is mechanically supplied during the pre-bankruptcy period regardless of the firm’s 
ability to generate cash flows and its overall access to credit from financial institutions. This raises the 
question why distressed firms demand government debt in the first place? In this section, we further 
explore pre-bankruptcy debt dynamics induced by the entrepreneurs and the different creditors to 
answer this question. Our basic analysis of the pre-bankruptcy debt dynamics shows that the 
probability of government debt expansion drastically drops if bank and trade creditors are more eager 
to supply credit in the running up to petition filing (see section 2.4). This suggests that entrepreneurs 
may accumulate overdue taxes and social contributions to settle the claims of creditors more essential 
to business continuation, like trade creditors and financial institutions. Together with the relatively 
slow reaction of the government to overdue payments32, this entrepreneurial behaviour may turn the 
government into a passive lender of last resort in the Belgian context. Hence our fifth hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The government administration acts as lender of last resort if other creditors contract 
their lending in the running up to petition filing.  
 
We define different subsamples, based on the pre-bankruptcy behavior of the private creditors, to test 
its impact on the level of government debt predicted by hypothesis 5. 
 
Panel A of table 9 on government debt uses identical subsamples than those of panel A of table 7 on 
trade debt. The coefficient estimate for the variable Payroll costs/assets in the 53-case subsample with 
bank credit contraction is large33 and significant, which is not the case in the competing subsample 
with bank credit expansions. This suggests that entrepreneurs have incentive to not transfer taxes to 
government administration if banks contract their credit. Government is used as lender of last resort 
and hypothesis 5 is not rejected. In addition, in both subsamples, we find that the levels of government 
debt are not significantly related to the internal money flow generation of a distressed firm. Our 
findings in the subsample with bank credit contraction are interesting as they confirm that cash flow 
does not precede government debt in the pecking order for bank-debt constrained firms (this finding is 
related to hypothesis 2 on trade credit). 
 
We certainly expect that government acts as lender of last resort if both trade creditors and banks 
contract. A comparison between the last available accounting data and the debt reported in the plans 
reveals that a creditor’s run by creditors of the private market takes place with 31 out of 89 cases (see 
CAT 1 and CAT 3 of table 3). In panel B of table 9, we find that Payroll costs/assets turns highly 
significant, and coefficient estimates are larger than before (compare with panel A of table 9). This 
suggests that the mechanical supply effect of government debt plays under debt contraction by both 
trade and bank creditors. We can clearly not reject hypothesis 5.  
                                               
32
 The slow reaction of government administration may be strengthened by information asymmetries between 
government and the private market creditors involved. Specifically it cannot be excluded that well-informed 
creditors withdraw their lending in the running up to petition-filing for bankruptcy-reorganization.  
33
 The coefficients of the variable Payroll costs/assets in the 53-case subsample with bank contraction are larger 
than those estimated in the full 89-case sample (see table 8 of section 2.6.1). 
Chapter 2. Pre-bankruptcy Dynamics and Unsecured Debt 
                                                                                                                        2.26 
Table 9: Government as lender of last resort. 
The dependent variable Government Debt/Total Assets is the firm’s government debt at the start of the 
procedure scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets. In panel A, we expect that firms use more government debt 
(measured by Payroll cots/assets) under a bank credit contraction than under a bank credit expansion. We refer to 
panel A of table 7 for a definition of the different subsamples. In panel B, both banks and trade creditors contract 
their lending in the running up to petition filing, and entrepreneurs are expected to heavily rely on government 
debt. This situation of a creditor’s run by creditors of the private market occurs for 31 out of 89 distressed firms 
(see CAT 1 and CAT 3 of table 3).  
Panel A Bank credit contraction Bank credit expansion  
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 
Internal funds         
EBITDA / assets -0.0527 
[-0.45] 
   -0.1630 
[-1.14] 
   
Net profits assets  -0.0744 
[-0.76] 
   -0.0841 
[-0.86] 
  
Cash flow / assets   -0.0548 
[-0.49]** 
-0.0530 
[-0.47]* 
  -0.1481 
[-0.25] 
-0.1539 
[-1.23] 
Controls         
L(total assets) -0.0919 
[-3.64]*** 
-0.0923 
[-3.63]*** 
-0.0919 
[-3.63]*** 
-0.0893 
[-3.56]*** 
-0.1007 
[-5.01]*** 
-0.1030 
[-5.02]*** 
-0.0999 
[-4.90]*** 
-0.0949 
[-4.01]*** 
Payroll costs  / assets 0.4889 
[3.36]*** 
0.4792 
[3.25]*** 
0.4708 
[3.05]*** 
0.4617 
[2.95]*** 
-0.0111 
[-0.07] 
0.0414 
[0.29] 
0.0009 
[0.01] 
0.0090 
[-0.06] 
Land and buildings / assets 
(collateral) 
   -0.0819 
[-0.56] 
   -0.0487 
[-0.43] 
Intercept 0.7493 
[4.09]*** 
0.7416 
[4.05]*** 
0.7491 
[4.09]*** 
0.7468 
[4.02]*** 
0.8318 
[5.68]*** 
0.8228 
[5.69]*** 
0.8124 
[6.61]*** 
0.7930 
[5.22]*** 
Number of obs. 53 53 53 53 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.4537 0.4572 0.4543 0.4565 0.5758 0.5595 0.5743 0.5769 
Prob > F 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0002*** 0.0001* 0.0004*** 
 
     
Panel B Bank and trade credit contraction: a creditor’s run     
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4     
Internal funds         
EBITDA / assets 0.0897 
[0.34] 
       
Net profits assets  -0.0226 
[-0.11] 
      
Cash flow / assets   0.1153 
[0.48] 
0.1153 
[0.47] 
    
Controls         
L(total assets) -0.1286 
[-3.98]*** 
-0.1235 
[-4.15]*** 
-0.1286 
[-4.08]*** 
-0.1286 
[-3.99]*** 
    
Payroll costs  / assets 0.6549 
[5.34]*** 
0.6147 
[4.03]*** 
0.7174 
[3.64]*** 
0.7171 
[3.54]*** 
    
Land and buildings / assets 
(collateral) 
   -0.0019 
[-0.01] 
    
         
Intercept 0.9543 
[4.23]*** 
0.9251 
[4.21]*** 
0.9496 
[4.34]*** 
10.9497 
[4.25]*** 
    
Number of obs. 31 31 31 31     
R-squared 0.6178 0.6133 0.6216 0.6216     
Prob > F 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0002***     
 
Using our data provided by the National Bank of Belgium, we estimated government debt models in a 
subsample with large contractions (18 out of 37) and in a subsample with small contractions (19 out of 
37).  The subsamples are identical as those used in panel B of table 7. Our specifications estimated in 
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the subsample with large bank credit contractions are however not significant (based on the p-values - 
Prob > F). 
 
2.6.3.  A legal rationale for high government debt in Belgium. 
 
Specific legislation on personal liability for tax and social contributions is absent in Belgium. 
Therefore, entrepreneurs can exploit government to those creditors that are essential for the 
continuation of the business activity, namely banks and trade creditors. Banks can seize their 
contractual right, and sell the collateral attached to the debt. Trade creditors can stop supplying of 
goods and services, but they may also have an equity-like stake in the survival of the firm. Our results 
show that firms tend to accumulate government debt to pay bank debts and trade creditors.    
 
Third party liability of firm officers and directors for unpaid taxes and social contributions differs 
across countries (see B.G. Morgan with respect to tax claims, 2000). In the United States, federal laws 
and the Bankruptcy Code provide in personal liability with respect to certain types of tax claims and 
other specific debts34. Baird & Morrison (2005) argue that entrepreneurs take into account personal tax 
liability by opting for Chapter 11, because it provides a better chance of reaching a compromise on 
their tax obligations35. The Canadian legislator prescribes director liability with respect to tax and 
social contributions. This might drive the low percentage (only a few percentages) of government debt 
during court-supervised reorganization in Canada (Fisher & J. Martel, 1995). In the U.S., this 
percentage amounts to 7.3% on average (Baird, Bris & Zhu, 2007), while it averages approximately 
26% in Belgium (see table 2)36. 
 
Baird, Bris and Zhu (2007) show that small firms have a relatively high percentage of tax and social 
security priority claims compared to larger firms under court-supervised reorganization. They use a 
sample of 139 firms37 that emerge from Chapter 11, and in principle, a plan is confirmed for those 
firms. They find that American owner-managers of small companies are more likely to use 
government debt as informal financing mechanism than larger companies. The authors argue “owner-
managers are more likely to succumb to temptation. They invade the trust funds in the hope that their 
business is facing only a temporarily cash flow problem and they can replace the money before it is 
missed”. In table 10 we show a similar pattern in our Belgian sample as smaller corporations (among 
our sample of small corporations) tend to have a higher ratio of government debt to total debt, 
although our relationship is not perfectly monotonic. Still, our percentages outperform the American 
ones, most likely due to the lack of personal liability rules. 
 
 
                                               
34
 See also the Stigma reports of the European Commission (2001-2005) – Best Project on Restructuring, 
Bankruptcy, and a Fresh start. 
35
 Tax obligations in the U.S. typically include social security taxes.  
36
 The American, Canadian and Belgian tax debt percentages cannot be unconditionally compared as the priority 
character and the extent of government claims may differ among countries.  
37
 Their sample is similar than this of Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006). Baird, Bris and Zhu (2007) however analyse 
only the firms that did succeed (i.e. firms that are dismissed and converted during the pre-confirmation stage of 
Chapter 11 are not included). 
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Table 10: Government debt to total liabilities. 
This table compares government debt under court-supervised reorganization in the United States and 
Belgium. Size classes are expressed in $ for Chapter 11 firms and in € for Belgian firms38.   
 Chapter 11 Belgian Law on Judicial composition 
  Cond. on claim > 0  Cond. on claim > 0 
Pre-Bankruptcy assets . . .  N Perc. N Perc. N Perc. N Perc. 
Smaller than 100K 9 26.7% 7 39.7% 12 28.6% 12 28.6% 
Between 100K and 200K 8 16.1% 5 25.7% 13 37.8% 13 37.8% 
Between 200K and 500K 24 7.2% 17 10.6% 18 32.5% 17 34.4% 
Between 500K and 1000K 21 6.9% 14 10.3% 17 22.6% 15 25.6% 
Between 1000K and 2000K 10 10.2% 6 18.3% 16 16.5% 16 16.5% 
Between 2000K and 5000K 23 5.8% 13 10.3% 13 1908% 13 19.8% 
Larger than 5000K 44 2.1% 19 4.9% N/A 
Only Public Companies 11 2.8% 3 10.1% N/A 
Total 139 7.3% 81 12.8% 89 26.1% 86 27.0% 
 
In a companion paper (Leyman, Schoors, Coussement; 2008), we find that excessive levels of 
government debt adversely affect survival probabilities of firms that filed for court-supervised 
reorganization (likely because of the ‘mandatory’ repayment of government debt during plan 
execution3940). One might argue that this perverse ‘lender of last resort’ effect of the access to 
government debt may be avoided by enacting personal liability rules on tax and social contributions. 
This would render the option of institutional debt more expensive and therefore urge the entrepreneur 
to file earlier for judicial composition (or bankruptcy-liquidation)41, with possible positive effects on 
the reorganization outcome. On the other hand, more stringent rules on personal liability may also 
strengthen the stigma on bankruptcy and discourage risk-taking and entrepreneurship42. Therefore, the 
ultimate effect of more stringent liability rules on economic welfare remains unclear. 
 
2.7. Restructuring of unsecured debt in the light of the pre-bankruptcy dynamics. 
  
The previously reported debt structure is largely rearranged under court-supervised reorganization, by 
way of debt forgiveness and debt deferral. Debt restructuring is typically at the core of a 
reorganization plan. Within reasonable limits, bankruptcy law should in principle preserve the 
Absolute Priority Rule. While the Absolute Priority Rule is in general fully respected in liquidation 
procedures, deviations occur frequently in reorganization proceedings, depending on the legal 
framework (see e.g. Weiss, 1990). Table 11 shows data on debt restructuring for a restricted sample of 
86 out of 89 small corporations. Missing data or plans drafted for a period of less then 24 months 
                                               
38
 The American sample of 139 firms consists of firms with confirmed plans. 
39
 The ratio of government debt/total debt for failing firms during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage 
averages 0.2199 (N = 44 of 89), while it only averages 0.3031 for firms that remain intact during this period (N = 
45 of 89). Those differences in mean are significant at the 5% level (based on a two-tailed t-test). Medians are 
respectively 0.1392 and 0.2583. 
40
 Fisher & Martel (1995, 2004) equally show that the full repayment of prioritized government claims lower the 
likelihood of plan confirmation under the Canadian system.  
41
 See Adler et al. (2006) and Donoher (2004) on delay incentives.  
42
 See Fan and White (2003) for the impact of exemption levels (with respect to the private wealth of the 
entrepreneurs) on the level of entrepreneurial activity. 
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prevent the use of 3 plans43. In this restricted sample of plans drafted for exactly 24 months, all firms 
have outstanding trade debt, 83 firms owe unsettled tax and social contributions, and 65 firms are 
bank-financed (55 secured and 10 unsecured). The debt restructuring of the bank debt is analyzed in 
further research. 
 
According to panel A, trade creditors largely bear the burden of alleviating the debt levels. In 60 of the 
86 cases, trade creditors undergo a debt reduction, averaging 50.63 % of the face value of the claim44. 
Deviations from the absolute priority rules disfavoring trade creditors are thus omnipresent. This type 
of APR deviation is not uncommon in other countries since the trade creditors’ expected proceeds 
under bankruptcy-liquidation are typically close to zero, especially if the debtor is a small firm. Our 
previous finding that trade creditors are willing to provide credit to finance a shortfall in cash flow 
(hypothesis 1) offers an additional argument to rationalize these APR deviations, namely that trade 
creditors are responsible for at least part of the undue trade credit. 
 
Taxes and social contributions are less subject to debt forgiveness as reported in panel A, and if any, 
the percentage is lower compared to the one of trade credit. The plans clearly show that the social 
security administration forgives debt in most cases, while that tax authorities do most certainly not. A 
legal rationale therefore is that the social security administration is treated as an ordinary creditor 
under the Belgian reorganization law, while a reduction of the tax claims demands the tax authority’s 
individual consent.  
 
The government administration might also be unwilling to forgive debt because they are aware of the 
pre-bankruptcy debt dynamics – i.e. government administration is used as lender of last resort 
(hypothesis 5). This may be problematic because the ‘mandatory’ full repayment of government debt 
increases the likelihood of the firm’s transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation during the post-confirmation 
stage45 (see section 2.6.3). From an efficiency point of view, it cannot be ruled out that viable firms 
with higher levels of government debt are more likely to be liquidated simply because they can 
temporarily not meet the high promised repayments on their government debt. The success of plan 
execution after all depends on the firm’s ability to meet the projected cash flows. This implies the 
presence of type-II errors (see White, 1994), where viable firms only suffering from financial distress 
are shut down instead of reorganized. 
  
The initial debtor-proposed plan needs to be executed during a period of maximum 24 months, which 
is fixed at exactly 24 months for 98% of cases. This implies that the complete repayment of unsecured 
debt (after debt reduction) should be scheduled within this period. If the original plan cannot be fully 
                                               
43
 One plan is excluded in table 11 because of missing data on specific variables (on debt deferral). Two other 
firms spending less then 24 months under court-supervision after plan confirmation are equally removed. We do 
also not analyze the newly drafted plans with respect to a prolongation (with maximum 12 months) of the initial 
24-month plan execution period. This restricts our analysis to firms with an initial plan execution period of 
exactly 24 months. 
44
 In regression analysis reported in appendix E, we find that the fraction of debt forgiveness increases with the 
level of outstanding trade credit. 
45
 Using a Canadian sample, Fisher & Martel (1995, 2004) also find that government debt impedes the likelihood 
of successful reorganization. 
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enforced, the debtor can however propose an amendment of the plan, resulting in an additional period 
of maximum 12 months for the execution of this new plan. Conflicting with the Belgian reorganization 
legislation, we however find that a minority of the initially drafted plans schedule trade and 
government debt repayments for a period larger than 24 months. Panel B reports that this occurs in 28 
cases (41%) for trade debt and 14 cases (30%) for government debt. 
 
Our unreported calculations reveal that the promised repayment percentage for both unsecured trade 
and government debt averages 74.64% (and 76.58% on median) in our sample of 86 corporations. Bris 
et al. (2006) find that unsecured creditors do only recover about one-third to one-half of their claims 
under Chapter 11. Sundgren (1998) reports an average promised repayment of 43% (and 37% on 
median) under Finnish reorganization, and shows that the mean (median) repayment period to 
unsecured creditors is 6.1 (5.5) years. A payoff rate to unsecured creditors of 46.9% is found under 
Japanese reorganization (Eisenberg and Tagashira, 1994), and repayment terms of 5.8 years (mode is 
5.1).  
 
The share of tax and social contributions in total promised payments to unsecured creditors is large 
under Belgian reorganization because these claims are considerable and are only rarely subject to debt 
forgiveness. Data limitations on foreign recovery rates for tax and social contributions prevent a 
comparison with our Belgian data. The Canadian payoff rates for ordinary creditors, which are 
typically trade creditors, average 44 cents on each dollar of debt (Fisher & Martel, 1994). Our payoff 
rate to trade creditors averages 64.67%, and 64.49% on median46. Distinct data on trade creditor 
repayments is missing in the above-mentioned U.S., Japanese and Finnish studies. Under the 
assumption that repayments to prioritized unsecured creditors (like the tax administration) are larger 
than these to trade creditors, the above-reported percentages for unsecured creditors are upper bounds 
for the payoff rates to trade creditors. Thus, trade creditors are repaid at most one-third to one-half of 
their claims in the U.S., 43% in Finland and 46.9% in Japan. We conclude that trade creditors fare 
very well under Belgian court-supervised reorganization, which suggests that the procedure is friendly 
to unsecured creditors. 
 
Table 11: Debt restructuring of unsecured debt.  
Panel A: debt forgiveness 
 
Number of cases with debt 
forgiveness Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
Trade debt 60 out of 86 0.5063 0.5000 0.2255 0.0178 0.9441 
Tax & soc. 19 out of 83 0.2179 0.2061 0.1426 0.0161 0.5883 
Panel B: Postponed repayments (in principal) until after the court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months per type of debt claim 
  Repayment of specific debt after 24 months / Total repayments of 
specific debt within and after 24 months 
 Cases with debt deferral Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
Trade debt 28 out of 86 0.4101 0.3692 0.2110 0.0648 1 
Tax & soc. 14 out of 83 0.3038 0.3543 0.2106 0.0139 0.6363 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
46
 Our calculations are based on 26 cases without debt reduction and on 60 cases with debt reduction. 
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2.8. Concluding remarks. 
  
Our paper starts with a profound overview of the debt composition of Belgian small distressed firms 
attempting to reorganize under Belgian court-supervision. The debt composition mainly consists of 
bank debt, trade credit, and due taxes and social contributions. Unsecured claims accounts for more 
than 70% of the outstanding debt. Those debt level variables contain information on the pre-
bankruptcy dynamics. First, we find that small distressed corporations accumulate trade credit to 
finance their loss-making business during the pre-bankruptcy period, in line with Peterson and Rajan 
(1997). This finding is robust after controlling for a distressed firm’s access to bank financing, and is 
very persistent under a liquidity constraint due to a bank credit contraction. Second, we identified an 
almost mechanical supply effect of the tax and social security administration that acts as lender of last 
resort during the pre-bankruptcy period. This latter practice is clearly objectionable. The alteration of 
personal liability rules might be recommended to remedy this problem. Personal liability rules for 
taxes and social contributions would render the access to government debt more costly and therefore 
make debt substitution in the pre-bankruptcy period less attractive and likely force the entrepreneur to 
file earlier for court-supervised restructuring. The ultimate effect of more stringent liability rules on 
economic welfare remains vague. Therefore we suggest the establishment of a mechanism to 
encourage the government administration to collect its overdue debts more actively.  
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Appendix A. 
 
Bank debt fina ncing: a simple model. 
 
Financial contracts critically depend on the liquidation value of the pledged assets (see e.g. Hart & 
Moore, 1994, 1998; Berglöf & Von Thadden, 1994). The creditor’s willingness to provide credit 
increases with the pool of collateralizable assets. Less-specialized assets are preferred as collateral to 
avoid ‘fire sales’ because of illiquid markets upon liquidation (Shleifer & Vichny, 2002). Berger et al. 
(1996) find that less specialized assets results in more liquidation option value per dollar of book 
value. Land and buildings are typically considered as very redeployable assets because of their less-
specialized nature1.  
 
We expect that more bank debt is attracted when firms have more land and buildings on their balance 
sheets. In specification 1 of table 1 of this appendix, we regress the book value of land and buildings 
on the bank’s loan size (both variables scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets). The book value of real estate 
is reported in the pre-bankruptcy accounts and the outstanding bank debt is measured at the moment of 
imitation of the bankruptcy-reorganization procedure. We control for pre-bankruptcy assets. The 
empirical findings of specification 1 are in line with our expectations. Specification 2 shows that 
Machinery and equipment/Assets has no effect on the outstanding bank credit. 
 
Creditors are reluctant to provide credit when a distressed firm’s profit and cash flow realization is 
highly uncertain (see e.g. Lemmon & Zender, 2007). After all, creditors bear the full risk if the 
distressed business ultimately fails, and they need to share the potential business surplus value with the 
shareholders. Specification 3 controls for uncertainty by introducing the variation in the industry’s 
profit margin2 and the industry attrition rate. The latter rate is the proportion of small businesses within 
a particular industry that file a petition for bankruptcy-liquidation each year (see Morrison, 2007). We 
also introduce EBITDA/assets in specification 3. We find that firms with more variation in the 
industry’s profit margin significantly attract less bank credit. 
 
Asymmetric information reduces the willingness of creditors to provide credit. Firm age is used as a 
measure of the informational transparency of a firm, whereby older firms are expected to be more 
transparent. Specification 4 introduces the logarithmic value of the age of a firm, i.e. the variable 
L(firm age). We surprisingly find that older firms have lower levels of bank debt. Specification 5 
shows that firms older than 20 years have less bank financing, while young firms (< 5 years) do not 
suffer from informational asymmetries. 
 
Specification 6 adds the dummy variable D-Debt personally guaranteed that amounts 1 if the 
entrepreneur provided a personal guarantee to the bank (13 out of 89 cases). This dummy variable is 
significantly positive as expected. Specification 6 is used to instrument the level of bank debt at the 
                                               
1
 Ronen & Sorter (1972) classify land and buildings as less specialized than other fixed assets. 
2
 The industry’s variation in profit margin consists in the industry average of the standard deviation of the 
operating profit margin over the last 3 fiscal years. This variable is based on variation in profit margin within 
businesses over time (i.e. non cross-sectional – based on 3-digit Nace codes). 
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moment of procedure initiation (scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets) in our trade and government debt 
models of section 2.6 and 2.7. 
 
Table 1 of appendix A 
The dependent variable is bank debt at the moment of initiation of the procedure scaled by total assets. The 
independent variables Land and buildings/assets, Machinery and equipment/assets, total assets, EBITDA/assets 
are obtained from the latest pre-bankruptcy fiscal accounts prior to petition filing. The industry’s variation in 
profit margin consists in the industry average of the standard deviation of the operating profit margin over the 
last 3 fiscal years. This variable is based on the variation in profit margin within businesses over time (i.e. non 
cross-sectional). The variable Industry attrition rate is the proportion of small businesses within a particular 
industry that file a petition for bankruptcy-liquidation each year. The dummy D-Debt personally guaranteed 
amounts one if the entrepreneur provided a personal guarantee to the bank, and zero otherwise. The values in 
brackets are the robust t-statistics: * / ** / *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%.  
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 
Book value of land and buildings / assets 0.5168 
[3.89]*** 
0.5182 
[3.89]*** 
0.5137 
[3.62]*** 
0.5308 
[4.41]*** 
0.5363 
[4.52]*** 
0.3840 
[2.35]** 
Book value machinery and equipment / 
assets 
 0.0812 
[0.54] 
    
Industry variation in profit margin   -0.0200 
[-1.72]* 
-0.0236 
[-2.28]** 
-0.0296 
[-2.73]*** 
-0.0186 
[-2.35]** 
Industry Attrition Rate   0.0405 
[0.55] 
   
EBITDA / assets   -0.0485 
[-0.42] 
   
L(Firm age)    -0.0587 
[-1.99]** 
  
D - Old firm (>20 years)     -0.2109 
[-2.61]** 
 
D - Young firm (< 5 years)     0.0294 
[0.47] 
 
D-Debt personally guaranteed      0.2115 
[1.67]* 
Controls       
L(assets) -0.0024 
[-0.13] 
-0.0016 
[-0.08] 
-0.0175 
[-0.79] 
-0.0074 
[-0.33] 
-0.0140 
[-0.67] 
 
       
Intercept 0.2383 
[1.85]* 
0.2271 
[1.70]* 
0.3737 
[1.72]* 
0.5070 
[2.71]*** 
0.4674 
[2.47]** 
0.3041 
[5.08]*** 
       
No. of observations 89 89 89 89 89 89 
R-squared 0.1430 0.1443 0.1860 0.2034 0.2327 0.2338 
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Appendix B: summary statistics 
 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Debt composition variables (debt reported in confirmed plans)    
Trade credit / assets 0.4543 0.3919 0.3954 
Government debt/assets 0.2995 0.1994 0.3028 
    
Financial health and internal money flow generation    
Net profits / assets -0.2364 -0.1008 0.3714 
Cash flow / assets -0.2036 -0.0443 0.4613 
EBITDA / assets -0.0711 0.0220 0.3479 
Altman’s Z”- Score -2.9480 -1.3366 6.5827 
    
Access to external funds    
Ex ante Leverage 1.2035 1.0539 0.4709 
Ex-ante bank debt / total assets 0.3284 0.3143 0.2528 
Land and buildings / total assets (collateral proxy) 0.1453 0 0.2177 
Bank debt at procedure initiation / assets   0.2990 0.2407 0.2942 
    
Controls    
L(Total Assets) 6.1229 6.3333 1.3698 
D-Public Limited Liability Corporation 0.5056 1 0.5028 
L(Firm Age) 2.1005 2.1963 0.8386 
Current assets excl. cash/ assets 0.5789 0.5999 0.2737 
Inventories / assets 0.1934 0.1520 0.1941 
Receivables / assets 0.2404 0.2161 0.2166 
    
Debtor profile    
Previous Bankruptcies3 0.5618 0 1.0220 
Management Experience4 4.0449 2 5.1652 
    
Supply of government debt    
Payroll costs /assets  0.2991 0.2380 0.3005 
Added value excl. payroll costs / assets -0.0405 0.0270 0.3442 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3
 Maximum is 5 
4
 Maximum is 27 
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Appendix C: correlation matrix of variables used in table 4 (trade credit model) 
 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 
S1 1,0000 -0,3405 -0,4299 -0,2654 -0,4646 0,3937 -0,1695 -0,3085 -0,1653 -0,3562 0,0335 -0,1608 0,1870 0,0296 -0,1264 -0,2005 0,0101 
S2 -0,3405 1,0000 0,8619 0,8869 0,8677 -0,4894 0,0469 0,1385 -0,0222 0,0763 -0,1778 -0,0270 -0,0116 0,1420 0,1433 0,0523 -0,0812 
S3 -0,4299 0,8619 1,0000 0,7256 0,7693 -0,5500 0,1637 0,1534 0,0767 0,1606 -0,1046 -0,0742 -0,1567 0,1111 0,0788 0,0191 -0,0386 
S4 -0,2654 0,8869 0,7256 1,0000 0,7628 -0,3576 0,0661 0,1046 -0,0283 -0,0129 -0,2019 -0,0268 -0,0725 0,0667 0,0417 0,0185 -0,0978 
S5 -0,4646 0,8677 0,7693 0,7628 1,0000 -0,6831 0,0418 0,1358 0,0599 0,2200 -0,0798 -0,0182 0,0997 0,2265 0,3020 0,0502 -0,0102 
S6 0,3937 -0,4894 -0,5500 -0,3576 -0,6831 1,0000 0,2458 -0,2191 0,0099 -0,3159 -0,1259 0,0891 -0,0173 -0,0947 -0,1733 -0,0823 -0,1589 
S7 -0,1695 0,0469 0,1637 0,0661 0,0418 0,2458 1,0000 0,4003 0,5423 0,2768 0,1073 0,0688 -0,3425 -0,1020 -0,2274 0,0227 0,0345 
S8 -0,3085 0,1385 0,1534 0,1046 0,1358 -0,2191 0,4003 1,0000 0,3780 0,3866 0,1545 0,2045 -0,5253 -0,1741 -0,2585 0,0205 0,0192 
S9 -0,1653 -0,0222 0,0767 -0,0283 0,0599 0,0099 0,5423 0,3780 1,0000 0,1365 0,0899 -0,0689 -0,2320 -0,0100 -0,1343 -0,0787 -0,0922 
S10 -0,3562 0,0763 0,1606 -0,0129 0,2200 -0,3159 0,2768 0,3866 0,1365 1,0000 0,4994 0,3387 -0,1226 0,0615 0,0972 0,0310 0,3353 
S11 0,0335 -0,1778 -0,1046 -0,2019 -0,0798 -0,1259 0,1073 0,1545 0,0899 0,4994 1,0000 0,0610 -0,0043 0,0392 0,0863 0,0601 0,4550 
S12 -0,1608 -0,0270 -0,0742 -0,0268 -0,0182 0,0891 0,0688 0,2045 -0,0689 0,3387 0,0610 1,0000 0,0634 0,0038 0,1569 0,0069 -0,1206 
S13 0,1870 -0,0116 -0,1567 -0,0725 0,0997 -0,0173 -0,3425 -0,5253 -0,2320 -0,1226 -0,0043 0,0634 1,0000 0,4833 0,4486 0,0884 0,0241 
S14 0,0296 0,1420 0,1111 0,0667 0,2265 -0,0947 -0,1020 -0,1741 -0,0100 0,0615 0,0392 0,0038 0,4833 1,0000 -0,0587 -0,1099 -0,0154 
S15 -0,1264 0,1433 0,0788 0,0417 0,3020 -0,1733 -0,2274 -0,2585 -0,1343 0,0972 0,0863 0,1569 0,4486 -0,0587 1,0000 0,0119 0,0607 
S16 -0,2005 0,0523 0,0191 0,0185 0,0502 -0,0823 0,0227 0,0205 -0,0787 0,0310 0,0601 0,0069 0,0884 -0,1099 0,0119 1,0000 0,4042 
S17 0,0101 -0,0812 -0,0386 -0,0978 -0,0102 -0,1589 0,0345 0,0192 -0,0922 0,3353 0,4550 -0,1206 0,0241 -0,0154 0,0607 0,4042 1,0000 
 
 
S1: Trade credit /Assets (dependent variable) S10: L(Total Assets) 
S2: Net profits / assets S11: D-Public Limited Liability Corporation 
S3: Cash flow / assets S12: L(Firm Age) 
S4 : EBITDA / assets S13: Current assets excl. cash/ assets 
S5 : Altman’s Z”- Score S14 : Inventories / assets 
S6 : Ex ante Leverage S15: Receivables / assets 
S7: Ex-ante bank debt / total assets S16: Previous Bankruptcies 
S8: Land and buildings / total assets (collateral) S17: Management Experience 
S9: Bank debt at procedure initiation / assets    
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Appendix D: correlation matrix of variables used in table 5 (government debt models) 
 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 
S1 1,0000 0,4574 -0,1125 -0,1389 -0,2627 -0,1396 -0,1880 0,2987 -0,3322 -0,2936 -0,1898 -0,4005 -0,1568 0,1910 0,0394 0,0596 0,0696 -0,2359 
S2 0,4574 1,0000 -0,2070 -0,3194 -0,3281 -0,3161 -0,1547 0,1272 -0,2769 -0,1865 -0,1003 -0,0457 0,0291 0,0624 -0,0247 0,2133 -0,0244 0,1477 
S3 -0,1125 -0,2070 1,0000 0,9094 0,7480 0,9372 0,7800 -0,3613 0,0775 0,0978 -0,0324 0,0094 -0,2257 -0,0991 0,0354 0,1001 0,0216 -0,1038 
S4 -0,1389 -0,3194 0,9094 1,0000 0,8619 0,8869 0,8677 -0,4894 0,0469 0,1385 -0,0222 0,0763 -0,1778 -0,0116 0,1420 0,1433 0,0523 -0,0812 
S5 -0,2627 -0,3281 0,7480 0,8619 1,0000 0,7256 0,7693 -0,5500 0,1637 0,1534 0,0767 0,1606 -0,1046 -0,1567 0,1111 0,0788 0,0191 -0,0386 
S6 -0,1396 -0,3161 0,9372 0,8869 0,7256 1,0000 0,7628 -0,3576 0,0661 0,1046 -0,0283 -0,0129 -0,2019 -0,0725 0,0667 0,0417 0,0185 -0,0978 
S7 -0,1880 -0,1547 0,7800 0,8677 0,7693 0,7628 1,0000 -0,6831 0,0418 0,1358 0,0599 0,2200 -0,0798 0,0997 0,2265 0,3020 0,0502 -0,0102 
S8 0,2987 0,1272 -0,3613 -0,4894 -0,5500 -0,3576 -0,6831 1,0000 0,2458 -0,2191 0,0099 -0,3159 -0,1259 -0,0173 -0,0947 -0,1733 -0,0823 -0,1589 
S9 -0,3322 -0,2769 0,0775 0,0469 0,1637 0,0661 0,0418 0,2458 1,0000 0,4003 0,5423 0,2768 0,1073 -0,3425 -0,1020 -0,2274 0,0227 0,0345 
S10 -0,2936 -0,1865 0,0978 0,1385 0,1534 0,1046 0,1358 -0,2191 0,4003 1,0000 0,3780 0,3866 0,1545 -0,5253 -0,1741 -0,2585 0,0205 0,0192 
S11 -0,1898 -0,1003 -0,0324 -0,0222 0,0767 -0,0283 0,0599 0,0099 0,5423 0,3780 1,0000 0,1365 0,0899 -0,2320 -0,0100 -0,1343 -0,0787 -0,0922 
S12 -0,4005 -0,0457 0,0094 0,0763 0,1606 -0,0129 0,2200 -0,3159 0,2768 0,3866 0,1365 1,0000 0,4994 -0,1226 0,0615 0,0972 0,0310 0,3353 
S13 -0,1568 0,0291 -0,2257 -0,1778 -0,1046 -0,2019 -0,0798 -0,1259 0,1073 0,1545 0,0899 0,4994 1,0000 -0,0043 0,0392 0,0863 0,0601 0,4550 
S14 0,1910 0,0624 -0,0991 -0,0116 -0,1567 -0,0725 0,0997 -0,0173 -0,3425 -0,5253 -0,2320 -0,1226 -0,0043 1,0000 0,4833 0,4486 0,0884 0,0241 
S15 0,0394 -0,0247 0,0354 0,1420 0,1111 0,0667 0,2265 -0,0947 -0,1020 -0,1741 -0,0100 0,0615 0,0392 0,4833 1,0000 -0,0587 -0,1099 -0,0154 
S16 0,0596 0,2133 0,1001 0,1433 0,0788 0,0417 0,3020 -0,1733 -0,2274 -0,2585 -0,1343 0,0972 0,0863 0,4486 -0,0587 1,0000 0,0119 0,0607 
S17 0,0696 -0,0244 0,0216 0,0523 0,0191 0,0185 0,0502 -0,0823 0,0227 0,0205 -0,0787 0,0310 0,0601 0,0884 -0,1099 0,0119 1,0000 0,4042 
S18 -0,2359 0,1477 -0,1038 -0,0812 -0,0386 -0,0978 -0,0102 -0,1589 0,0345 0,0192 -0,0922 0,3353 0,4550 0,0241 -0,0154 0,0607 0,4042 1,0000 
 
S1: Government debt/Assets (dependent variable) S10: Land and buildings / total assets (collateral) 
S2: Payroll costs/assets S11: Bank debt at procedure initiation / assets   
S3: Added value excl. payroll costs/assets S12: L(Total Assets) 
S4: Net profits / assets S13: D-Public Limited Liability Corporation 
S5: Cash flow / assets S14: Current assets excl. cash/ assets 
S6 : EBITDA / assets S15 : Inventories / assets 
S7 : Altman’s Z”- Score S16: Receivables / assets 
S8 : Ex ante Leverage S17: Previous Bankruptcies 
S9: Ex-ante bank debt / total assets S18: Management Experience 
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Appendix E. 
 
 
Table 1 of appendix E 
 
The dependent variable is the amount of forgiven trade credit divided by the outstanding amount of trade credit 
(i.e. the percentage of debt forgiveness). The debt variables are trade debt/assets, government debt/assets and 
bank debt/assets. All debt amounts are measured at procedure initiation. Earning before interests, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by assets is obtained from the latest annual account prior to 
petition filing for bankruptcy-reorganization, and is used as proxy for the expected operational cash flows to 
repay the promised debt during confirmed plan execution. Specification 3 is estimated in a sample restricted to 
63 firms with debt reduction in our sample of 89 firms. The values in brackets are the robust t-statistics: * / ** / 
*** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%.  
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 
Trade credit/assets 0.1740 
[1.86]* 
0.1966 
[2.45]** 
0.1632 
[4.01]*** 
Government debt/assets -0.0838 
[-0.80] 
-0.0638 
[-0.56] 
0.0112 
[0.09] 
Bank debt/assets 0.0303 
[0.36] 
0.0390 
[0.44] 
0.0083 
[0.12] 
EBITDA/assets  0.0722 
[0.70] 
0.0548 
[0.62] 
L(assets) 0.0769 
[3.37]*** 
0.0810 
[3.59]*** 
0.0747 
[3.91]*** 
Intercept -0.1733 
[-1.02] 
0.2120 
[-1.27] 
-0.0385 
[-0.28] 
    
No. of observations 89 89 63 
R-squared 0.1524 0.1586 0.1697 
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We use a unique dataset to analyze the contract renegotiation between a debtor and its 
secured bank creditors during Belgian court-supervised reorganization. We find that secured 
banks with higher collateralization succeed in renegotiating higher debt repayments during 
the court-supervised post-confirmation stage. There is also mild evidence that secured bank 
creditors renegotiate higher loan repayments during the court-supervised post-confirmation 
stage if the debtor’s assets are more redeployable. The proceeds of asset sales are used to 
generously repay secured banks and there is some evidence that secured banks push for those 
sales. Our findings are consistent with theory suggesting that secured creditors prefer 
liquidation above court-supervised reorganization. 
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3.1. Introduction. 
 
In this paper we use unique Belgian data to analyze debt renegotiation between distressed debtors and 
their secured bank creditors under Belgian court-supervised reorganization. The pre-distress secured 
lending contract is renegotiated during the pre-confirmation stage. These renegotiated loan conditions 
are the heart of any reorganization plan that is executed under the supervision of judges during a fixed 
post-confirmation period of 24 months. This judicial supervision during the post-confirmation stage 
sets the Belgian court-supervised reorganization procedure apart from the US Chapter 11 procedure. In 
addition, Belgian debtors cannot rely on the same legal instruments to enforce secured debt deferral or 
rescheduling during the post-confirmation stage as US debtors filing for Chapter 11 (section 1129 of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code). Compared to the US, the Belgian bankruptcy system is therefore biased in 
favor of secured creditors.  
 
Specifically we search for the determinants of the renegotiated loan repayment on secured bank debt 
due during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months. Theory suggests that banks and 
secured creditors may be biased towards liquidation instead of reorganization (see e.g. Bulow & 
Shoven, 1978; White, 1989; Kordana et al., 1999) because the expected loan repayment upon 
reorganization is lower than the loan recovery under immediate liquidation. Bergström et al (2002) 
argue that secured creditors who belief that they will receive close to full repayment in liquidating 
bankruptcy may prefer bankruptcy to reorganization, even when the continuation value is higher than 
the liquidation value. If the reorganization succeeds, secured creditors receive only part of the 
appreciation of the firm’s value, while they bear all of the costs if the reorganization fails. The secured 
creditor’s expected loan repayment under reorganization might therefore be too low compared to the 
liquidation proceeds, and gives well-secured creditors an incentive to liquidate. Bris, Welch and Zhu 
(2006) find that firms in which a bank is a creditor are more likely to choose liquidation (Chapter 7) to 
reorganization (Chapter 11). They argue that this is consistent with the view that pre-bankruptcy 
negotiations are more likely to occur with banks, and this bank has already shown itself unwilling to 
compromise during the pre-bankruptcy period. In our analysis of the determinants of the renegotiated 
loan repayment, we expect that secured banks will call a substantial part of their debt during court-
supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months. This expectation is only further supported by the 
fact that the Belgian procedure is less debtor-friendly than the US-system.  
 
One of our main findings is indeed that secured creditors with higher collateralization succeed in 
renegotiating higher debt repayments. This is in line with bargaining theory suggesting that the 
renegotiated loan call will be higher if the debtor has pledged more assets relative to outstanding bank 
credit. In addition we find strong support that, if secured creditors are well-secured, they are less likely 
to reach an agreement with debtors on the loan repayment during the pre-confirmation stage. Asset 
sales are used to generously repay secured banks. More than one third of the distressed firms did plan 
to sell at least part of their assets during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage (see Asquith et 
al. for an empirical study on asset sales, 1994). These planned asset sales are mostly part of the 
renegotiated and confirmed reorganization plan, and sales largely consist of real estate. In addition, we 
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find indications that secured creditors push for asset disposal if they have high levels of 
collateralization. 
 
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, empirical research that primarily deals with 
bank behaviour during court-supervised reorganization is largely missing. Second, we find that 
contract renegotiation critically depends on liquidation values. This finding confirms theoretical 
literature analyzing the impact of contract renegotiation on the nature of financial contracts (see e.g. 
Hart & Moore, 1994, 1998; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Berglof & Van 
Thadden, 1994; Gorton & Kahn, 2000).  
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the legal framework of the Belgian court-
supervised reorganization. Section 3.3 gives an overview of the literature and formulates the 
hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes the data. The main dependent variable, i.e. the negotiated loan 
repayment fraction, is defined and discussed in section 3.5. Section 3.6 presents the empirical 
determinants of negotiated loan repayment. Section 3.7 analyses the likelihood of asset sales, and the 
subsequent loan repayment by the sales proceeds.  Section 3.8 reconsiders the robustness of our main 
findings in a sample of distressed firms without asset sales, and section 3.9 analyses what happens if 
debtor and secured creditors did not reach an agreement during the pre-confirmation stage. Section 
3.10 deals with bank policy and judicial discretion. Section 3.11 concludes.   
 
3.2.  Legal framework: bankruptcy-reorganization. 
 
An insolvent firm can either liquidate or reorganize. In Belgium, liquidation and reorganization are 
regulated by distinct legislations.  The United States Bankruptcy Code makes an equivalent distinction 
between Chapter 7 (bankruptcy-liquidation) and Chapter 11 (bankruptcy-reorganization) within the 
same legislation.  The Belgian reorganization legislation was enacted in 1997, with the objective to 
reduce the number of bankruptcies and to preserve firms with profitable operations by means of a 
process of court-supervised financial restructuring. This legislation is called the Law on Judicial 
Composition (hereafter LJC) and came into force on January 1st 1998.  
 
Figure 1 below illustrates the timing of the Belgian LJC procedure in three stages. In the pre-
bankruptcy period (stage I), the debtor first decides whether or not to file for LJC1. If the firm files a 
petition, the bankruptcy court makes an initial assessment of the viability of the distressed firm. If the 
court accepts the petition, the debtor remains in possession and must draft and confirm a 
reorganization plan during a six-month exclusivity period. The court appoints an examiner who 
controls and assists the debtor in drafting the plan2. This exclusivity period can be extended by 
maximum 3 months to deal with bargaining issues. In the U.S., Bris et al. (2006) refer to the 
bargaining period as the Chapter 11-phase ‘from submission to plan confirmation’. We define stage II 
of the Belgian bankruptcy system as the pre-confirmation stage consisting of both phases ‘from filing 
                                               
1
 In principle, the debtor takes the decision to file a petition for reorganization. The public prosecutor may also 
initiate the petition, but this is exceptional. Creditors cannot file a petition for reorganization.  
2
 See Hahn (2004) for a discussion on the appointed examiner (trustee) in the U.S. 
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to plan’ and ‘from submission to plan confirmation’. Like in the U.S., secured creditors are subject to 
an automatic stay during the pre-confirmation stage.  
 
At the end of stage II, a meeting of the unsecured creditors votes on the proposed reorganization plan. 
The unsecured creditors mainly consist of trade creditors and the social security administration. A 
reorganization plan is approved if (i) a majority of unsecured creditors present at the meeting vote in 
favor of the plan, and (ii) the value of the claims voting in favor of the plan represent at least 50% of 
the total value of claims of unsecured creditors present at the meeting. The debts of those creditors 
have to be, in principal, repaid during a fixed period of maximum 24 months, i.e. the court-supervised 
post-confirmation stage (stage III – see further). 
 
Secured creditors do not vote collectively. Their individual approval is required when the debtor 
proposes an alteration to their legal entitlements. If the secured creditor and the debtor reach a new 
agreement on the loan repayments, the creditor can not seize or sell assets during the post-
confirmation stage as long as the debtor fully complies with this new contract. If on the other hand no 
agreement is reached between both parties, the Belgian legal framework provides the debtor with only 
one alternative, i.e. the deferral of the principal amount of the loan for a maximum of 18 months, on 
the condition that during this period interest is paid. As a consequence, the secured creditor will 
temporarily not be able to seize and sell the pledged assets. The secured creditor will however always 
regain his liquidation rights after 18 months. Further reaching legal measures, comparable to the 
forced rescheduling of secured debt in accordance with § 1129 U.S. Bankruptcy Code, are not 
available to Belgian debtors.  
 
After the approval by the unsecured creditors and any arrangement with secured creditors (or forced 
deferral), the court confirms the plan and the debtor enters stage III of the procedure.3 The plan 
execution takes place during a period of maximum 24 months under supervision of the judge and the 
appointed examiner (further the court-supervised post-confirmation stage – stage III). This court-
supervised period is however fixed on 24 months for 96% of the sample firms. This implies that plans 
are drafted for a period of 24 months in 96% of the cases. During this fixed period, the court and 
creditors can however decide to extend this period with a maximum of 12 months. Upon prolongation, 
a new and adjusted plan needs to drafted and confirmed. A prolongation does not occur frequently 
(approx. 10 % of the cases). The distressed firm either goes bankrupt during the court-supervised post-
confirmation period - mainly by judicial conversion to bankruptcy-liquidation or by debtor 
bankruptcy-confession4 - or leaves the procedure intact as going concern. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3
 Because the L.C.J. states that the court ‘can’ confirm the plan, certain courts have assumed the authority to test 
the feasibility of the plan. We are however only aware of a few cases where the Bankruptcy Court refused to 
confirm the plan. 
4
 Motions filed by creditors occur rarely. 
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Figure 1: Time schedule of the judicial composition (bankruptcy-reorganization). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Literature and hypotheses. 
 
Theory shows that secured creditors and banks oppose a debtor’s reorganization if their expected loan 
repayment in reorganization is lower than the loan recovery under immediate liquidation (see example 
given Bulow & Shoven, 1978; White, 1989). Bergström et al. (2002) specifically argue that secured 
creditors may increasingly oppose a debtor’s court-supervised reorganization as collateral value 
approaches the creditor’s claim. If the reorganization succeeds, secured creditors receive only part of 
the appreciation of the firm’s value, while they bear the brunt of the depreciation of the firm’s value if 
the reorganization fails5. This results in an expected loan repayment that is less than the loan recovery 
of well-secured creditors under immediate liquidation. Kordana et. al (1999) also suggest that secured 
creditor’s incentives are skewed towards liquidation over reorganization. 
 
Empirical evidence on the relation between creditor security and the reorganization process is however 
scant. Bergström et al. (2002) analyze the impact of secured debt on the likelihood of plan 
confirmation under Finnish court-supervised reorganization. They conclude that highly secured banks 
oppose plan confirmation. Franks and Sussman (2005) hypothesize that banks have an incentive to 
liquidate distressed companies as the collateral value equals or exceeds the value of bank debt 
exposure, regardless of the firm’s restructuring efforts. They use a sample of U.K.-firms restructuring 
out-of-court to test their hypothesis. Although not significant, they find that the incentive to liquidate 
is increasing with the collateral value, while banks have little interest in liquidation when the loan 
                                               
5
 Consider the simple example of a firm that obtained a bank loan at time t=0 to finance a project with a positive 
net present value. The bank credit assigned at time t=0 is € 100 and needs to be repaid at time t=1 before the 
business project ends at time t=2. Interest is assumed to be zero. The bank is secured and can exercise a 
liquidation right upon contractual default at time t=1. If the entrepreneur is unable to repay the credit of € 100 at 
time t=1, the bank has the option to seize and sell the business assets.  
We specifically discuss the case of contractual default (due to distress) at time t=1; the bank may then opt for 
liquidation at time t=1 or continuation until time t=2. In case of liquidation, the bank receives the certain 
liquidation proceeds of € 90. Upon continuation, the business value at time t=2 is uncertain as it can appreciate 
or depreciate both with probability ½. The business value is € 150 under successful reorganization (surplus value 
of € 60 compared to immediate liquidation) and € 50 in case of unsuccessful reorganization (depreciation of € 40 
compared to immediate liquidation). If the reorganization succeeds, secured creditors collect their loan of € 100, 
and the entrepreneur receives € 40. The bank receives € 50 if the reorganization fails, and the entrepreneur 
receives zero. If the bank chooses continuation at time t=1, the expected loan repayment is ½ * € 100 + ½ * € 50  
= € 75. Clearly, the secured bank opts at time t=1 for liquidation instead of reorganization, although the expected 
continuation value at time t=1 is € 95 (½ * € 140 + ½ * € 50) and larger than the liquidation proceeds of 90 € at 
time t=1. If the bank however receives a loan repayment of at least € 130 instead of € 100 in case of an 
appreciation, she would prefer continuation to liquidation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     TIME  
Pre-confirmation stage 
6 to 9 months (stage II) 
Court-supervised post-confirmation stage of maximum 24 months with 
optional prolongation of maximum 12 months (stage III)     Pre-bankruptcy period (stage I) 
Petition filed for judicial 
composition by debtor 
Creditors vote on the reorganization proposal, 
and bankruptcy court confirms or rejects 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
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value exceeds the collateral value6. They use managerial replacement as a proxy for the restructuring 
efforts of the company and its prospects of recovery. In addition, Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) show 
that banks, whether secured or not, prefer liquidation (Chapter 7) over reorganization (Chapter 11). 
They argue that this is consistent with the view that pre-bankruptcy negotiations are more likely to 
occur with banks7, and this bank has already shown itself unwilling to compromise.  
 
We expect that banks are less willing to accept a loan rescheduling if their loan enjoys a higher level 
of collateralization, because they have a more valuable outside option to liquidate. The literature on 
non-cooperative bargaining with outside options, pioneered by Osborne & Rubinstein (1990) and 
further developed in the context of optimal debt theory by Hart & Moore (1994) readily supports these 
expectations8. Specifically, a higher liquidation value of collateral provides a more credible threat to 
liquidate assets and therefore enhances the bargaining power of secured creditor. By consequence, 
secured creditors with higher collateralization are expected to succeed in renegotiating a higher level 
of loan repayment during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage.  
 
The threat of liquidation is more than real in the Belgian context. If the debtor breaches the 
renegotiated contract, for example by not paying the due principal or the due interest, secured creditors 
can seize and sell assets during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage (see section 3.2). If 
secured creditors are completely unwilling to reach an agreement, they can even freely seize and sell 
assets during the post-confirmation stage after a maximum stay of 18 months (see also section 3.2). 
This yields our first testable hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Higher liquidation values result in a higher renegotiated loan repayment for secured 
creditors to be repaid during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage. 
 
Liquidation values fall with the degree of asset specialization. More specialized assets9 are therefore 
expected to lower the bargaining power of banks during contract renegotiation. Ronen & Sorter (1972) 
classify current assets as less specialized than fixed assets, non-inventory current assets as less 
specialized than inventory, and land and buildings as less specialized than other fixed assets10. Berger 
et al. (1996) find that more specialized assets results in less liquidation option value per dollar of book 
                                               
6
 In the latter case of very high collateralization, banks may not fear negative effects of depreciation in the asset 
value of the distressed business. They therefore might have little interest in immediate liquidation. 
7
 In a sample of small to medium-sized Dutch distressed companies that are under strong pressure to informally 
reorganize to avoid the liquidation-oriented Dutch bankruptcy system, Couwenberg and de Jong (2006) find that 
banks assist distressed firms’ out-of-court restructuring efforts and that this assistance is of crucial importance to 
the success of restructuring.   
8
 Hart & Moore (1994) specify how a new contract would be negotiated as follows: “If a new contract is to be 
renegotiated at some time t, the parties split up the future gross revenues, R(t), on a 50:50 basis, unless the 
creditor’s option from liquidation, L(t), is preferable to her, in which case the creditor receives L(t). In other 
words, the creditor’s payoff from time t onwards is max{1/2 R(t), L(t)}.”  
9
 More specialized assets are less redeployable. The term ‘redeployability’ originates from Williamson (1988). 
10
 In addition, Shleifer and Vichny (1992) note that whereas ‘commercial land can be used for many different 
purposes’, fixed assets often ‘have no reasonable other uses’. 
Chapter 3. Bank Debt Restructuring under Belgian Court-supervised Reorganization 
 
 3.7 
value. Their findings are consistent with Ronen en Sorter’s classification11. This leads to the following 
hypothesis on asset specialization: 
 
Hypothesis 2: A higher degree of asset specialization results in a lower renegotiated loan repayment 
during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage. 
 
The theoretical literature argues that priority rules (in bankruptcy-liquidation) and control rights affect 
the reorganization process and contract renegotiation. Using a sample of small firms that defaulted on 
their bank debt in France, Germany and the U.K., Davydenko & Franks (2008) find that banks 
significantly adjust their lending and reorganization practices in response to costly aspects of 
bankruptcy law. Their principal findings suggest for two main aspects of bankruptcy regulation 
affecting bank behaviour: priority rules and control rights. First, they find that specific priority rules 
determine the composition of different types of collateral in the three countries. In France, prioritized 
preferential creditors such as employee wages and bankruptcy fees dilute the sales proceeds of real 
estate. Therefore, the French banks’ real estate collateral recovery is far less valuable, while 
immovable property proceeds are the most important source of bank’s recovery in the U.K. and 
Germany. Second, Davydenko & Franks argue that French bankruptcy courts tend to sell real estate 
below market value to preserve employment. This contrasts with the direct realization of accounts 
receivables and personal guarantees by French banks. Therefore, these latter collateral types are more 
subject to collateralization at loan origination than real estate in France. 
 
In a Belgian bankruptcy-liquidation, a court-appointed receiver collects the liquidation proceeds for 
security interests in real estate and in all other floating charge assets like inventory, receivables not 
subject to factoring, machinery, furniture and vehicles. The secured creditors are subject to the 
automatic stay and the other rules described in section 2. Therefore, control rights do not matter for 
contract renegotiation in our study. Contrary to France, the realized fixed charge proceeds are free of 
dilution by preferential creditors, such as employees. The scope of floating charges on the other hand 
is limited by Belgian law. In case of liquidation, 50% of the inventory proceeds are reserved for the 
benefit of unsecured creditors, which is comparable with the fencing-technique in the U.K. with 
floating charges as explained in Frisby (2004). This dilution on inventory proceeds is further 
commented in the empirical sections. 
 
A bank with a guarantee can directly liquidate assets without interference of the court-appointed 
receiver, because a guarantee pledges assets that fall beyond the scope of the distressed firm and is 
therefore independent of the other creditors’ rights. Direct liquidation increases the expected 
liquidation value resulting in additional bargaining power for banks. Therefore, the renegotiated 
principal installment payments due during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage are likely to be 
higher for banks with a guarantee. On the other hand, the provision of a guarantee may act as a signal 
on the firm’s viability as entrepreneurs pledge private wealth in favor of banks. If this latter signal 
                                               
11
 E. Benmelech et al. (2005) use commercial zoning regulation to capture the flexibility of a property’s 
permitted uses as a measure of assets redeployability. Among plenty of other findings, they show that more 
redeployable assets receive larger loans with longer maturities and durations.  
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effect dominates, we could have the opposite effect that banks with guarantees accept lower loan 
repayment during the court-supervised reorganization, simply because they regard a firm that has 
given a guarantee as more viable. Since there is no theoretical guidance on the direction of the effect, 
we formulate two sub-hypotheses 3.a. and 3.b.: 
 
Hypothesis 3.a.: A guarantee in the hands of a bank results in a higher renegotiated loan repayment 
during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage (direct liquidation effect). 
 
Hypothesis 3.b.: A guarantee in the hands of a bank results in a lower renegotiated loan repayment 
during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage (signaling effect). 
 
3.4.      Data 
 
3.4.1. Data sources and sampling procedure. 
 
Our dataset consists of unique private information on bank debt restructuring under court-supervised 
reorganization. Data input largely originates from reorganization plans filed with 17 of the 23 regional 
Bankruptcy Courts in Belgium. Approximately 306 plans were confirmed between 1 January 1998 and 
30 June 2004. We obtained the full legal records of all confirmed reorganization plans from 17 
Bankruptcy Courts. This amounts to 190 reorganization plans or 62.1% of the population of confirmed 
plans. We aggregated the data of closely related companies that filed for bankruptcy-reorganization 
together. On average a legal record contains 300 pages of information that were scanned and 
handcoded. The dataset distilled from the legal records is validated and complemented with financial 
statement data from the Graydon-database and the Belfirst DVD’s, which are respectively delivered by 
the private data vendors Graydon Belgium and Bureau van Dijk. We additionally acquired specific 
data on bank credit flows during the pre-bankruptcy and post-confirmation stage (see figure 3) by 
intermediation of the Central Corporate Credit Register of the National Bank of Belgium.  
 
3.4.2. Summary statistics on sample firms 
 
Banks are involved with 148 reorganization plans as 42 firms (190-148) do not rely on bank credit. Of 
the 148 businesses financed by bank debt, 95 (64.19%) are incorporated companies and 53 (35.81%) 
are sole proprietorships. Of those 95 corporations, 56 firms are non-quoted public limited liability 
companies, 35 are private limited companies and 4 corporations have another legal form. Table 1 
gives summary statistics by legal form12. Except for total debt reported in the reorganization plans, 
company data are taken from the last annual accounting statement prior to the petition filing for 
bankruptcy-reorganization. First, public limited liability firms are clearly more sizeable, and are about 
1,5 times as large as the median Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the study of Bris et al. (2006). The size of 
the private limited companies is comparable to the sample firms of Morrison (2007). Second, the 
sample firms are heavily indebted, although they tend to be no more underwater than Chapter 11 
                                               
12
 We have no balance sheet data on sole proprietorships because they are not obliged to publish a financial 
statement.   
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firms. Third, the internal money flows are clearly weak, with both the average and the mean cash flow 
numbers in deep red for Public limited Liability Corporations and Private Limited Companies alike. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics on firms by legal form. 
Total assets, employees and cash flow are firm characteristics reported in the last annual account prior to petition 
filing for bankruptcy-reorganization. Total debt is the amount of debt reported in the reorganization plan. Data 
are sorted by legal form: public limited liability corporations, private limited companies and sole proprietorships.  
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Public Limited Liability Corporation  
Total Assets (€ 1000) 56 6833 1912 25760 126 188899 
Employees (No.) 56 28.57 10 70.36 1 512 
Total debt  (€ 1000) 56 4491 1374 13321 103 83210 
Total debt / total assets (%) 56 104.46 91.62 60.34 24.95 424.00 
Cash flow / Total assets (%) 56 -16.06 -2.95 42.11 -263.04 18.78 
Private Limited Companies  
Total Assets (1000 € 33 564 258 662 21 3015 
Employees (No.) 35 5.31 2 7.58 1 28 
Total debt (€ 1000 ) 35 521 343 500 44 18478 
Total debt / total assets (%) 33 119.62 106.79 55.12 46.82 263.15 
Cash flow / Total assets (%) 33 -10.92 -3.49 30.87 -140 24.41 
Sole Proprietorships       
Employees (No.) 53 0.43 0 0.84 0 3 
Total debt (€ 1000) 53 244 185 177 48 875 
 
3.4.3. Debt contract characteristics 
 
Like Davydenko and Franks (2008), we analyze financial characteristics of all loans, overdrafts and 
other credit facilities for each sample firm. The amount of the aggregated bank credit is obtained from 
the 148 confirmed reorganization plans in our study. Panel A of table 2 shows that multiple-bank 
financing is scant13, but if it occurs, outstanding credit amounts are sizeable.  
 
Like in for example given the U.K. and Finland, we distinguish two main security interests in 
Belgium: a security interest in real estate and a security interest on the pool of floating charge assets 
(see Franks & Sussman, 2005; Bergström et al., 2002). The floating charge assets mainly consist of 
(non-factored) receivables, inventory, machinery, furniture and vehicles. Panel B summarizes the bank 
credit amounts by collateral or security types and by personal guarantee provision. First, like in many 
European countries, we find that banks heavily rely on collateral rights (see Franks and Davydenko 
(2008) for France, Germany and the U.K.). Only approximately 10 % of the bank debt is not secured. 
Second, banks that hold a security both on real estate and on floating charge assets provided more 
credit. Third, panel B shows a positive relation between the provision of guarantees and bank debt 
exposure14, which reveals the complementary characteristics of a personal guarantee as collateral type. 
  
 
                                               
13
 There are only 4 firms financed by more than three banks in our sample study. The maximum number of banks 
involved with a distressed firm is 6. 
14
 A guarantee is provided in addition with both a security interest on floating charge assets and in real estate for 
13 sample firms (out of 18). The other 5 firms with guarantee only granted a security interest on floating charge 
assets. 
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Table 2: Bank credit exposure by number of banks, collateral and guarantees. 
This table gives summary statistics on the bank debt exposure for our 148 sample firms. We aggregated all loans, 
overdrafts and other credit facilities for each sample firm as reported in the confirmed reorganization plans. 
Panel A shows the bank debt exposure by the number of financing banks. Panel B summarizes the aggregated 
bank credit amounts by collateral types and by guarantee provision. The number of firms in the categories ‘No 
collateral’, ‘Security interest on floating charge assets’, ‘Security interest in real estate’, and ‘both a security on 
floating charge assets and in real estate sum up to 145 firms (3 missing cases out of 148). 19 of those 145 firms 
provided the bank with a guarantee in addition to a security interest on floating charge assets and/or in real 
estate. 
Bank claim (€ 1000) N Mean Median St. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Number of banks financing the distressed firm       
Single bank 113 274 126 387 5.84 2345 
Multiple bank 35 3580 466 11209 29.81 60802 
Panel B: collateral types and guarantees       
No collateral 15 116.19 24.79 244.12 5.84 923.48 
Security interest on floating charge assets 32 213.58 57.91 406.28 11.76 1951.87 
Security interest in real estate 22 100.25 82.32 76.79 19.58 343.14 
Both a security on floating charge assets and in real estate 76 1900.31 326.45 7713.65 21.87 5184.21 
Guarantee (in addition to other collateral types) 19 665.90 594.94 641.42 15.74 2345.27 
Missing data 3 - - - - - 
 
3.5. Loan repayment during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage 
 
3.5.1. The renegotiated loan repayment 
 
Secured banks and debtors renegotiate the original lending contract during the pre-confirmation stage 
to reach an agreement on the loan repayment during the court-supervised post-confirmation period. 
134 plans report this renegotiated loan repayment for a fixed period of 24 months15. We calculate the 
renegotiated loan call as a fraction of the initial loan for each sample firm as: 
 
 
 
 
 
The renegotiated loan repayment consists only in the principal amount of the loan. Interest payments 
are not the scope of this study16. The renegotiation process results in newly granted bank credit for 13 
out of 134 firms. Our dataset does not allow us to distinguish loan repayments on the new credit from 
those on the original credit. The new credit and its principal payments during the court-supervised 
post-confirmation stage are therefore included in respectively the denominator and nominator. Also, 
we only analyze the loan renegotiation with respect to the initial plan drafted for a period of 24 
months. The few additional renegotiations during the fixed period of 24 months resulting in a 
prolongation of maximum 12 months are not further analyzed in this paper. 
 
                                               
15
 14 firms are excluded for the analysis in the remainder of this paper. Seven of those 14 firms drafted a 
(confirmed) plan for a period less then 24 months. 7 firms are additionally excluded because their confirmed 
plans did not report a loan repayment. 
16
 We have no data on interest adjustments. 
 
                     Renegotiated loan repayment in € during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months 
 
    Bank credit exposure in €   
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Figure 2.a. shows the histogram of the renegotiated loan repayment for all 134 firms. The figure 
reveals a high fraction on the y-axis for the bar ranging from 0.9 to 1 on the x-axis. 33 firms out of 134 
have a renegotiated loan repayment of 1. Those full repayment fractions of 1 are most likely due to 
non-agreements on the loan repayment between secured creditors and entrepreneurs. As stated in 
section 3.2, entrepreneurs must repay the full loan at most 18 months after plan confirmation to avoid 
seizure of collateralized assets if there is no agreement. Asset sales definitely occur to repay the bank 
in full when no agreement is reached17. Figure 2.b. shows the histogram for firms without asset sales 
(89 firms). The share of full repayment cases (renegotiated loan repayment fraction =1) drops by 
almost 50%.   
 
Figure 2: Histogram of the Renegotiated Loan Call Fraction during the court-supervised post-
confirmation period. 
The x-axis shows the renegotiated loan repayment fraction. The y-axis shows the fraction of sample firms for 
each bar defined on the x-axis. Figure 2.a. shows the histogram of the 134 sample firms, while the histogram of 
figure 2.b. omits firms with asset sales as bargaining outcome. The number of firms without asset sales is 89.  
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17
 Asset sales can also take place on initiative of the debtor. 
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3.5.2. The actual loan repayment 
 
Banks and debtors renegotiate their contract during court-supervised reorganization. The renegotiated 
loan repayment described above (section 3.5.1) is the outcome of this renegotiation process. The 
newly written contract will be incomplete as banks and entrepreneurs are unable to specify all the 
relevant contingencies. Therefore, additional renegotiations during the court-supervised post-
confirmation stage are not excluded.18 
 
Figure 3 plots the actual loan repayment and the initially renegotiated loan repayment for firms not 
ending in bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-supervised post-confirmation period. The actual 
principal installments payments are reported in the Central Corporate Credit Register of the National 
Bank of Belgium for aggregated credits larger then € 25.0001920. The few cases with a negative loan 
repayment fraction are those where banks and debtors renegotiate a higher lending level, i.e. the cases 
where banks decide to refinance. We find a high correlation coefficient of 0.7272 between the actual 
and negotiated loan repayments in figure 3, which suggests that the renegotiated contracts are strictly 
enforced and largely renegotiation-proof during the post-confirmation stage.  
                                               
18
 See Hart & Moore (1998) for a seminal paper on incomplete contracts and renegotiation 
19
 Unfortunately, we cannot use the actual loan repayment fraction of firms converted to bankruptcy-liquidation 
during the court-supervised post-confirmation period. Bank data is not reported anymore in the dataset of the 
Central Corporate Credit Register of the National Bank of Belgium at the time that firms convert to bankruptcy-
liquidation. Therefore, we can only calculate the actual loan call fraction between plan confirmation and the 
conversion time to bankruptcy-liquidation. We do not have (structured) data on the renegotiated monthly bank 
debt repayments, and are therefore unable to determine the renegotiated repayment during plan confirmation and 
conversion to bankruptcy-liquidation.   
20
 We have data on the actual loan repayments for 44 firms not converted to bankruptcy-liquidation. 4 firms out 
of those 44 sample firms are however excluded to plot the scatter diagram of figure 3. Those 4 firms obtained 
new bank credit, but we have strong evidence that the amount of new credit granted is incorporated in the 
nominator of the actual loan repayment fraction, while new credit is incorporated in the denominator for the 
construction of the negotiated loan repayment. However, we have some evidence that the amount of new credit 
is not always incorporated in the nominator of the actual loan repayment. Therefore, we simply drop those 4 
observations, and use 40 observations to plot the scatter of figure 3. 
Chapter 3. Bank Debt Restructuring under Belgian Court-supervised Reorganization 
 
 3.13 
Figure 3: Scatter diagram between the actual and negotiated loan repayment for firms not converted to 
bankruptcy-liquidation. 
In this diagram, we compare the renegotiated loan repayment fraction (x-axes) with the actual loan repayment 
fraction (y-axes) during the court-supervised post-confirmation period of 24 months. Our analysis is restricted to 
40 cases because of data limitations (see further). The renegotiated loan repayments are reported in the 
confirmed reorganization plans, and the fraction is calculated in section 3.5.1. The actual loan repayments are 
reported in the Central Corporate Credit Register of the National Bank of Belgium, and the fraction is likewise 
calculated as in section 3.5.1. The actual data are only available for firms not transferred to bankruptcy-
liquidation during the court-supervised post-confirmation period of 24 months (which restricts our sample to 40 
cases) as data are not reported anymore in the Central Corporate Credit Register at the time that firms are 
transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation. The few cases with a negative actual loan repayment fraction are due to 
banks that do not require the negotiated loan repayment, but instead expand their lending (which results in a 
‘negative’ actual loan repayment in our analysis). 
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3.6. The determinants of the renegotiated loan repayment. 
 
We analyze the determinants of the renegotiated loan repayment fraction, as defined in section 3.5.1., 
by a two-limit Tobit model with both upper and lower censoring at a fraction of 1 and 0 respectively 
(see Long, 1997 for common applications of the two-limit Tobit model). The estimated Tobit 
coefficients are reported in table 3. Appendix D reports the marginal effects at mean values of the 
regressors, and compares with the OLS-estimates. The Tobit and OLS estimates are comparable. 
 
The descriptive statistics in table 2 indicate that the pre-renegotiation level of bank debt varies among 
the different collateral types and that it is larger for firms financed by multiple banks. These bank debt 
characteristics might co-determine the renegotiated loan repayment fraction. Specification 1 of table 3 
estimates the renegotiated loan repayment as a function of the collateral types, the binary variable D-
multiple bank (1 if multiple banks are involved), and controls for the legal form of the distressed firm. 
The estimates are based on the full sample of distressed firms including both corporations and sole-
proprietorships. The results indicate that personal guarantees lower the repayment fraction, while the 
other collateral types seem to bear no effect on the renegotiation.  
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Apparently collateral type does not play a major role in debt renegotiation21. In the following 
estimations we will only keep the personal guarantees variable. Since the object of our study is the 
behavior of secured banks, we drop firms with unsecured bank debt in the remaining equations of 
table 3. All sole proprietorships are additionally excluded because of missing data: the liquidation 
values included in further specifications demand data on asset values from the annual accounts, but 
sole proprietorships are not obliged to draft and publish their accounts. Together, this limits our 
sample to 66 corporations with secured bank debt22. 
 
We hypothesized that secured banks and entrepreneurs with higher liquidation values renegotiate a 
higher loan repayment due during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage (hypothesis 1). 
Specification 2 introduces the log of Collateral value/secured debt. The collateral value is estimated by 
the sum of the book values of the major asset types: receivables, inventory, land & buildings, 
machinery, furniture and vehicles. Inventory is accounted only for half of its book value, in 
accordance to legal limitations on the scope of floating charges for the benefit of unsecured creditors. 
(see section 3.3). 2 sample firms did not provide a floating charge security. Their floating charge 
collateral is valued at zero. Another 3 firms did not provide a fixed charge on their real estate. The 
value of their land & buildings is valued at zero23. We also introduce the log of the level of bank debt24 
and leverage (Pre-bankruptcy total debt/total assets) as control variables. The results of specification 2 
indicate a strongly significant estimate for Collateral value/secured debt, which does not allow us to 
reject hypothesis 1 that higher liquidation values are related to higher renegotiated loan repayments. 
The estimate of D-guarantee loses significance, but retains its sign. Using standardized marginal 
effects in specification 2 (derived from the Tobit marginal effects reported in appendix D), we find 
that a standard deviation increase in the collateral value leads, on average, to a 0.460525 standard 
deviation increase in the renegotiated loan repayment fraction. The standardized marginal effect of the 
collateral variable is larger than that of any other variable in specification 2. As noted before, we use 
logarithmically transformed collateral variables, as in Bergström et al. (2002). In appendix E, we show 
                                               
21
 Our analysis of collateral types on the negotiated loan repayment fraction is based on dummy variables. We 
are unable to control for other aspects of a collateral right such as the amount of its legal subscription right (e.g. 
the registration of a mortgage for a residential real estate). If the amount of this subscription right is lower than 
the outstanding bank claim, the bank is actually unsecured for the non-subscribed part of its loan. This might 
affect bank behavior in distressed companies. 
22
 Our complete sample consists of 95 corporations. 11 of those corporations did not report bank loan 
repayments, or the plan was drafted for less then 24 months. 11 corporations did not provide security rights. 
Another 4 corporations published no recent annual account (2 private limited companies and 2 other partnership 
forms). The account of 1 public limited liability corporation is not useful because the corporation did split up in 
two entities (the collateral value per entity cannot be determined anymore – see further on the collateral value). 
Finally, two special cases are excluded because they provided security rights to the bank but the actual collateral 
value is zero. Our final sample of corporations with secured debt therefore amounts 66. 
23
 All estimation results in this paper are however robust with respect to the 5 revaluations. 
24
 The summary statistics of table 2 show that the bank debt exposure indirectly controls for multiple bank 
situations and for the different types of collateral rights. In an unreported analysis, we noticed that the estimation 
of L(Bank debt) is driven by a few large firms in our 66-case sample (idem in specification 3 to 9 – see further). 
All other findings of table 3 are however robust to the exclusion of the largest sample firms. 
25
 The standardized marginal effect is 0.4605, and is calculated as follows: the marginal effect of the collateral 
proxy, 0.2024 (see appendix D), multiplied by the standard deviation of the collateral proxy (0.8594 – see 
appendix B), and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable (0.3777 – see also in appendix B). 
The OLS standardized coefficient is 0.3542 ((0.1557 * 0.8594) / 0.3777). 
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that our main estimation results and conclusions of this paper are fairly robust when we do not use 
logarithmic transformations. 
 
In specification 3 and 4 we introduce measures for the expected going concern value to control for the 
distressed firm’s financial capacity to repay the negotiated principal installments payments. 
Specification 3 includes the pre-bankruptcy cash flows26 (scaled by total assets), industry sales growth 
and industry profit margin27, but surprisingly, without any statistical findings. Specification 4 controls 
for uncertainty by introducing the variation in the industry’s profit margin28 and the industry attrition 
rate. The latter rate is the proportion of small businesses within a particular industry that are liquidated 
each year (see Morrison, 2007). The variable Industry profit margin is dropped in specification 4 
because of high correlation with the variable Industry variation in profit margin. The results indicate 
that going concern values do not affect the outcome of the renegotiation process. 
 
Banks possess private information on a firm’s viability and going concern value. We expect that 
private information held by banks may affect the reorganization outcome. Three proxies on private 
information are tested and discussed. The granting of new credit by the bank is expected to reveal 
positive information on a distressed firm’s viability. Specification 5 shows that banks lower their 
renegotiated loan repayment when they promised the provision of additional credit (D-new credit) 
during the renegotiations29. The ratio Equity/Bank30 debt introduced in specification 5 contains 
information on the past financing decisions. A high ratio, i.e. relatively more subscribed capital than 
bank debt, identifies firms with limited access to bank financing (i.e. firms with limited bank debt 
capacity). We expect that secured banks contract their lending with bank debt-constrained firms. The 
positive sign of Equity/Bank debt confirms our expectations. The standardized marginal effects 
indicate that a standard deviation increase in the collateral value leads, on average, to a 0.3279 
standard deviation increase in the renegotiated loan repayment fraction. The standardized marginal 
effects for D-new bank credit and Equity/bank debt are -0.2234 and 0.4020 respectively, suggesting a 
considerable effect of the bank’s private information on the negotiated loan repayment. 
 
The variable Pre-bankruptcy credit flow is the fraction of bank credit contraction and/or expansion 
during a 12-month pre-bankruptcy period prior to petition filing for bankruptcy-reorganization31. A 
positive and negative flow is respectively an expansion and contraction. These expansions and 
contractions may reveal the bank’s private information about the viability of the firm. The estimate of 
the variable Pre-bankruptcy credit flow of specification 6 implies a lower renegotiated bank loan 
                                               
26
 Unreported, we also introduced the distressed firm’s Z-score and net profit scaled by total assets as going 
concern proxies in specification 3 (unreported). The estimates were however insignificant in line with the 
estimate of the pre-bankruptcy cash flows scaled by total assets. 
27
 The industry sales growth is the industry average of the annual sales growth over the last three fiscal years 
before the distressed firm’s filing for bankruptcy-reorganization. The industry profit margin is the operating 
profit margin for the last fiscal year. Both variables are based on 3-digit Nace codes. 
28
 The industry’s variation in profit margin consists in the industry average of the standard deviation of the 
operating profit margin over the last 3 fiscal years. This variable is based on variation in profit margin within 
businesses over time (i.e. non cross-sectional). 
29
 The findings of table 3 are robust to the exclusion of corporations that obtained additional credit. 
30
 Equity consists in the debtor’s subscribed capital.   
31
 The data are obtained from the Central Corporate Credit Register of the National Bank of Belgium.   
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repayment for a pre-bankruptcy expansion and a higher renegotiated loan repayment for a pre-
bankruptcy contraction, which is consistent with the idea that pre-bankruptcy credit flows reveal the 
bank’s private information and that banks react coherently on their own private information both in 
pre- and post-bankruptcy stages32. 
 
We hypothesized that a higher degree of asset specialization results in a lower loan repayment. Despite 
the relatively high redeployability of inventories33, the legal limits on the allocation of their proceeds 
in bankruptcy-liquidation potentially mitigate the secured bank’s bargaining power. In general, we 
expect that receivables and real estate provide banks with more bargaining power resulting in a 
significantly higher loan repayment, while inventory and other fixed assets than real estate do not 
significantly affect the loan repayment. Specification 7 introduces the variables Collateral value 
receivables/secured debt and Collateral value real estate/secured debt. Both variables are significant. 
In section 3.7, we show that Collateral value real estate/secured debt is largely driven by the proceeds 
of real estate sales during the court-supervised reorganization. In section 3.8, we find that banks rely 
on pledged receivables to renegotiate a higher loan repayment. The variable Equity/bank debt is 
dropped from specification 7, because of its relatively high correlation with the collateral proxies. 
Specification 8 both estimates Collateral value inventory/secured debt and Collateral value fixed assets 
excluding real estate/secured debt, but without any significant result. The variable Collateral value 
fixed assets excluding real estate/secured debt includes the relatively large asset category machinery. 
Specification 9 therefore includes the variable Collateral value machinery/secured debt, but without 
any significant results. We find support for our second hypothesis in the significant results for the real 
estate and receivable variables in specification 7. 
 
We also hypothesized that a personal guarantee affects the renegotiation outcome (hypothesis 3.a and 
3.b). The significant estimate for D-guarantee in specification 1 shows that the provision of a 
guarantee results in a relatively debtor-friendly renegotiation outcome. The significant estimate 
however disappears in specification 2 until 9 after controlling for other variables, although the 
consistently negative sign suggests that guarantees are related to a lower renegotiated loan repayment.  
 
                                               
32
 The standardized marginal effects of specification 6 for the collateral variable, D-new bank credit and Pre-
bankruptcy bank credit flow are respectively 0.4824, -0.2451, and -0.2913.  The effect of Pre-bankruptcy bank 
credit flow on the negotiated loan repayment is substantial. 
33
 The accounts of small to medium sized firms do not provide detailed information on the composition of the 
inventory.  
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Table 3:   Determinants of the renegotiated loan repayment. 
The dependent variable is the renegotiated loan repayment fraction. This fraction is calculated in section 3.5.1. as the renegotiated loan repayment in € during the court-
supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months scaled by bank debt exposure in €. The coefficients are estimated using Tobit analysis, and marginal effects evaluated at the 
means are reported in appendix D. The values in brackets are robust t-statistics; * / ** / *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%.  We refer to appendix A for a detailed description 
of all explanatory variables in this table. The estimates of specification 1 are based on a full sample of 133 bank-financed distressed firms, which includes both sole 
proprietorships and corporations, and both cases with secured and unsecured bank debt. The specifications 2 to 9 are restricted to both corporations (because sole 
proprietorships do not draft and publish accounts) and cases with secured bank debt, which results in a sample of 66 corporations with secured bank debt. The estimates of 
specification 6 are equally based on the 66-case sample, but data limitations on the variable Pre-bankruptcy bank credit flow restrict our analysis to 49 cases. The findings are 
robust to OLS regression analysis (see also in appendix D). 
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 
Collateral type          
D-Floating charge -0.0737 
[-0.67] 
        
D-Fixed charge -0.0397 
[-0.40] 
        
D-Guarantees -0.3002 
[-2.36]** 
-0.1699 
[-1.10] 
-0.1484 
[-0.93] 
-0.1574 
[-0.98] 
-0.1021 
[-0.71] 
-0.1654 
[-0.94] 
-0.1305 
[-0.90] 
-0.1007 
[-0.61] 
-0.1088 
[-0.64] 
Liquidation values           
Collateral value / secured bank debt (log)  0.2856 
[3.39]*** 
0.2704 
[3.40]*** 
0.2568 
[3.33]*** 
0.1934 
[3.10]*** 
0.2878 
[2.99]*** 
   
Collateral value receivables / secured bank debt (log)        0.0662 
[1.83]* 
  
Collateral value real estate / secured debt exposure (log)       0.0532 
[2.20]** 
  
Collateral value inventory / secured bank debt (log)        0.0073 
[0.16] 
0.0191 
[0.47] 
Collateral value fixed assets excluding real estate / secured bank debt (log)        0.0877 
[1.38] 
 
Collateral value plant & machinery/ secured bank debt (log)         0.0556 
[1.30] 
Going concern value          
Pre-bankruptcy cash flow / total assets   -0.2234 
[-1.01] 
-0.2110 
[-0.94] 
     
Industry sales growth   -0.5272 
[-0.31] 
-0.6842 
[-0.40] 
     
Industry profit margin   -0.2234 
[-0.17] 
      
Chapter 3. Bank Debt Restructuring under Belgian Court-supervised Reorganization 
 
 3.18 
Continuation of table 3 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 
          
Industry variation in profit margin    -0.6143 
[-0.14] 
     
Industry attrition rate    -0.1127 
[-0.91] 
     
Private information          
D-new bank credit      -0.4028 
[-3.79]*** 
-0.4655 
[-3.55]*** 
-0.5059 
[-4.99]*** 
-0.3618 
[-3.82]*** 
-0.3938 
[-3.78]*** 
Equity / Bank debt exposure     0.2298 
[2.66]*** 
    
Pre-bankruptcy bank credit flow      -0.2575 
[-2.13]** 
   
Controls & other variables          
D-Multiple banks -0.1250 
[-1.25] 
        
D-Public Limited Liability Corporation 0.1257 
[0.96] 
        
D-Sole proprietorships -0.0695 
[-0.61] 
        
L(Bank debt)  -0.0537 
[-1.34] 
-0.0625 
[-1.85]* 
-0.0636 
[-1.85]* 
-0.0589 
[-1.62] 
-0.0205 
[-0.45] 
-0.0876 
[-2.77]*** 
-0.0861 
[-2.37]** 
-0.0768 
[-2.18]** 
Pre-bankruptcy  total debt/total assets  0.2710 
[0.92] 
       
Constant 0.6576 
[4.76]*** 
0.8011 
[1.06] 
1.2642 
[2.69]*** 
1.4592 
[2.57]*** 
1.1242 
[2.26]** 
0.6881 
[1.08] 
2.2737 
[5.10]*** 
1.7887 
[3.60]*** 
1.7579 
[3.45]*** 
          
Pseudo R2 0.0333 0.1508 0.1592 0.1642 0.2292 0.2087 0.1424 0.1062 0.1030 
Chi-squared 8.25 24.02 23.12 24.20 39.95 29.40 45.65 33.51 30.11 
p-value 0.2203 0.0001 0.0008 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of observations 133 66 66 66 66 49 66 66 66 
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3.7. The likelihood of asset sales and loan repayment. 
 
More than one third of the distressed firms plan to sell assets during the court-supervised post-
confirmation stage, which is reported in the confirmed reorganization plans. Panel A of table 4 shows 
that the majority of asset sales consists in real estate. Panel B shows a renegotiated loan repayment for 
those sales of 0.9660 on median. The reorganization plans show that the floating charge asset sales 
mainly consist of stock and machinery. If floating charge asset sales occur, banks are clearly not fully 
repaid. However, if both real estate and floating charge asset sales are sold, which occurs with 11 
firms, panel B shows that banks are repaid to a very large extent. A liquidation scheme is confirmed 
for 8 out of those 11 firms34. 
  
Notwithstanding the theoretical support for the liquidity and redeployability of accounts receivable, 
we find no evidence from our confirmed plans that firms sell receivables during Belgian court-
supervised restructuring. Instead it is common practice that the entrepreneur collects receivables under 
supervision of the court-appointed examiner, who then uses the collected money to repay banks and 
other creditors. This practice at least partially substitutes a factoring system where receivables are sold 
to a third party.  
 
Table 4: Summary statistics on planned asset sales during the court-supervised post-confirmation 
stage. 
 
Panel A gives an overview of the planned asset sales as reported in the confirmed reorganization plans. The asset 
sales are categorized as real estate and floating charge asset sales. Floating charge assets consist of (non-
factored) receivables, inventory, machinery, furniture and vehicles. Panel B gives summary statistics on the 
renegotiated loan repayment per type of asset sales. 
Panel A: Overview of asset sales. 
Panel B: Summary statistics on the renegotiated loan 
repayment fraction 
Type of asset sales 
Number of firms per 
type of asset sales  
Fraction of firms per 
type of asset sales 
provided asset sales 
take place. 
Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Real estate 26 26/52 = 0.50 0.7797 0.9660 0.2867 0.1326 1 
Floating charge asset sales 9 9/52 = 0.1730 0.4490 0.3302 0.3390 0 1 
Both real estate and 
floating charge asset sales 
11 11/52 = 0.2115 0.7328 0.9206 0.3507 0.1480 1 
Not specified 6 6/52 = 0.1154 
 Total  = 52 (of 148) -  
 
We wonder to what extent asset sales are explained by the structure of assets and the liquidation value 
of assets. In table 5 we model the likelihood of planned asset sales (asset sales equals 1 if assets are 
sold and 0 otherwise) as a function of the structure of assets, the liquidation value of assets and a set of 
control variables. Since the dependent variable is limited to the values 0 and 1, a probit regression 
seems the appropriate econometric methodology. The sample consists of 66 corporations financed by 
secured banks.  
 
                                               
34
 A liquidation scheme is confirmed for only 8 of the 146 firms with secured debt. 
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We start by looking at the asset structure of firms selling assets, which allows us to roughly identify 
the profile of firms with redeployable assets during court-supervised reorganization. Specification 1 
introduces Real estate/total assets and Fixed assets excluding real estate/total assets. Total assets acts 
as control variable. We find a significant estimate for Real estate/total assets, which is consistent with 
our findings on real estate sales reported in table 4. In specification 2 we add Plant & Machinery/ total 
assets to the list of dependent variables, which is found to be significant. Specification 3 shows that 
the significance of the Plant & machinery/ total assets is driven by firms that hold more than 20% of 
their assets in machinery.  
 
Table 5:  Which distressed firms sell assets? 
We estimate the likelihood of planned asset sales as reported in the confirmed plans by using a probit model. The 
binary dependent variable equals 1 if any assets are planned to be sold and 0 otherwise. The values in brackets 
are robust t-statistics; * / ** / *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%.  We refer to appendix A for a description of the 
explanatory variables. The estimates of specification 1 to 9 are based on our 66-sample of corporations with 
secured bank debt,  
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5  Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 
Asset structure          
Receivables  / total assets  0.8765 
[0.90] 
       
Inventory / total assets  0.8449 
[0.62] 
       
Real estate / total assets 1.4114 
[2.09]** 
2.0811 
[2.16]** 
1.6438 
[2.26]** 
  1.4019 
[1.84]* 
   
Fixed assets excluding real 
estate / total assets 
-0.0381 
[-0.04] 
        
Plant & Machinery / total assets  2.8077 
[1.94]* 
   2.1714 
[1.63] 
   
Dummy if Plant & machinery 
/total assets >=0.20 
  1.1401 
[2.04]** 
      
Liquidation values          
Collateral value/secured debt 
(log) 
   0.2419 
[1.15] 
0.4978 
[2.18]** 
0.5749 
[2.07]** 
   
Collateral value real estate / 
secured debt (log) 
      0.2389 
[3.02]*** 
0.2380 
[2.85]*** 
0.2337 
[2.81]*** 
Collateral value plant & 
machinery/ secured debt (log) 
      0.2325 
[2.23]** 
0.2077 
[2.06]** 
0.2129 
[2.11]** 
Controls          
L(Total assets) 0.2929 
[2.61]*** 
0.2982 
[2.62]*** 
0.2954 
[2.56]** 
0.2710 
[2.53]** 
     
L(Bank debt)     0.3098 
[2.91]*** 
0.2912 
[2.52]** 
0.2231 
[2.17]** 
0.2371 
[2.04]** 
0.2114 
[1.81]* 
Industry Attrition Rate        -0.8754 
[-1.87]* 
-0.8095 
[-1.80]* 
Industry Profit Margin        -0.9409 
[-0.30] 
 
Pre-bankruptcy total debt/ total 
assets 
        -0.4551 
[-0.68] 
Constant -2.6687 
[-3.30]*** 
-3.4806 
[-3.17]*** 
-2.8770 
[-3.28]*** 
-2.3580 
[-3.11]*** 
-4.5976 
[-3.24]*** 
-4.8969 
[-3.01]*** 
-0.5371 
[-0.33] 
0.4776 
[0.25] 
1.1172 
[0.53] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1208 0.1530 0.1715 0.0934 0.1161 0.1736 0.1905 0.2349 0.2401 
Number of observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 
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We hypothesized that secured banks and entrepreneurs with higher liquidation values renegotiate a 
higher loan repayment due during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage (hypothesis 1). 
Therefore we expect that banks with higher collateral value/bank values are more likely to push their 
debtors to liquidate assets. In specification 4 the collateral value/bank debt variable is found to be 
positive, as expected. This positive sign becomes significant in specification 5, where we introduce a 
control variable for the level of bank debt, and remains significant in specification 6, where we include 
some asset subcategories that are part of the total collateral value. We interpret this as mild evidence 
that higher liquidation values are related to a higher likelihood of asset sales, suggesting that creditors 
may play a role in bringing these assets sales about.35 
 
In the last specifications we introduce specific asset categories (using collateral values) scaled by the 
level of secured debt instead of assets. The results are very comparable to those in specifications 1 to 
3. In specification 8 we introduce the Industry Attrition Rate and the Industry Profit Margin (see 
Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) and Shleifer and Vichny (1992) for industry effects on asset 
sales) as additional control variables36. Not surprisingly asset sales are less likely in industries with 
higher attrition rates, since the high supply of sector specific assets and the low demand thereof in 
sectors with high attrition rates yields low prices in the secondary market. In specification 9 we 
additionally control for leverage, which is found to be unrelated to asset sales. 
 
In summary we find in line with Ronen & Sorter (1972) and with empirical findings of Berger et al. 
(1996) that real estate is very redeployable. In addition, firms with high levels of machinery are more 
likely to sell assets, which is slightly more surprising37.  The court-supervised reorganization might be 
used by economic agents to sell rather specialized assets like machinery to avoid fire sales under 
bankruptcy-liquidation. This might explain why firms with a lot of machinery sell more-specialized 
assets during the post-confirmation stage of the Belgian court-supervised restructuring. Also the 
consistently positive sign of the collateral variable suggests that secured bank creditors may play a role 
by requiring these asset sales from debtors.   
 
3.8. Robustness check 1: The renegotiated loan repayment for firms without planned asset 
sales. 
 
In this section we verify whether our earlier findings are robust for a more limited sample with only 
firms that do not sell assets in the post-confirmation stage. In the first 4 specifications of table 6, we 
control for asset sales in the full sample of 66 corporations, by introducing the dummy D-Asset sales 
(1 if assets sales will be sold, 0 otherwise). In specification 1 we find that the estimate of the collateral 
variable is robustly positive, which does again not allow us to reject hypothesis 1. In specification 2 
we introduce the liquidation value measures Collateral value receivables/secured debt and Collateral 
                                               
35
 In unreported regressions, we limit our sample to sizable assets sales like in Asquith et al. (1994), where asset 
sale are defined as sizable if companies sell at least 20% of their assets. The coefficient for the liquidation value 
variable (Collateral value/bank debt) remains positive but is not significant in this smaller sample. 
36
 We also introduced Industry sales growth and Industry variation in profit margin (see table 3) in the Probit 
model, but standard errors of the coefficient estimates were rather large. 
37
 Firms with much machinery are not necessarily larger firms. 
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value real estate/secured debt. The significance found earlier in specification 7 of table 3 for real estate 
variable falters. In specification we add Collateral value inventory/secured debt and Collateral value 
fixed assets excl. real estate/secured debt and in specification 4 we additionally add Collateral value 
machinery/secured debt, to no avail. This suggests that the differences in asset specificity that drive 
asset-specific liquidation values only affect the renegotiated loan repayment through their effect on 
forced asset sales.   
 
In the remainder table 6, we restrict the sample to 41 corporations without planned asset sales and re-
estimate specifications 1, 2, 3 and 4, obviously without the dummy D-asset sales as an explanatory 
variable. Specification 5, 6, 7 and 8 show the respective estimation results. Collateral value/secured 
debt is significant, confirming once more earlier results. Interestingly the variable Collateral value 
receivables/secured debt shows up with a significant coefficient when the variable is introduced in 
specification 6. If banks do not force the debtor to sell assets in order to repay bank debt, they 
apparently rely on pledged receivables to renegotiate a higher loan repayment, which gives again mild 
support for hypothesis 2 that asset specificity matters for loan renegotiation.  
 
The main conclusion of this section is however the consistently positive and significant estimate for 
the collateral variable. Clearly, the presence of collateral that can be liquidated changes the bargaining 
position of secured creditors to the effect that they succeed in renegotiating better terms of loan 
repayment even if no collateral is eventually sold. The presence of a credible threat seems to suffice 
for the renegotiation result. 
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Table 6:   Determinants of the renegotiated loan repayment for firms without planned asset sales. 
The dependent variable is the renegotiated loan repayment fraction. This fraction is calculated in section 3.5.1. as 
the renegotiated loan repayment in € during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months scaled by 
bank debt exposure in  €. The coefficients are estimated using Tobit analysis. The values in brackets are robust t-
statistics; * / ** / *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%.  We refer to appendix A for a detailed description of all 
explanatory variables in this table. The estimates of specification 1 to 4 are based on our 66-sample of 
corporations with secured bank debt. Firms with planned asset sales are excluded to estimate specification 5 to 8, 
which results in a sample of 41 cases. 
 
 Sample of 66  firms controlling for asset sales Sample of 41 firms without asset sales 
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8 
Liquidation values         
Collateral value/bank debt (log) 0.1889 
[3.07]*** 
   0.2159 
[2.69]*** 
   
Collateral value receivables / 
Secured debt (log) 
 0.0482 
[1.47] 
   0.0799 
[2.09]** 
  
Collateral value real estate / 
Secured debt (log) 
 0.0215 
[0.90] 
   0.0282 
[0.97] 
  
Collateral value inventory/ 
Secured debt (log) 
  0.0180 
[0.43] 
0.0322 
[0.88] 
  0.0390 
[0.57] 
0.0694 
[1.28] 
Collateral value fixed assets 
excluding real estate/bank debt 
(log) 
  0.0782 
[1.47] 
   0.0735 
[0.96] 
 
Collateral value plant & 
machinery/ Secured debt (log) 
   0.0289 
[0.77] 
   -0.0079 
[-0.16] 
Asset sales         
D-Asset sales 0.3568 
[3.08]*** 
0.3807 
[2.94]*** 
0.4498 
[4.12]*** 
0.4362 
[3.83]*** 
    
Controls         
D-new bank credit  -0.3485 
[-2.93]*** 
-0.3738 
[-2.91]*** 
-0.2703 
[-2.47]*** 
-0.3011 
[-2.78]*** 
-0.2679 
[-2.53]** 
-0.3356 
[-2.60]*** 
-0.1888 
[-1.98]** 
-0.1868 
[-1.56] 
L(bank debt) -0.0974 
[-3.12]*** 
-0.1162 
[-3.59]*** 
-0.1194 
[-3.65]*** 
-0.1101 
[-3.49]*** 
-0.0857 
[-2.00]** 
-0.1004 
[-2.23]** 
-0.1026 
[-2.35]*** 
-0.0962 
[-2.26]** 
Constant 1.5801 
[3.71]*** 
2.1488 
[4.63]*** 
2.0178 
[4.48]*** 
1.9338 
[4.19]*** 
1.4158 
[2.45]** 
2.0503 
[3.36]*** 
1.8268 
[3.03]*** 
1.7005 
[2.69]*** 
         
Pseudo R2 0.2435 0.2041 0.2129 0.1965 0.1694 0.1465 0.1191 0.1014 
Chi-squared 50.06 44.52 46.48 45.73 14.17 13.11 10.73 9.02 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0027 0.0107 0.0298 0.0606 
Number of observations 66 66 66 66 41 41 41 41 
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3.9. Robustness check 2: The renegotiated loan repayment for firms without agreement. 
 
We argued in section 3.2 that secured creditors and debtors do not necessarily reach an agreement on 
the renegotiated loan repayment. It might therefore be interesting to analyze the impact of liquidation 
values on the likelihood that an agreement is reached or not. Unfortunately, our dataset provides only 
noisy information on the fact whether an agreement is effectively reached. We strongly suspect, 
though we have no proof, that a renegotiated loan repayment of 1 means that there was not really a 
successful renegotiation. This is possible in the Belgium context because an uncompromising bank can 
always force the debtor legally to repay the loan in full not later than 18 months after plan 
confirmation, which implies that the reorganization plan, drafted for a period of 24 months, reports a 
full loan repayment of 1.  
 
In this section, we will therefore assume that no agreement is reached when the loan repayment 
fraction amounts to 1. To model the determinants of the failure of renegotiation, we estimate a probit 
regression with D-No agreement (1 when the loan repayment fraction is 1, zero otherwise) as the 
dependent variable. Results are shown in table 7. The likelihood of non-agreement clearly increases 
with the liquidation value of collateral (Collateral value/secured debt). Banks with higher liquidation 
values are less likely to compromise. In addition, we find that distressed firms with relatively weak 
pre-bankruptcy cash flows are less likely to reach an agreement.  
 
In summary, we still conclude that higher liquidation values result in a higher loan repayment 
(hypothesis 1). More specifically highly secured banks are more unwilling to compromise, resulting in 
a full loan repayment.  
 
Table 7:   Determinants of the negotiated loan repayment for firms without agreement. 
We estimate the likelihood that no agreement on the loan renegotiation is reached between banks and debtor by 
using a probit model. We assume that firms and secured banks did not reach an agreement when the loan 
repayment fraction amounts 1. The binary dependent variable equals 1 if no agreement is reached, and zero 
otherwise. The values in brackets are robust t-statistics; * / ** / *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%.  We refer to 
appendix A for a description of the explanatory variables. The estimates are based on our 66-sample of 
corporations with secured bank debt,  
 Probit model with dependent variable D-No 
agreement between secured creditors and 
entrepreneurs 
Collateral value/secured debt (log) 1.1470 
[3.33]*** 
Controls  
Pre-bankruptcy cash flow/total assets -0.9719 
[-2.30]** 
L(bank debt) -0.2411 
[-1.75]* 
Constant 1.4580 
[0.79] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2962 
Number of observations 66 
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3.10. Robustness Check 3: Bank strategy and judicial discretion. 
 
Bris, Welch & Zhu (2006) show that banks are more likely to choose liquidation (chapter 7) over 
reorganization (chapter 11) irrespective whether banks are secured or not. They argue that banks are 
unwilling to compromise during Chapter 11 because pre-bankruptcy negotiations were already 
brought to a standstill. We expect that this unwillingness to compromise might depend on the 
respective banks’ strategies with respect to court-supervised reorganizations. Our conclusions with 
respect to liquidation values as a bargaining instrument (hypothesis 1) could therefore be driven by 
heterogeneous bank strategies.  
 
The three largest banks active in corporate finance in Belgium are frequently present in our sample. In 
specification 1 of table 8 we control for those three large banks by including bank dummies. The 
dummies equal one when a large bank did exclusively finance a distressed firm (respectively for 15, 
12 and 12 firms out of 66 firms) and zero otherwise. Multiple bank situations take place for 20 of the 
66 cases. The estimates show that large bank 1 seemingly has another strategy resulting in lower 
renegotiated loan calls, but also that the collateral variable remains significantly positive, again hinting 
at the fact that the evidence in support of hypothesis 1 is robust.  
 
Recent literature shows that judicial discretion significantly affects the restructuring process and 
outcome (see Bris et al., 2006, and Chang & Schoar, 2006). Judicial discretion might drive our earlier 
findings with respect to the impact of the collateral value on the loan repayment. Unlike in the U.S., 
more then one judge is assigned to a firm filing for bankruptcy-reorganization, and those judges act as 
a college. We however have no structured data on the specific judges involved with a distressed firm. 
Specification 2 simply controls for judicial discretion by including court dummies for the three largest 
bankruptcy courts in our sample (respectively 12, 10 and 9 firms out of 66 firms). Although the loan 
repayments for firms filing a petition with the court of Charleroi are larger, the introduction of court 
dummies does not significantly affect the collateral proxy, which again shows the robustness of our 
primary result. 
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Table 8:   Regression analysis on the negotiated loan repayment 
The dependent variable is the renegotiated loan repayment fraction. This fraction is calculated in section 3.5.1. as 
the renegotiated loan repayment in € during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months scaled by 
bank debt exposure in  €. The coefficients are estimated using Tobit analysis. The values in brackets are robust t-
statistics; * / ** / *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%.  The dummies on large banks equal 1 if one of the three 
largest Belgian banks (active in corporate finance) exclusively financed the distressed firm (Large bank 1, 2 and 
3 for respectively 15, 12 and 12 firms out of 66) and zero otherwise. The court dummies represent the three 
largest bankruptcy courts in our sample (Court of Antwerpen, Charleroi and Leuven for respectively 12, 10 and 9 
firms out of 66). 
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 
Liquidation values    
Collateral value / secured bank 
debt (log) 
0.2628 
[3.74]*** 
0.2563 
[3.96]*** 
Bank variables   
D-Large bank 1 -0.3369 
[-1.62] 
 
D-Large bank 2  0.0459 
[0.20] 
 
D-Large bank 3 0.1121 
[0.60] 
 
D-Multiple banks 0.1235 
[0.66] 
 
Court variables   
Court of Antwerpen  0.1601 
[1.10] 
Court of Charleroi  0.1707 
[1.83]* 
Court of Leuven  -0.1375 
[-0.67] 
Controls & other variables   
D-new bank credit -0.5674 
[-5.21]*** 
-0.4854 
[-5.05]*** 
L(Bank debt) -0.1014 
[-2.72]*** 
-0.0605 
[-1.94]* 
Constant 1.7627 
[3.51]*** 
1.1739 
[2.62]*** 
   
Pseudo R2 0.2480 0.2139 
Chi-squared 41.90 45.12 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of observations 66 66 
 
3.11.  Conclusion. 
 
We analyze unique data on contract renegotiation between entrepreneurs and secured banks under 
Belgian court-supervised reorganization. The initial lending contract is renegotiated during the pre-
confirmation stage and enforced during the post-confirmation period. Unlike the U.S., Belgian courts 
supervise this enforcement during a fixed period of 24 months. Strict contractual enforcement 
demands that the negotiated principal installments payments are paid during this fixed period of 24 
months. Using a sample of firms not-converted to bankruptcy-liquidation (Chaper 7 in U.S.), we find a 
strongly positive correlation between renegotiated and actual loan repayments during this court-
supervised time-fixed period suggesting that the renegotiated contracts are strictly enforced during the 
post-confirmation stage. 
Chapter 3. Bank Debt Restructuring under Belgian Court-supervised Reorganization 
 
 3.27 
 
Our main research objective is to understand the determinants of the renegotiated loan repayment 
fraction during the court-supervised post-confirmation period of 24 months. This fraction amounts to 
the renegotiated principal installments payments scaled by bank debt exposure at the moment of plan 
confirmation. Theory suggests that secured creditors are more likely to oppose a debtor’s 
reorganization if their collateral has a higher liquidation value. In line with this theory, we hypothesize 
that secured banks succeed in renegotiating higher loan repayment fractions during the post-
confirmation period if they have higher liquidation values. Controlling for a distressed firm’s expected 
going concern value, for the bank’s private information on the debtor’s viability and for loan size, we 
cannot reject our main hypothesis that higher liquation values of collateral result in higher renegotiated 
loan repayment fractions. More specifically secured banks with higher liquidation values of collateral 
are less willing to accept anything less than a full loan repayment.  
 
Asset sales are planned in the confirmed reorganization plans for more than one third of our distressed 
sample firms and largely consist of real estate. Firms with more machinery, which are not necessarily 
large firms, frequently liquidate inventories, machinery, and other assets. Possibly, firms with more 
machinery use the court-supervised reorganization to sell specialized assets to avoid fire sales under 
bankruptcy-liquidation. Secured banks are generously repaid by the proceeds from asset sales and 
there is some evidence that banks push for these asset sales.  
 
Although receivables are commonly regarded as redeployable assets, we find no clear evidence of 
their disposal to a third party (factoring). It is common practice in Belgium that receivables are simply 
collected by the entrepreneur under supervision of the appointed examiner, and that the collection 
proceeds are used to repay banks and other creditors. However, if the debtor does not sell assets to 
repay its loans, banks rely on pledged receivables to insist on a higher renegotiated loan repayment. 
 
In sum, we find that the liquidation values of the collateral and of the specific asset types are more 
important for the outcome of loan renegotiation than the legal form of the collateral38 or the 
continuation value of the distressed firm. This is consistent with the theoretical result that secured 
creditors prefer liquidation to court-supervised reorganization39.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
38
 Personal guarantees, that pledge assets outside the distressed firm, may be the exception to this rule. 
39
 The implementation of the EU directive on financial collateral arrangements (dd. December 15th 2004 – i.e.  
after our dataset construction) grants additional power to secured creditors as they can easily pledge financial 
assets like accounts, but also directly seize these liquid assets upon default of a distressed firm. Given the found 
liquidation preference, the effect of this additional power on the liquidity position of distressed firms may be 
considerable.   
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Appendix A: Description of all explanatory variables analyzed in table 3 on the renegotiated loan 
repayment fraction. 
D-Floating charge Dummy variable that is assigned the value of one in case the bank possesses a security interest on 
floating charge assets, and zero otherwise. Floating charge assets are mainly working capital like 
inventories. 
D-Fixed charge Dummy variable that is assigned the value of one in case the bank possesses a security interest in real 
estate (land and buildings), and zero otherwise.  
D-Guarantees Dummy variable that is assigned the value of one in case the entrepreneur provided a personal 
guarantee to the bank, and zero otherwise. 
D-Multiple bank  Dummy variable that is assigned the value of one in case the distressed firm is financed by more than 
one bank, and zero otherwise.  
D-Public Limited Liability Corporation Dummy variable that is assigned the value of one in case the distressed firm is a Public Limited 
Liability Corporation, and zero otherwise. 
D-Sole proprietorship Dummy variable that is assigned the value of one in case the distressed firm is a sole proprietorship, 
and zero otherwise. 
Collateral value/secured debt (log) A logarithmically transformed ratio of the bank’s collateral value divided by the amount of outstanding 
secured debt. The collateral value is estimated by the sum of the book values of the major asset types: 
receivables, inventory, land & buildings, machinery, furniture and vehicles. The book values are 
obtained from the latest annual account prior to petition filing for bankruptcy-reorganization, and are 
valued at zero if no security rights are provided. Inventory is accounted only for half of its book value, 
in accordance to legal limitations on the scope of floating charges for the benefit of unsecured creditors. 
The amount of the outstanding secured bank credit is reported in the confirmed reorganization plans. 
L(Bank debt) The logarithmic variable of the outstanding bank debt amount as reported in the confirmed plans.  
Total debt /Assets Total debt scaled by assets (as reported in the latest annual account prior to petition filing for 
bankruptcy-reorganization). 
Pre-bankruptcy cash flows/assets Cash flows scaled by assets (as reported in the latest annual account prior to petition filing for 
bankruptcy-reorganization). 
Industry sales growth The industry sales growth is the industry average of the annual sales growth over the last three fiscal 
years before the distressed firm’s filing for bankruptcy-reorganization (based on 3-digit Nace codes). 
Industry profit margin The industry profit margin is the operating profit margin for the last fiscal year before the distressed 
firm’s filing for bankruptcy-reorganization (based on 3-digit Nace codes). 
Industry’s profit margin Uncertainty parameter for the going concern value. The industry’s variation in profit margin consists in 
the industry average of the standard deviation of the operating profit margin over the last 3 fiscal years. 
This variable is based on variation in profit margin within businesses over time (i.e. non cross-
sectional). 
Industry attrition rate Uncertainty parameter for the going concern value. The Industry attrition rate is the proportion of small 
businesses within a particular industry that file a petition for bankruptcy-liquidation each year.  
D-new bank credit Dummy variable that is assigned the value of one in case a bank did promise (in the confirmed 
reorganization plan) the provision of additional credit, and zero otherwise. 
Equity/Bank debt The variable is a proxy for the distressed firm’s bank debt capacity.  Equity consists in the debtor’s 
subscribed capital (as reported in the latest annual account prior to petition filing for bankruptcy-
reorganization). The amount of bank debt is reported in the confirmed reorganization plans. 
Pre-bankruptcy credit flow The variable is the fraction of bank credit contraction and/or expansion during a 12-month pre-
bankruptcy period prior to petition filing for bankruptcy-reorganization. A positive and negative flow is 
respectively an expansion and contraction. (Data obtained by intermediation of the National Bank of 
Belgium).  
Collateral value receivables/secured 
debt (log) 
A logarithmically transformed ratio of the collateral value of receivables divided by the amount of 
outstanding secured bank debt. See above for details on the calculation of the collateral value. 
Collateral value real estate/secured debt 
(log) 
A logarithmically transformed ratio of the collateral value of land and buildings divided by the amount 
of outstanding secured bank debt. See above for details on the calculation of the collateral value. 
Collateral value inventories/Secured 
debt (log) 
A logarithmically transformed ratio of the collateral value of inventories divided by the amount of 
outstanding secured bank debt. See above for details on the calculation of the collateral value. 
Collateral value fixed assets excluding 
real estate/secured debt (log) 
A logarithmically transformed ratio of the collateral value of fixed assets excl. real estate divided by the 
amount of outstanding secured bank debt. See above for details on the collateral value. 
Collateral value plant & 
machinery/secured bank debt (log) 
A logarithmically transformed ratio of the collateral value of plant and machinery divided by the 
amount of outstanding secured bank debt. See above for details on the collateral value. 
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Appendix B: summary statistics of variables used in table 3 for 66-case sample. 
 
 Mean Median St. dev. 
 
   
Renegotiated loan repayment fraction (dependent variable) 0.4864 0.3746 0.3777 
D-Guarantees 0.2121 0 0.4119 
Collateral value / secured bank debt (log) 0.5350 0.5496 0.8594 
L(Bank debt) 12.7747 12.7666 1.6522 
Pre-bankruptcy  total debt/total assets 1.1167 1.0268 0.2980 
Pre-bankruptcy cash flow / total assets -0.1340 -0.0051 0.4187 
Industry sales growth 0.0705 0.06575 0.0442 
Industry profit margin 0.0892 0.0675 0.0528 
Industry variation in profit margin 0.0413 0.0390 0.0168 
Industry attrition rate (%) 1.3721 1.4000 0.4306 
D-new bank credit 0.0909 0 0.2897 
Equity / Bank debt exposure 0.6540 0.3556 0.8863 
Pre-bankruptcy bank credit flow -0.0239 -0.1220 0.5800 
Collateral value receivables / secured bank debt (log)  -0.9835 -0.5225 1.7613 
Collateral value real estate / secured debt exposure (log) -8.9261 -8.0081 2.2767 
Collateral value inventory / secured bank debt (log) -1.6653 -1.4521 1.6574 
Collateral value fixed assets excluding real estate / secured bank debt (log) -0.9015 -0.7447 1.2306 
Collateral value plant & machinery/ secured bank debt (log) -2.5409 -2.4018 1.7350 
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Appendix C: correlation table of the variables used in the regression analysis on the negotiated loan repayment fraction for sample of 66 firms (table 3). 
 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 
S1 1,0000 -0,2805 0,3870 -0,2200 0,0389 -0,1652 -0,0449 -0,1023 -0,0063 -0,0588 -0,3263 0,3013 -0,2064 0,1772 0,1358 0,0617 0,2561 0,2062 
S2 -0,2805 1,0000 -0,1217 0,1089 -0,0748 0,0959 -0,0300 0,2013 0,0539 -0,0630 0,2467 -0,0331 0,0737 -0,0644 0,1516 -0,0472 -0,0948 -0,0414 
S3 0,3870 -0,1217 1,0000 -0,3044 -0,2764 0,1140 0,2024 -0,0982 -0,0761 -0,0157 0,0118 0,5811 -0,0166 0,7238 0,1123 0,5064 0,3679 0,3367 
S4 -0,2200 0,1089 -0,3044 1,0000 -0,2890 0,1085 0,0011 -0,0058 -0,0761 0,0766 0,0775 -0,3517 0,0433 -0,1440 0,1616 -0,2717 -0,0288 -0,0734 
S5 0,0389 -0,0748 -0,2764 -0,2890 1,0000 -0,6690 -0,3816 -0,1575 -0,0805 0,0323 -0,0578 0,0553 -0,0114 -0,1793 -0,1396 -0,3119 0,0266 0,0687 
S6 -0,1652 0,0959 0,1140 0,1085 -0,6690 1,0000 0,2620 0,0498 -0,0669 -0,0538 0,0948 -0,1986 0,0408 0,1337 0,0375 0,2877 -0,0992 -0,1228 
S7 -0,0449 -0,0300 0,2024 0,0011 -0,3816 0,2620 1,0000 0,1286 0,1372 -0,1301 0,0681 0,1732 0,0084 0,0529 -0,1587 0,4353 0,1419 0,1619 
S8 -0,1023 0,2013 -0,0982 -0,0058 -0,1575 0,0498 0,1286 1,0000 0,6566 -0,1875 -0,0220 0,0022 0,0104 -0,2478 0,1260 -0,0698 -0,3955 -0,1377 
S9 -0,0063 0,0539 -0,0761 -0,0761 -0,0805 -0,0669 0,1372 0,6566 1,0000 -0,1628 -0,0524 0,0532 0,0544 -0,2453 0,0162 -0,1227 -0,2382 -0,1421 
S10 -0,0588 -0,0630 -0,0157 0,0766 0,0323 -0,0538 -0,1301 -0,1875 -0,1628 1,0000 -0,0190 -0,0330 -0,0865 -0,2342 0,0338 -0,2337 -0,1512 0,0399 
S11 -0,3263 0,2467 0,0118 0,0775 -0,0578 0,0948 0,0681 -0,0220 -0,0524 -0,0190 1,0000 -0,0138 -0,1838 0,0834 0,2523 -0,0151 -0,0665 -0,0017 
S12 0,3013 -0,0331 0,5811 -0,3517 0,0553 -0,1986 0,1732 0,0022 0,0532 -0,0330 -0,0138 1,0000 -0,0769 0,3685 -0,0220 0,3280 0,4095 0,4220 
S13 -0,2064 0,0737 -0,0166 0,0433 -0,0114 0,0408 0,0084 0,0104 0,0544 -0,0865 -0,1838 -0,0769 1,0000 0,0378 -0,1249 0,1281 -0,0131 -0,1002 
S14 0,1772 -0,0644 0,7238 -0,1440 -0,1793 0,1337 0,0529 -0,2478 -0,2453 -0,2342 0,0834 0,3685 0,0378 1,0000 0,0500 0,4031 0,2689 0,1757 
S15 0,1358 0,1516 0,1123 0,1616 -0,1396 0,0375 -0,1587 0,1260 0,0162 0,0338 0,2523 -0,0220 -0,1249 0,0500 1,0000 -0,3472 -0,3154 -0,1458 
S16 0,0617 -0,0472 0,5064 -0,2717 -0,3119 0,2827 0,4353 -0,0698 -0,1227 -0,2337 -0,0151 0,3280 0,1281 0,4031 -0,3472 1,0000 0,3104 0,1939 
S17 0,2561 -0,0948 0,3679 -0,0288 0,0266 -0,0992 0,1419 -0,3955 -0,2382 -0,1512 -0,0665 0,4095 -0,0131 0,2689 -0,3154 0,3104 1,0000 0,6497 
S18 0,2062 -0,0414 0,3367 -0,0734 0,0687 -0,1228 0,1619 -0,1377 -0,1421 0,0399 -0,0017 0,4220 -0,1002 0,1757 -0,1458 0,1939 0,6497 1,0000 
 
 
S1: Negotiated Loan repayment Fraction S10: Industry attrition rate 
S2: D-Guarantees S11: D-new bank credit 
S3: Collateral value/Secured bank debt (log) S12: Equity/bank debt exposure 
S4: L(Bank debt) S13: Pre-bankruptcy credit flow 
S5: Total debt/total assets S14: Collateral value receivables/secured bank debt (log) 
S6: Pre-bankruptcy cash flow/total assets S15: Collateral value real estate/secured bank debt (log) 
S7: Industry sales growth S16: Collateral value inventory/secured bank debt (log) 
S8: Industry profit margin S17: Collateral value fixed assets excluding real estate/secured bank debt (log) 
S9: Industry variation in profit margin S18: Collateral value plant & machinery/secured bank debt (log) 
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Appendix D: Marginal Tobit effects and OLS estimates.. 
The dependent variable is the renegotiated loan repayment fraction. This fraction is calculated in section 3.5.1. as 
the renegotiated loan repayment in € during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months scaled by 
bank debt exposure in €. Marginal effects of the Tobit analysis are evaluated at the mean of the independent 
variables (means are reported in appendix B). OLS coefficients are also reported.  The values in brackets are 
robust t-statistics; * / ** / *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%.   
 Spec. 2 of table 3 Spec. 5 of table 3  Spec. 7 of table 3 Spec. 9 of table 3 
 
Tobit 
(marginal 
effects) 
OLS  Tobit 
(marginal 
effects) 
OLS Tobit 
(marginal 
effects) 
OLS Tobit 
(marginal 
effects) 
OLS 
Collateral type         
D-Guarantees -0.1205 
[-1.11] 
-0.1153 
[-1.05] 
-0.0764 
[-0.72] 
-0.0603 
[-0.59] 
-0.0939 
[-0.92] 
-0.0809 
[-0.81] 
-0.0759 
[-0.65] 
-0.0673 
[-0.58] 
Liquidation values          
Collateral value / secured bank debt 
(log) 
0.2024 
[3.76]*** 
0.1557 
[3.72]*** 
0.1442 
[3.24]*** 
0.1200 
[3.07]*** 
    
Collateral value receivables / secured 
bank debt (log)  
    0.0476 
[1.84]* 
0.0417 
[1.80]* 
  
Collateral value real estate / secured debt 
exposure (log) 
    0.0383 
[2.31]** 
0.0396 
[2.39]** 
  
Collateral value inventory / secured bank 
debt (log) 
      0.0134 
[0.47] 
0.0137 
[0.49] 
Collateral value plant & machinery/ 
secured bank debt (log) 
      0.0387 
[1.30] 
0.0308 
[1.13] 
Private information         
D-new bank credit    -0.2913 
[-3.89]*** 
-0.3544 
[-4.65]*** 
-0.3391 
[-5.49]*** 
-0.4324 
[-6.08]*** 
-0.2649 
[-3.83]*** 
-0.3483 
[-4.59]*** 
Equity / Bank debt exposure   0.1713 
[2.64]*** 
0.0761 
[1.97]* 
    
L(Bank debt) -0.0371 
[-1.30] 
-0.0440 
[-1.68]* 
-0.0439 
[-1.55] 
-0.0407 
[-1.71]* 
-0.0630 
[-2.69]*** 
-0.0659 
[-3.22]*** 
-0.0535 
[-2.06]** 
-0.0572 
[-2.42]** 
Pre-bankruptcy  total debt/total assets 0.1921 
[0.93] 
0.0956 
[0.54] 
      
         
R-squared  0.2224  0.3183  0.2711  0.2044 
Number of observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 
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Appendix E: main specifications of table 3 without logarithmically transformed collateral variables. 
 
Table 1 of this appendix estimates the main specifications of table 3 using non-logarithmically 
transformed collateral variables. The distribution of the collateral variables Collateral value/secured 
bank debt, Collateral value receivables/secured bank debt, and Collateral value inventory/secured bank 
debt are skewed to the right, and we recoded the upper percent of values to the 95th percentile of the 
distribution (i.e. 2 cases out of 66). Our previous findings on the main specifications 2, 7, 8 and 9 in 
table 3 are highly robust. Further, the estimate of the variable Collateral value plant & 
machinery/secured bank debt becomes significant, and is consistent with our findings that firms with 
much machinery have a higher likelihood to sell assets, and that the sales proceeds are used to repay 
banks (see table 5 on planned asset sales). In unreported analysis (available on demand), we find that 
all other results reported in this paper are robust to non-logarithmically transformed collateral 
variables 
 
Table 1 of appendix E:   Determinants of the renegotiated loan repayment. 
The dependent variable is the renegotiated loan repayment fraction. Specification 2, 7, 8 and 9 of table 3 are 
estimated using non-logarithmically transformed collateral variables. The distribution of the collateral variables 
Collateral value/secured bank debt, Collateral value receivables/secured bank debt, and Collateral value 
inventory/secured bank debt are skewed to the right, and we recoded the upper percent of values to the 95th 
percentile of the distribution (2 cases). The coefficients are estimated using Tobit analysis. The values in 
brackets are robust t-statistics; * / ** / *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%.   
 Spec. 2 of table 3 Spec. 7 of table  3 Spec. 8 of table 3 Spec. 9 of table 3 
Collateral type     
D-Guarantees -0.1987 
[-1.30] 
-0.1784 
[-1.26] 
-0.0888 
[-0.55] 
-0.0657 
[-0.39] 
Liquidation values      
Collateral value / secured bank debt  0.2028 
[3.85]*** 
   
Collateral value receivables / secured bank debt   0.1903 
[2.32]** 
  
Collateral value real estate / secured bank debt   0.2073 
[2.27]*** 
  
Collateral value inventory / secured bank debt    0.0164 
[0.15] 
-0.0109 
[-0.10] 
Collateral value fixed assets excluding real estate / secured 
bank debt  
  0.1300 
[1.37] 
 
Collateral value plant & machinery/ secured bank debt     0.5514 
[2.92]*** 
Private information     
D-new bank credit   -0.4431 
[-4.57]*** 
-0.3346 
[-3.49]*** 
-0.3477 
[-3.71]*** 
Controls & other variables     
L(Bank debt) -0.0291 
[-0.74] 
-0.0671 
[-2.04]** 
-0.0811 
[-2.20]** 
-0.0821 
[-2.31]** 
Pre-bankruptcy total debt/Assets 0.2087 
[0.72] 
   
Constant 0.3132 
[0.40] 
1.2186 
[2.49]** 
1.5199 
[2.93]*** 
1.5244 
[3.08]*** 
Pseudo R2 0.1830 0.1677 0.1086 0.1697 
Chi-squared 28.07 40.22 34.29 38.25 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of observations 66 66 66 66 
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the Failure of Distressed Firms under Court-supervised Restructuring: 
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Abstract. 
Unlike Chapter 11 in the U.S., the Belgian reorganization legislation requires that distressed firms 
remain under court-supervision during plan execution. In principle, the court-supervised post-
confirmation stage takes a fixed period of 24 months. Using a unique sample of small Belgian firms, 
we analyze both the likelihood of failure and the time spent before transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation 
during this post-confirmation stage. More profitable debtors are less likely to fail. If banks are 
secured by collateral with high liquidation value, debtors are more likely to fail. The mandatory 
repayment of government debt, like unpaid taxes and social contributions, also renders the distressed 
firm more likely to fail. Judicial discretion sharply affects the likelihood of failure in a subsample of 
individual debtors seeking to preserve a sole proprietorship. 
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4.1.   Introduction 
 
The ultimate goal of a bankruptcy system is to sort viable and unviable distressed firms. Asymmetric 
information however prevents an errorless bankruptcy system. Type I errors occur when unviable 
firms are saved under court-supervised reorganization. Type II-errors occur if viable firms are shut 
down instead of reorganized under court-supervised reorganization (White, 1994). Many studies show 
that firms exiting Chapter 11 are liquidated during the post-bankruptcy period (see e.g. Hotchkiss, 
1995, Bris et al., 2006; Morrison, 2007). This strongly suggests that type I errors are only revealed in 
the post-confirmation stage.  
 
Using a sample of small distressed firms, we analyze failure or bankruptcy-liquidation of distressed 
firms during the post-confirmation stage. Unlike Chapter 11 in the U.S., the Belgian reorganization 
legislation temporary imposes court-supervision after plan confirmation1. The court-supervised post-
confirmation stage takes maximum 24 months with an optional prolongation of at most 12 months. In 
most cases, the court-supervised post-confirmation period is simply fixed at 24 months. This court-
supervised period can lead to the full execution of the plan or not. In the latter case, a creditor or the 
court-appointed examiner can file a request with the court to revoke the judicial composition and the 
post-confirmation stage. The debtor can do the same if it is clear that a full execution or any creditor-
approved amendment of the plan is unfeasible. In case of revocation, the judge takes a decision to 
‘convert’ to bankruptcy-liquidation after additional examination of the distressed firm’s viability. If 
the judge revokes the court-supervised post-confirmation period without conversion, the case is 
actually ‘dismissed’ like in the pre-confirmation stage of Chapter 11. 
 
Our analysis of failure is strictly limited to the court-supervised post-confirmation period. We analyze 
the likelihood of failure during this period, and the time spent under this court-supervised stage before 
transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation. We specifically test whether unviable firms are liquidated as fast as 
possible. The delay in the shutdown decision produces direct administrative costs and indirect resource 
allocation costs. The longer an unviable firm lingers under court-supervision, the greater the delay in 
reallocating the distressed firm’s assets to a third party who can put them to a better use. Many critics 
of the Chapter 11 reorganization process argue that unviable firms are not liquidated in a timely 
manner (see e.g. Franks & Torous, 1989; Bris et al., 2006; Morrison, 2007; Denis & Rodgers, 2007).  
 
Chang and Schoar (2006) show that judicial discretion affects company performance during the post-
confirmation stage. Specifically some judges appear to rule persistently more favorably towards 
creditors (pro-creditor bias) and debtors (pro-debtor bias)2. They show that a pro-debtor judicial bias 
leads to increased rates of re-filing and firm shut-down as well as lower credit ratings and lower 
                                               
1
 Before August 1, 1991, the Chapter 11 debtor was required to file post-confirmation reports detailing its 
progress toward plan consummation (see Jensen-Conklin, 1992). So, to some extent, there existed court-
supervision during the post-confirmation period before August 1, 1991. After the reform, the revocation decision 
is left to creditors, which is the case too in Japan (Eisenberg and Tagashira, 1999).  
2
 Evans (2003) analyzes the effect of discretionary actions on small firm’s ability to survive Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, but does not focus on the post-Chapter 11 period.   
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annual sales growth of firms that emerge from Chapter 11. In sum, a judge’s discretionary actions 
during the pre-confirmation stage affect business continuation during the post-chapter 11 era.  
 
Chang and Schoar (2006) create an aggregate index to measure bias by 8 types of motions that are 
filed exclusively by the debtor or the creditors, e.g. the use of cash collateral and the lifting of the 
automatic stay. Unfortunately, we cannot follow their approach as specific and comparable Belgian 
rules do not exist, or are not formalized. We instead introduce proxies for judicial activity (passivity) 
during the pre-confirmation stage to investigate its impact on the likelihood of transfer to bankruptcy-
liquidation after plan confirmation. Our approach offers insight in another dimension of judicial 
behavior often implicitly refereed to in literature.  
 
Theoretical models suggest that secured creditors may prefer liquidation to reorganization (see e.g. 
Bulow & Shoven, 1978; White, 1989; Kordana & Posner, 1999). Bergström et al. (2002) e.g. find that 
well-secured creditors oppose plan confirmation under Finnish court-supervised reorganization. In our 
sample of confirmed plans it seems logical not to expect secured creditor resistance after plan 
confirmation, since secured creditors and debtors in principle reached a compromise on the loan 
conditions during pre-confirmation bargaining. This intuition might be very misleading. First, judges 
and unsecured creditors may confirm a plan without the individual consent of secured creditors, as is 
actually the case in both the U.S. and Belgium. Obviously, the conflict between secured creditors and 
debtors remains unsettled. Moreover, and unlike in the U.S., secured creditors always regain their 
liquidation rights 18 months after plan confirmation, if no agreement was reached during the pre-
confirmation stage. Therefore, if secured creditors are not fully repaid within those 18 months, they 
can freely seize and sell assets. This may lead well-secured creditors to induce bankruptcy-liquidation 
during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage. Next to secured debt, the debt composition of 
distressed firms mainly consists of unpaid government claims and trade credit. Those unsecured 
claims are examined and incorporated in the analysis. 
 
Our paper contributes to the limited empirical evidence on court-supervised reorganization of small 
firms (see e.g. Campell, 1996; Sundgren, 1998; Bris et al., 2006; Morrison, 2007; Fisher & Martel, 
2004). The total assets of our sample corporations do not exceed € 5.000.000. An additional sample of 
individuals seeking to preserve a sole proprietorship under the Belgian reorganization procedure is 
analyzed separately. Unlike in the U.S., individual debtors with a sole proprietorship cannot file a 
petition for a Chapter 13-like procedure in Belgium. Our research findings shed light on the 
identification process of type I errors after the pre-confirmation stage, on judicial discretion, and on 
the liquidation preference of secured banks during Belgian court-supervised reorganization.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the legal framework of the Belgian court-
supervised reorganization. Section 4.3 gives an overview of the literature and formulates the 
hypotheses. Section 4.4 describes the data and defines variables. Section 4.5 shows the main empirical 
results. Using hazard regression analysis, the length of time spent in the court-supervised post-
confirmation stage before transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation is analyzed in section 4.6. Section 4.7 
concludes. 
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4.2. Legal framework 
 
An insolvent firm can either liquidate or reorganize. In Belgium, liquidation and reorganization are 
regulated by distinct legislations.  The United States Bankruptcy Code makes an equivalent distinction 
between Chapter 7 (bankruptcy-liquidation) and Chapter 11 (bankruptcy-reorganization) within the 
same legislation.  The Belgian reorganization legislation was enacted in 1997, with the objective to 
reduce the number of bankruptcies and to preserve firms with profitable operations by means of a 
process of court-supervised financial restructuring. This legislation is called the Law on Judicial 
Composition (hereafter LJC) and came into force on January 1st 1998.  
 
Figure 1 below illustrates the timing of the Belgian LJC in three stages. In the pre-bankruptcy period 
(stage I), the debtor decides to file for bankruptcy-reorganization or not. The debtor has to file with the 
court where the firm is registered and the register of the firm must by law be related to real activity, 
which largely excludes forum shopping in the Belgian context. The creditor cannot file a petition. The 
bankruptcy court makes an initial assessment on the viability of the distressed firm when a petition is 
filed. If the court accepts the petition, the debtor remains in possession and must draft and confirm a 
reorganization plan during a six-month exclusivity period. The court appoints an examiner who 
controls the debtor and assists him with drafting the plan3. This exclusivity period can be extended by 
maximum 3 months to deal with bargaining issues. In the U.S., Bris et al. (2006) refer to the 
bargaining period as the Chapter 11-phase ‘from submission to plan confirmation’. We define stage II 
of the Belgian bankruptcy system as the pre-confirmation stage consisting of both phases ‘from filing 
to plan’ and ‘from submission to plan confirmation’. Like in the U.S., secured creditors are subject to 
an automatic stay during the pre-confirmation stage.  
 
Like in the U.S., the distressed firms can be subject to case dismissal or conversion to bankruptcy-
liquidation during the pre-confirmation stage. The court can only decide to dismiss a case upon request 
of the appointed examiner or the debtor and on the ground that the firm is no longer viable or no 
longer distressed to justify the stay of the creditors4. In principle, a court that dismisses the case on the 
ground of inviability and the impossibility to reorganize should convert the case immediately to 
bankruptcy-liquidation according to jurisprudence of the Belgian Supreme Court.5 In practice, there 
are hardly any consequences for a judge that neglects this conversion rule6. This rule is thus frequently 
                                               
3
 See Hahn (2004) for a discussion on the appointed examiner (trustee) in the U.S. 
4
 In principle, the debtor, the public prosecutor, the examiner and any party concerned can request for the 
revocation. Based on a thorough study of the judicial composition records, we however find that only the 
examiner or the debtor requests for the revocation, and certainly not the creditors and the public prosecutor. 
Unfortunately, we could only notify the official revocation, and not the underlying creditor-dynamics of a 
revocation. 
5
 The court has in the past always upheld that insolvent commercial entities should be liquidated to ensure a 
level-playing field. A court-supervised liquidation procedure was additionally considered necessary to 
investigate possible malfeasance of the debtor or its management and determine their eligibility for future 
commercial activities. Currently this point of view only applies to economically unviable firms, whereas 
economically viable firm are to be reorganized.   
6
 This differentiation is important from a comparative point of view as Morrison (2007) states that “judges often 
dismiss a case, instead of converting it to Chapter 7, if the debtor has no assets unencumbered by liens. With no 
assets available to unsecured creditors, there is no benefit to a Chapter 7 proceeding, which generates 
administrative costs”. In Belgium however, the initiation of bankruptcy-liquidation is obliged for firms that have 
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violated, for reasons discussed below (section 4.4), leaving the court with a margin of appreciation in 
case of dismissal.  
 
At the end of stage II, a meeting of the unsecured creditors votes on the debtor-proposed 
reorganization plan. The unsecured creditors mainly consist of trade creditors and the social security 
administration. A reorganization plan is approved if (i) a majority of unsecured creditors present at the 
meeting vote in favor of the plan, and (ii) the value of the claims voting in favor of the plan represent 
at least 50% of the total value of claims of unsecured creditors present at the meeting. The debts of 
these creditors have to be, in principal, repaid during a maximum period of 24 months, i.e. the court-
supervised post-confirmation stage (see further on this stage – stage III). 
 
Secured creditors do not vote collectively. Their individual approval is obliged when the debtor 
proposes an alteration to their legal entitlements. If the secured creditor and the debtor reach a new 
agreement on the loan repayments, the creditor cannot seize or sell assets during the post-confirmation 
stage as long as the debtor fully complies with this new contract. If on the other hand no agreement is 
reached between both parties, the Belgian legal framework provides the debtor with only one 
alternative, i.e. the deferral of the principal amount of the loan for a maximum of 18 months, on the 
condition that during this period interest is paid. As a consequence, the secured creditor will 
temporarily not be able to seize and sell the pledged assets, but regains his full liquidation rights after 
18 months. More far-reaching legal measures comparable to the forced rescheduling of secured debt in 
accordance with § 1129 U.S. Bankruptcy Code are not available to Belgian debtors.  
 
After the approval by the unsecured creditors and any arrangement with secured creditors (or forced 
deferral), the court confirms7 the plan and the debtor is supposed to fully execute this plan. The plan 
execution takes place during a period of maximum 24 months under supervision of the judges and the 
appointed examiner. Our dataset clearly shows that the court-supervised period is fixed at 24 months 
for 98% of the cases. During this fixed period, the court and creditors can however decide to prolong 
the court-supervised period with a maximum of 12 months. In case of prolongation, a new plan needs 
to be established because the initial confirmed plan is only drafted for a period of 24 months. A 
prolongation of the court-supervised post-confirmation period does however not occur frequently. We 
refer to the period of maximum 24 months with optional prolongation of 12 months, as the court-
supervised post-confirmation stage (stage III).  
 
The court-supervised post-confirmation stage can lead to the full execution of the plan or not. In the 
latter case, a creditor or the appointed examiner can file a request with the court to revoke the judicial 
composition and the post-confirmation stage. The debtor can do the same if it is clear that a full 
execution or any creditor-approved amendment of the plan is unfeasible. If the court grants the request 
for revocation, it can again opt for the conversion of the firm to bankruptcy-liquidation. 
                                                                                                                                                   
no unencumbered assets to be distributed to the unsecured creditors. In section 4.4., we show that the decision to 
convert to bankruptcy-liquidation during the pre-confirmation stage is discretionary. 
7
 Because the L.C.J. states that the court ‘can’ confirm the plan, certain courts have assumed the authority to test 
the feasibility of the plan. We are however only aware of a few cases where the Bankruptcy Court refused to 
confirm the plan after unsecured creditor approval.  
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Figure 1: Time schedule of the judicial composition (bankruptcy-reorganization). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3. Theory and hypotheses. 
 
Several studies show that many firms are liquidated after leaving Chapter 11 (see e.g. Jensen-Conklin, 
1992; Hotchkiss, 1995, Bris et al., 2006; Morrison, 2007). This suggests that some of the Type-I 
errors, where unviable firms are allowed to reorganize, are revealed in the post-confirmation period.  
 
Firms in distress typically suffer from poor operating performance in combination with a suboptimal 
capital structure. In line with conventional theory, we expect that more distressed firms are more likely 
to fail during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage, while less distressed firms are more likely 
to survive. Testable hypothesis 1.a. is formulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1.a: More distressed firms are more likely to fail during the court-supervised post-
confirmation period. 
 
Next to the likelihood of failure, we also analyze the time spent under the court-supervised post-
confirmation stage for failing firms. We expect that more distressed firms are liquidated faster within 
the sample of failing firms. Testable hypothesis 1.b. reads: 
 
Hypothesis 1.b: More distressed firms are liquidated faster during the court-supervised post-
confirmation stage. 
 
In our sample of firms with confirmed plans it seems logical not to expect creditor resistance in the 
post-confirmation period, since secured creditors and debtors have reached an agreement after 
renegotiating the loan conditions during the pre-confirmation bargaining. This may however be 
misguided for several reasons. Theoretical models suggest that secured creditors favor liquidation over 
reorganization (see White 1989; Bulow & Shoven, 1994). Also, judges and unsecured creditors may 
confirm a plan without the explicit agreement of secured creditors, as is the case in the US (see e.g. 
section 1129 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code), leaving the conflict between secured creditors and debtors 
unresolved. Moreover, and unlike in the U.S., secured creditors always regain their absolute rights 18 
months after plan confirmation, if no agreement was reached during the pre-confirmation stage. If 
secured creditors are not fully repaid within those 18 months, they can freely seize and sell assets. 
Therefore creditor behavior may invoke bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-supervised post-
confirmation stage. We formulate hypothesis 2.a. as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     TIME  
Pre-confirmation stage 
         6 to 9 months 
(Stage II) 
      Court-supervised post-confirmation stage of 24 months 
      with optional prolongation of 12 months (Stage III) 
    Pre-bankruptcy period 
(Stage I) 
Petition filed for judicial 
composition by debtor 
Creditors vote on the reorganization proposal, 
and bankruptcy court confirms or rejects 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
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Hypothesis 2.a: Distressed firms that depend more on secured debt are more likely to fail during the 
court-supervised post-confirmation period. 
 
Fisher & Martel (1995) argue that the mandatory repayment of prioritized government claims under 
the Canadian court-supervised restructuring may impose a heavy burden on the cash flows. They show 
that distressed firms with more government debt/total debt have a lower likelihood of plan 
confirmation. In Belgium, prioritized government debt is fully repaid during the court-supervised post-
confirmation stage in most cases8, while this is not the case for trade debt. This is formalized in 
hypothesis 2.b: 
 
Hypothesis 2.b: Firms with more unpaid government debt have a higher likelihood to fail during the 
court-supervised post-confirmation period. 
 
Recent empirical research documents large behavioral differences among judges in the U.S. (see T. 
Chang, A. Schoar, 2006; Bris, Welch and Zhu, 2007)9. Chang and Schoar show that a pro-debtor bias 
leads to increased rates of re-filing and firm shutdown as well as lower post-bankruptcy credit ratings 
and lower annual sales growth up to five years after the original bankruptcy filing. Judicial discretion 
clearly affects the company performance during the post-confirmation stage in their study. The 
Belgian bankruptcy legislation assigns an extensive screening task to the public actors during the pre-
confirmation stage. Upon examination of the firm’s viability and rescue prospects, the judge can 
dismiss the judicial composition in three ways during the pre-confirmation stage. First, the judge can 
reject the petition for court-supervised reorganization filed by the debtor. Second, the judge can 
equally dismiss the judicial composition during the pre-confirmation stage upon request of the 
appointed examiner or the debtor. Third, if creditors accept the plan, the judge can ultimately refuse 
plan confirmation resulting in dismissal of the case. The appraisal of the firm’s viability and its future 
prospects is at best a vague guideline for the judge and the appointed examiner, leaving them with 
substantial discretionary power. In case of dismissal, the court can furthermore convert the distressed 
firm to bankruptcy-liquidation, which again leaves margin for discretionary behaviour. We therefore 
expect that the likelihood of bankruptcy-liquidation during the post-confirmation stage depends on the 
discretionary behaviour of judges and their appointed examiners during the pre-confirmation stage. 
Formally, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Judicial discretion affects the likelihood bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-
supervised post-confirmation. 
                                               
8
 In an unreported analysis (available on request), we find that debt reduction on institutional debt (25% of the 
cases) occurs less frequently than the reduction of trade debt (70% of the cases). Moreover, the debt reductions 
are small and the reduced social contributions and tax claims are fully repaid within 24 months in 81% of the 
cases. This repayment of relatively sizeable government claims within 24 months might impose a severe burden 
on the cash flows. This finding is not unexpected. The Belgian bankruptcy-reorganization law (LJC) has 
provided the tax authorities with a strong position in the procedure, as they can veto any alteration of their legal 
entitlements. Furthermore, the social security administration frequently resists debt reduction, and takes this 
matter to court (in event to the Supreme Court)  
9
 See N. Gennaioli and S. Rossi (2007) for a theoretic model on judicial discretion. 
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4.4. Data 
 
4.4.1. Data sources and sampling procedure. 
 
Our dataset consists of information on distressed firms with confirmed reorganization plans under 
court-supervised reorganization in Belgium. Approximately 306 plans were confirmed between 
January 1, 1998 and June 30, 2004 with one of the 23 regional Belgian Bankruptcy Courts. Our 
sample is restricted to all confirmed reorganization plans submitted to 17 of those Bankruptcy Courts. 
This amounts to 190 reorganization plans or 62% of the population of confirmed plans. Corporations 
and sole proprietorships submitted respectively 125 and 65 plans (125+65 = 190). Blocks of closely 
related corporations jointly submitted five out of those 125 plans10. The dataset is complemented with 
financial statement data from the Graydon-database and the Belfirst DVD’s, which are delivered by 
the private data vendors Graydon Belgium and Bureau van Dijk respectively.  
 
We test our hypotheses in a sample of small distressed firms that submitted a going concern plan. We 
exclude corporations with total assets exceeding € 5.000.000, which leaves a sample of 107 small 
corporations. We additionally exclude an incorporated soccer club and one liquidation scheme among 
the small corporations11. Sole proprietorships are small by definition. We remove four individual 
debtors with liquidation schemes. All those sample restrictions result in a sample of 105 small 
corporations and 61 sole proprietorships. 
 
For the corporations we complement our dataset of confirmed plans with financial statement data prior 
to petition-filing for bankruptcy-reorganization. There are no financial statement data for sole 
proprietorships because they are not obliged to publish accounting data. To ensure a sufficiently high 
quality of the financial statement data, we do not include corporations for which the time period 
between the financial statement date and the filing date for bankruptcy-reorganization is longer then 
18 months. This removes another 14 corporations, resulting in a sample of 91 corporations.  
 
Since the court jointly appraises the cases of closely related corporations, the data on the financial 
statements should in principle be aggregated. Simple data aggregation is however not recommended 
because of intra-group transactions, and consolidated accounts are not available. Plans submitted by 
closely related corporations are therefore excluded from the sample of corporations resulting in final 
sample of 89 corporations12.  
 
4.4.2. Sample firms. 
 
The corporations differ by legal form. 45 corporations are non-quoted public limited liability 
corporations (Société Anonyme), 41 are private limited companies (Société Privée à Responsabilité 
Limitée), and 3 incorporated firms have another legal status. Table 1 gives summary statistics sorted 
                                               
10
 Five blocks of incorporated firms file jointly a plan. Those blocks respectively consist of 9, 4, 2, 2, and 2 
corporations. 139 corporations (120+9+4+2+2+2) are subsequently involved with the 125 plans. 
11
 Three large corporations confirmed a liquidation scheme, but are already excluded. 
12
 Three groups were already removed before because total group assets were larger than € 5.000.000. 
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by legal form. Like all debt variables in this paper (see further), total liabilities are measured at the 
initiation of the procedure, i.e. 6 to 9 months before plan confirmation. The public limited liability 
corporations are clearly larger than the private limited companies. The sole proprietorships are small 
(based on the comparison of the liabilities).  
 
Table 1: Firm characteristics sorted by legal form.  
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Public Limited Liability Corporation        
45 1472 1069 1365 90 4942 
45 10.22 6 10 1 37 
Pre-bankruptcy total Assets (€ 1000) 
Employees (No.) 
Liabilities (€ 1000) 45 1343 1104 1142 103 4873 
Private Limited Companies  
41 509 235 620 21 3015 
41 5.05 2 7.15 0 28 
Pre-bankruptcy total Assets (€ 1000)   
Employees (No.) 
Liabilities (€ 1000) 41 463 311 481 18.54 1848 
Sole Proprietorships       
61 0.3934 0 0.8222 0 3 Employees (No.) 
Liabilities (€ 1000) 61 199 135 175 10.46 875 
 
Table 2: Failure (bankruptcy-liquidation) during the court-supervised post-confirmation period.  
 Corporations Sole proprietorships 
Panel A   
Number of firms failing during the court-supervision period of 
maximum 24 months 
43 30 
Number of firms not failing during the court-supervision period of 
maximum 24 months 
46 31 
Total firms 89 61 
 
  
Panel B: Number of firms not failing during the court-supervision 
period of at maximum 24 months . . . 
  
. . and with additional prolongation of maximum 12 9 7 
. . and without additional prolongation of maximum 12 37 24 
Total firms 46 31 
   
Panel C   
Number of firms failing during the prolonged court-supervision 
period of maximum 12 months 
1 0 
Number of firms not failing during the prolonged court-supervision 
period of maximum 12 months 
8 7 
Total firms 9 7 
   
Panel  D: time from plan confirmation to failure in months   
Mean 11.2046 11.6633 
Median 10.5667 12.4333 
St. dev. 6.4988 6.2085 
Min. 1.3 0.1 
Max. 29.7 23.5 
Total firms 44 30 
 
The distressed firm is expected to execute the confirmed plan under court-supervision during a period 
of maximum 24 months. Panel A of table 2 shows that approximately 50% of the distressed firms end 
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in bankruptcy-liquidation during this period. Those failures are so-called type I errors [marked in 
bold]. The court-supervised period without prolongation takes a period of 24 months for 87 out of 89 
corporations and for 60 out of 61 sole proprietorships13.  If firms survive the initial post-confirmation 
period of maximum 24 months, the debtor can request prolongation of maximum 12 months. In this 
case a new plan is established and confirmed because the initial confirmed plan is only drafted for a 
period of maximum 24 months. The court and the unsecured creditors need to confirm the 
prolongation and the modified plan. Panel B of table 2 shows that the court-supervision period is 
extended for 9 corporations and 7 sole proprietorships. The prolongation takes 12 months for 
respectively 9 corporations and 6 sole proprietorships, and 9 months for 1 sole proprietorship. Panel C 
shows that only 1 corporation ends in bankruptcy-liquidation during the prolonged court-supervised 
post-confirmation period. Type I errors are therefore limited during the prolongation. Panel D shows 
the time spent in the court-supervised post-confirmation stage before transfer to bankruptcy-
liquidation. The average time is 11 months for both corporations and sole proprietorships. The 
minimal length of time spent shows that some firms fail almost immediately after plan confirmation.   
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics on the number of confirmed plans and the number of failing firms 
during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage per bankruptcy court. Data are sorted by courts 
size in the respective subsamples. The sole proprietorships resorting under the court of Charleroi fail 
infrequently after plan confirmation (bold cases in table 3). Put differently, sole proprietorships with 
confirmed plans in Charleroi have a significant likelihood to survive after plan confirmation.  
 
Table 3: Confirmed plans and failing firms per bankruptcy court. 
Corporations Sole proprietorships 
Bankruptcy court # confirmed 
plans 
# failing firms during court-
supervised post-
confirmation stage 
Bankruptcy court # confirmed plans # failing firms during 
court-supervised post-
confirmation stage 
Court of Antwerp 15 9 Court Charleroi 13 3 
Court Charleroi 13 7 Court Liège 12 5 
Court Leuven 13 8 Court Verviers 7 4 
Court Namur 7 3 Court Namur 4 3 
Court Liège 6 3 Court Huy 4 3 
Court Marche 5 2 Court Oudenaarde 4 2 
Court Mechelen 5 3 Court Leuven 3 1 
Court Verviers 4 2 Court Gent 2 1 
Court Huy 4 1 Court Marche 1 0 
Court Gent 4 2 Court of Antwerp 1 1 
Court Oudenaarde 2 1 Court Mechelen 0 0 
Other courts 11 3 Other courts 10 7 
      
Total 89 44 Total 61 30 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13
 2 corporations are supervised for only 13 and 7 months respectively, and 1 sole proprietorship is supervised 
for 3 months. 
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4.4.3. Firm distress and the debt composition. 
 
We hypothesized that more distressed firms are more likely to end in bankruptcy-liquidation during 
the court-supervised post-confirmation (hypothesis 1.a.). Table 4 shows summary statistics on distress 
for failing and non-failing firms. 
 
Panel A reports accounting data for our sample of 89 small corporations. Our profitability variable is 
defined as gross operating income (EBITDA) before filing the petition scaled by total assets, which is 
typically used as accounting measure of post-bankruptcy performance (see e.g. Hotchkiss, 1995; Denis 
& Rodgers, 2007). The reorganization plans show that distressed firms critically rely on their gross 
operating income for their installment payments during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage. 
The leverage ratio is defined as total liabilities to total assets and the liquidity ratio as the quick ratio 
(current asset minus inventory to current liabilities). We find that the pre-bankruptcy profitability is 
significantly lower at the 5% level for firms ending in bankruptcy-liquidation than for non-failing 
firms, which does not allow us to reject hypothesis 1.a. The pre-bankruptcy variables leverage and 
liquidity have no role to play. 
 
Panel A of table 4 shows that failing incorporated firms have significantly more unpaid government 
debt and trade credit14 outstanding at the 10% level. The finding on government debt is in line with 
hypothesis 2.b. We also find that the share of secured bank debt in total debt is significantly larger for 
non-failed firms at the 5% level, which is seemingly in conflict with hypothesis 2.a. In this univariate 
analysis debt interactions are however neglected. Failing firms might have accumulated more unpaid 
government debt and trade credit during the pre-bankruptcy period, resulting in lower shares of 
secured bank debt in total debt for failed firms as compared to the non-failed firms. In the multivariate 
analysis in section 4.5, we will control for the complete debt composition. Alternatively, the 
liquidation effect of secured banks on the likelihood of bankruptcy-liquidation might be less 
pronounced in our sample of confirmed plans (see also in section 4.5).  
 
Panel B shows financial data reported in the confirmed plans of individual debtors attempting to 
reorganize their sole proprietorship. There are no significant differences between failed and non-failed 
sole proprietorships in terms of government debt, trade debt or secured bank debt. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
14
 Creditors benefiting from retention of title clauses are most likely trade creditors, and their claims are 
therefore included in the trade credit. Due wages are also included in the trade debt because bankruptcy 
documents do not allow to distinguish them from trade claims. Social security contributions on the wages 
(payroll taxes) are included in the government debt. Due wages are however very small. Most distressed firms 
however still pay wages because 1) Belgian employees have always the outside option of welfare payments and 
2) the continuation decision of distressed firms critically depends on the employees, which typically results in 
paying wages without paying the due social contributions.  Fisher & Martel (1994) report that only 23% of 
Canadian plans involve some wage claims. Wage claims to total liabilities amount to 0.35% in their study.  
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Table 4: Distress of failed and non-failed firms during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage. 
Variables on distress 
Panel A: corporations 
Accounting data Profitability Leverage Liquidity 
 Mean** Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Non-failed firms  (N = 45) 0.0169 0.0496 1.1845 1.0302 0.4292 0.3942 
Failed firms (N = 44) -16.10 -0.0125 1.2230 1.0914 0.4698 0.3950 
    
Data from bankruptcy documents Government debt/total debt Trade credit/total debt Secured bank debt / total debt 
 Mean* Median Mean* Median Mean** Median 
Non-failed firms  (N = 44) 0.2199 0.1392 0.3471 0.3132 0.3149 0.3120 
Failed firms (N = 45) 0.3031 0.2583 0.4307 0.3915 0.1992 0.1701 
 
Panel B: sole proprietorships 
Data from bankruptcy documents Government debt/total debt Trade credit/total debt Secured bank debt / total debt 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Non-failed firms  (N = 31) 0.2698 0.2556 0.2993 0.2188 0.4195 0.4677 
Failed firms (N = 30) 0.2556 0.1796 0.3830 0.2830 0.3244 0.2887 
* Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed t-tests. 
**  Significant at the 5% level, two-tailed t-tests. 
 
4.4.4. Bankruptcy courts and appointed examiners. 
 
The screening behavior of public actors during the pre-confirmation stage affects the likelihood of 
failure during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage. We expect that active and intensive 
screening during the pre-confirmation period leads to lower failure rates in the post-confirmation 
stage. It is hard however to find appropriate measures for the screening behavior of the public actors. 
The power of the court to dismiss the case is conditional on a request thereto from another party and 
therefore reveals only partial information on the behavior of the court and the presiding judges. The 
same applies to actions from the appointed examiner since we can only observe the court files and not 
any underlying dynamics. A debtor’s request for dismissal might be instigated by the appointed 
examiner or vice versa.15 The judge, who has appointed the examiner, might instigate an appointed 
examiner’s request for dismissal. 
 
A less ambiguous parameter with regard to the screening behavior of the court is the court’s response 
to a dismissal. Within the philosophy of the American Bankruptcy system, case dismissal may be 
justified for a variety of reasons such as the failure to file financial schedules, pay fees or hire an 
attorney, or the absence of assets available to unsecured creditors. Although most of the dismissed 
cases in the U.S. are liquidated (see Morrison, 2007), dismissal is a logical part of the U.S. system. 
Case dismissal is however less justified in the Belgian framework. If Belgian judges dismiss a case of 
an unviable firm without resorting to conversion, they leave the bankruptcy-liquidation decision to the 
                                               
15 
 Since the examiner controls the debtor and assists him with drafting the reorganization plan (see section 4.2) 
he usually establishes a close working relationship with the debtor. As such, the debtor might have admitted the 
lack of future prospects, which the examiner has formalized in a petition for dismissal. An examiner might on 
the other hand convince the debtor to request himself for dismissal, as this might show his good faith when his 
excusability or fresh start-declaration is to be appraised as part of the bankruptcy-liquidation procedure.  
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debtor or the creditor16. The frequency of case dismissals during the pre-confirmation stage, or 
alternatively the frequency of case conversions, might reveal an important dimension of actual 
screening behavior by the public actors during the pre-confirmation stage:  Judges that systematically 
opt for dismissal instead of conversion can be labeled as passive, since they defer the filtering decision 
to other involved parties.  
. 
We calculate the Conversion rate during the pre-confirmation stage for each of the 17 bankruptcy 
courts involved in our sample study. The variable amounts to the fraction of conversions during the 
pre-confirmation stage scaled by the total number of bankruptcies (after conversion or dismissal) 
during the pre-confirmation stage17. A low rate of conversion indicates that the corresponding court 
has passive judges that leave the decision to transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation to the market. Panel A 
of table 5 gives summary statistics on this judicial activity variable for the five largest courts. The 
courts of Charleroi and Liège are clearly more active than other courts18. This might explain the low 
number of distressed firms ending in bankruptcy-liquidation after plan confirmation for the sole 
proprietorships resorting under those courts (see table 3). 
 
As already noted, judges can only decide to convert to bankruptcy-liquidation if examiners or debtors 
request to dismiss the court-supervised reorganization. The Conversion rate during the pre-
confirmation stage may therefore be driven by both judges and their appointed examiners (i.e. both 
public actors). 
 
The educational background and the professional experience of the appointed examiner may therefore 
affect the screening process and indirectly the likelihood of bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-
supervised post-confirmation stage. Eisenberg and Tagashira (1994) analyze examiners’ valuations of 
the liquidation value of business assets for a sample of Japanese firms under reorganization. They find 
that the valuations of lawyers and certified public accountants are not abnormal, while other examiners 
tend to overestimate the liquidation values. They however use one dummy variable to capture both 
certified public accountants and lawyer, which implies that there still might be an unidentified 
difference between these two categories. We distinguish four classes of educational background for 
examiners: lawyers, auditors, accountants, and those with other (economic) backgrounds. Lawyers, 
auditors, and accountants are committed to their respective professional institutes. The other 
examiners are often bookkeepers, which are equally committed to their professional institute. Lawyers 
                                               
16
 We verified that a dismissal on initiative of a creditor does not occur frequently during the pre-confirmation 
stage. Example given: it occurred only one time for the court of Charleroi and never for the court of Antwerp. 
17
 We used the failure data of all firms that end in bankruptcy-liquidation during the pre-confirmation stage 
(from January 1998 until May 2006) to construct the Conversion rate variable. The data are provided by 
Graydon Belgium.  
18
 A judicial decision to convert may depend on a distressed firm’s business characteristics, as e.g. employment 
considerations may increase the activity rate of judges. A probit model (available on demand) was used to 
estimate the likelihood of conversion in a representative sample of firms that went bankrupt during the pre-
confirmation stage, and the independent variables are business characteristics obtained from the latest annual 
accounts prior to petition filing. The independent variables of this model are pre-bankruptcy business 
characteristics, i.e. the logarithm of total assets, the logarithm of the number of employees and leverage (total 
debt/assets). We find that these firm characteristics do not affect the likelihood of conversion, and this suggests 
that the courts of Charleroi and Liège are more active irrespective of the business characteristics. 
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might be less experienced in identifying viable and unviable firms because they are not trained in 
business economics. We do not address the question whether an accountant has better reorganizing 
and filtering skills than other examiners with economic background, as both auditors and bookkeepers 
equally need to pass exams to exercise their tasks (including these tasks of an examiner).  
 
Panel B shows that the educational background of the court-appointed examiners differs among courts. 
The judges of the courts of Charleroi and Liège appoint lawyers, while Antwerp judges appoint 
accountants. The examiner’s professional experience is measured by the number of past and current 
appointments as liquidators, auditors19 and members of the Board of Directors of Belgian firms. An 
appointment as liquidator might offer relevant expertise in reorganizing firms, as a liquidator sells 
viable business branches to a third, and liquidates remaining assets in a piecemeal way (see further). 
Panel C of table 5 shows that the experience of the appointed examiners varies very strongly across 
courts.  
 
Table 5: Public actors: judges and appointed examiners 
Panel A: Conversion rate during pre-confirmation stage  
Court of Antwerp 0.1277 
Court of Charleroi 0.6571 
Court of Leuven 0.1538 
Court of Liège 0.3750 
Court of Verviers 0.2105 
All other courts (average) 0.3581 
Panel B: Examiner Education Auditor Accountant Other economic 
background 
Lawyer N  
Court of Antwerp 3 13 0 0 16  
Court of Charleroi 1 0 0 25 26  
Court of Leuven 3 1 0 12 16  
Court of Liège 0 0 1 17 18  
Court of Verviers 1 0 7 3 11  
All other courts  12 9 4 38 63  
N 20 23 12 95 150  
Panel C: Examiner experience N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Court of Antwerp 16 2.6875 1 3.2397 1 12 
Court of Charleroi 26 8.0385 5 8.3113 0 32 
Court of Leuven 16 9.1250 8 7.1356 3 35 
Court of Liège 18 17.5 16.5 12.3824 1 37 
Court of Verviers 11 14.4546 22 10.4725 1 22 
All other courts  (average) 63 5.1587 3 6.3353 0 30 
 
Some examiners might be specialized in liquidations20. One could argue that these examiners are 
appointed to liquidate the distressed firm and are therefore endogenous to the survival probabilities of 
the firm. This is however unlikely in our sample of going concern plans (liquidation schemes were 
excluded from the sample). Further inspection also reveals that the correlation between the number of 
                                               
19
 We only measure the number of auditor positions in personal capacity, and trivially only for auditors. 
20
 In our sample of small corporations with 89 appointed examiners, 36 and 14 of these examiners have no 
experience as liquidator (40%) and as a member of the board of directors of Belgian firms (16%). The average 
number of appointments is respectively 3.94 and 3.19 (medians are 1 and 2). 
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appointments as liquidator and board member is negligible (–0.0652)21, suggesting that professional 
liquidators are not present in our sample. 
 
4.5. The likelihood of failure: distress, debt composition and judicial discretion. 
 
4.5.1. Corporations. 
 
The failure of corporations during the post-confirmation period of the Belgian court-supervised 
restructuring may be driven by firm distress, debt composition and judicial discretion. We model the 
likelihood of failure as a Probit model. Results are shown in table 6. In specification 1 of table 6 we 
introduce financial variables from the last annual account prior to petition filing for bankruptcy-
reorganization as determinants of the likelihood of failure. Like in the univariate analysis, higher 
profitability (measured as EBITDA scaled by total assets) is related to lower failure rates, while 
leverage and liquidity do not seem to affect the likelihood of failure. In specification 2 we control for 
industry conditions by introducing the industry sales growth, the industry profit margin, and industry 
dummies22. The estimates of specification 1 are robust, and the variables Industry sales growth and 
Industry profit margin have the expected negative sign. 
 
In specifications 3 and 4 we introduce debt composition measures in our specification. Specification 3 
reveals that distressed firms with higher levels of government debt are indeed more likely to fail, 
which does not allow us to reject hypothesis 2.b. Specification 4 shows that firms with higher levels of 
secured bank debt are less likely to fail, which seems to contrast the proposition that secured creditors 
prefer liquidation over reorganization and hence with hypothesis 2.a. The simultaneous inclusion of 
Secured bank debt/total debt, Government debt/total debt and Trade credit/total debt in the estimation 
is troublesome because of multicollinearity concerns, since secured debt, government debt and trade 
credit account for the lion’s share of debt for small distressed firms. In specification 5 we replace the 
denominator total debt by total assets and simultaneously include Secured bank debt/total assets, 
Government debt/total assets and Trade credit/total assets as independent variables. The leverage 
variable, which is very close to a linear combination of these three variables, is accordingly excluded 
from this and further specifications. Firms that are more reliant on government debt are robustly found 
more likely to fail, while the opposite is true, though not significantly, for secured bank debt.  
 
The variable Secured bank debt/total assets could be interpreted as a loan to value ratio (LTV ratio), 
where total assets act as proxy for the value of assets. A higher value of the LTV ratio implies lower 
expected proceeds in case of liquidation; and this might lower the secured bank’s incentive to 
liquidate. Total assets are however not the best measure of liquidation value. The bankruptcy literature 
usually employs more specific measures, e.g. Collateral value/secured debt (see Bergström et al., 
                                               
21
 The correlation between the number of appointments as liquidator and board member is also around zero in 
our sample of sole proprietorships. 
22
 The variable Industry sales growth is the industry average of the annual sales growth over the last three fiscal 
years prior to petition filing (based on 3 digit-Nace codes). The Industry profit margin is the industry average of 
the operating profit margin for the last fiscal year prior to petition filing (equally based on 3 digit-Nace codes). 
Industry dummies are defined as follows: wholesale (23 cases), retail (15 cases), manufacturing (13 cases), 
hotels and restaurants (9 cases), construction (8 cases), other industries (21 cases). Other industries are omitted.  
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2002; Franks & Sussman, 2005). Bergström et al. (2002) argue that secured creditors may increasingly 
oppose a debtor’s reorganization as the collateral value approaches the amount of their claims. If the 
reorganization succeeds, well-secured creditors receive only part of the appreciation of the firm’s 
value, while they bear the brunt of the depreciation of the firm’s value if the reorganization fails. 
Bergström et al. find accordingly that highly secured creditors oppose plan confirmation under Finnish 
court-supervised reorganization. We expect that well-secured creditors may oppose reorganization 
resulting in a higher likelihood of failure during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage. Like 
Bergström et al. (2002), we use the logs of Total assets/Secured bank debt and Collateral 
value/secured debt23 as proxies for secured creditor resistance. The collateral value is measured as the 
sum of the book values of receivables, inventory, land & buildings, machinery, furniture and vehicles. 
Inventories are accounted only for half of its book value because half of the inventory proceeds in 
bankruptcy-liquidation are allocated to other creditors24. The two variables are set to zero for cases 
without bank debt (21 cases) and with unsecured bank debt (10 cases)25. In specification 6 and 7 we 
separately add the collateral variables to the list of independent variables. We find that both variables 
have the expected positive sign and that Collateral value/secured debt is significant at the 5% level in 
specification 726. These findings suggest that secured banks do not support the reorganization if their 
collateral values are high.  
 
In the specifications 8 to 11, we show that judicial discretion does not heavily affect the failure of 
distressed corporations during the post-confirmation period. In specification 8 we enrich specification 
5 with court dummies for the three largest courts in our sample of corporations (the courts of Antwerp, 
Charleroi and Leuven) and find that they do not contribute to the explanation of failure. In 
specification 9 we introduce our court activity variable (the Conversion rate during the pre-
confirmation stage) which seems to play no role. In specification 10 we include our variables on 
examiner education and experience. We find that the likelihood of failure is lower if the appointed 
examiner is an auditor. This suggests that auditors are more effective screeners during the pre-
confirmation stage resulting in fewer bankruptcies during the post-confirmation stage27. The examiner 
experience variable is negative but insignificant. Specification 11 shows that cases with examiners 
with more Board experience have a lower likelihood to fail during the post-confirmation stage, 
although borderline not significantly (t-statistic is -1.51), suggesting that these examiners may be more 
effective screeners during the pre-confirmation stage. In unreported regressions (available on 
demand), we find that the examiner’s experience, as liquidator has no impact on the failure decision. 
                                               
23
 The estimation results are fairly robust if we do not use logarithmic transformations.  
24
 Two firms did not provide a security right with respect to their real estate. The value of land & buildings is 
revalued to zero by construction for those two cases. 
25
 The collateral value amounts to zero for one firm that provided security rights, but without assets reported in 
the annual account. As the bank is actually not secured, the value of Collateral value/secured debt (log) is zero.  
26
 We obtain significant estimates for both measures if we restrict the sample to firms with secured debt. 
27
 Critics might argue that the choice of examiner is endogenous. Specifically, judges may appoint auditors for 
distressed firms with a higher expected likelihood to survive, which could drive our result. We argue that our 
results are not driven by this possible ‘examiner shopping’ by judges for two reasons. First, the examiner is 
appointed at the initiation of the reorganization procedure when information on the rescue prospects is limited 
and uncertain (see Baird & Morrison on information revelation during court-supervised restructuring, 2001). 
Second, we find no evidence that distressed firms assisted by an appointed examiner-auditor have higher pre-
bankruptcy profitability (EBITDA/Assets).  
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In the remaining specifications, we add four entrepreneurial-related variables to baseline specification 
7. First, the variable Management experience is introduced in specification 12, which amounts to all 
positions on boards ever held (in the board of other Belgian firms) by members of the distressed firm’s 
board. The average number of management positions is 4.04 (median is 2 - maximum is 27). Although 
not significantly, we find that distressed firms managed by more experienced entrepreneurs have a 
higher likelihood to succeed in reorganization. More general, this suggests that management 
experience can be regarded as a proxy for organizational slack. Organizational slack acts as a buffer to 
protect the firm’s core from environmental pressures, and may allow the firm to survive (see e.g. 
Scharfman et al., 1988). Bourgeois (1981) defined slack as ‘that cushion of actual or potential 
resources that allows an organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to 
external pressures for change in policy as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to external 
environment’.  
 
The variable Management experience includes both past and current positions on boards ever held by 
members of the distressed firm’s board. If the number of positions is restricted to those exercised at 
the moment of procedure initiation (i.e. past positions are excluded), we have a proxy for the network 
and business relations of the management of the distressed firm. The variable is defined as 
Entrepreneurial network. The larger the entrepreneurial network, the more access to resources and 
financial support (potential slack)28, and the more ability to survive. The coefficient estimate of 
Entrepreneurial network in specification 13 is negative and significant. 
 
The entrepreneurial-related variable Prior bankruptcy is introduced in specification 14 (see also 
Morrison, 2007). Our variable Prior bankruptcy counts the earlier bankruptcies in which the board of 
directors of the distressed firm has been involved as a director29. The variable Prior bankruptcy is 
positive as expected, but insignificant. The dummy variable D-Personal guarantee takes the value of 
one when the entrepreneur provided a personal guarantee, and zero otherwise, and is equally 
introduced in specification 14. If entrepreneurs provided a guarantee, they are likely more motivated to 
survive because their private wealth is on stake. Debt personally guaranteed has the expected negative 
estimate, and is significant30.  
                                               
28
 See Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2006) on the existence of an ‘internal capital market’, whereby subsidiaries 
benefit from the support by the group it belongs, especially when the firm belongs to the core of the group. 
29
 If a firm goes bankrupt two years after management dismissal, we consider the dismissed manager responsible 
and count it as an involvement in a previous bankruptcy. In Belgium, from a legal point of view, replaced 
managers even remain responsible for three years after their discharge. 
30
 In unreported analysis (available on demand), we noticed that the distressed firm’s age has no effect on the 
likelihood of failure. 
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Table 6: The likelihood of failure during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage for small corporations.  
We estimate the likelihood of transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage by using a probit model. The binary dependent variable 
equals one if the firm ends in bankruptcy-liquidation, and zero otherwise. The values in brackets are robust t-statistics based on the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of 
variance; * / **/ *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%. We refer to appendix A for a description of the explanatory variables. The estimates of specification 1 to 14 are based on 
our sample of 89 small corporations. 
 Spec. 1  Spec 2. Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6  Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10 Spec. 11 Spec. 12 Spec. 13 Spec. 14 
Accounting data               
Profitability -1.1997 
[-2.30]** 
-1.2518 
[-2.54]** 
-1.3211 
[-2.56]*** 
-1.1031 
[-2.04]** 
-1.0134 
[-1.92]* 
-1.1585 
[-2.15]** 
-1.2624 
[-2.21]** 
-1.1159 
[-2.03]** 
-1.0484 
[-1.97]* 
-1.0242 
[-2.12]** 
-1.0074 
[-2.07]** 
-1.3712 
[-2.45]** 
-1.5258 
[-2.60]*** 
-1.4494 
[-2.39]** 
Leverage -0.0474 
[-0.14] 
-0.3218 
[0.88] 
-0.0791 
[-0.22] 
-0.1549 
[-0.46] 
          
Liquidity 0.4829 
[1.01] 
0.1258 
[0.25] 
0.4411 
[0.89] 
0.1782 
[0.35] 
0.3963 
[0.86] 
0.7213 
[1.56] 
0.7104 
[1.55] 
0.2834 
[0.58] 
0.4099 
[0.90] 
0.6800 
[1.39] 
0.7374 
[1.56] 
0.8110 
[1.74]* 
0.7806 
[1.76]* 
0.8419 
[1.81]* 
Variables on debt composition                
Government debt/total debt   1.4655 
[1.98]** 
           
Secured debt/total debt    -1.3017 
[-1.89]* 
          
Government debt/total assets     1.0966 
[1.82]* 
1.3456 
[2.34]** 
1.3684 
[2.32]** 
1.0863 
[1.82]* 
1.0650 
[1.79]* 
0.9632 
[1.72]* 
1.0968 
[1.97]* 
1.3198 
[2.24]** 
1.2563 
[2.12]** 
1.1236 
[1.83]* 
Secured bank debt/total assets     -0.7407 
[-1.48] 
  -0.6980 
[-1.39] 
-0.7645 
[-1.48] 
-0.6654 
[-1.41] 
-0.7011 
[-1.45] 
   
Trade debt/total assets     0.3004 
[0.79] 
0.3370 
[0.88] 
0.3272 
[0.86] 
0.2921 
[0.73] 
0.3042 
[0.80] 
0.5608 
[1.49] 
0.6187 
[1.55] 
0.3778 
[0.99] 
0.5279 
[1.31] 
0.7089 
[1.64] 
Total assets / secured bank debt 
(log) 
     0.3209 
[1.55] 
        
Collateral value/ secured bank 
debt (log) 
      0.5582 
[2.44]** 
    0.5794 
[2.40]** 
0.5871 
[2.37]** 
0.5951 
[2.20]** 
Court-level variables               
D-court of Antwerp        0.3972 
[0.95] 
      
D-court of Charleroi        0.4158 
[0.97] 
      
D-court of Leuven        0.5810 
[1.35] 
      
Conversion rate during pre-
confirmation stage 
        0.1734 
[0.28] 
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Continuation of table 6 Spec. 1  Spec 2. Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6  Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10 Spec. 11 Spec. 12 Spec. 13 Spec. 14 
               
Examiner variables               
D-auditor          -0.8025 
[-1.91]* 
-0.7898 
[-1.92]* 
   
D-accountant          0.1613 
[0.38] 
    
D-other examiner education          -0.2129 
[-0.45] 
    
Examiner experience          -0.0133 
[-0.82] 
    
Examiner Experience in boards 
of other Belgian firms 
          -0.0556 
[-1.51] 
   
Entrepreneurial variables               
Management experience            -0.0407 
[-1.21] 
  
Entrepreneurial Network             -0.1037 
[-1.67]* 
-0.1478 
[-2.06]** 
Prior bankruptcy              0.1665 
[0.86] 
Debt personally guaranteed              -0.8815 
[-1.77]* 
Controls               
Total assets (log) -0.0191 
[-0.18] 
-0.0300 
[-0.27] 
0.0383 
[0.33] 
0.0775 
[0.65] 
0.1443 
[1.24] 
0.0738 
[0.59] 
0.0420 
[0.33] 
0.1381 
[1.13] 
0.1354 
[1.12] 
0.1417 
[1.18] 
0.1516 
[1.30] 
0.0884 
[0.67] 
0.1257 
[0.93] 
0.2214 
[1.58] 
Industry sales growth  -2.4014 
[-0.81] 
            
Industry profit margin  -3.3761 
[-1.26] 
            
Industry dummies NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Constant -0.1327 
[-0.13] 
1.5381 
[1.22] 
-0.8258 
[-0.72] 
-0.1214 
[-0.12] 
-1.3975 
[-1.47] 
-1.6336 
[-1.68]* 
-1.4260 
[-1.45] 
-1.5345 
[-1.55] 
-1.3953 
[-1.47] 
-1.3549 
[-1.41] 
-1.4198 
[-1.51] 
-1.6105 
[-1.59] 
-1.8502 
[-1.83]* 
-2.4067 
[-2.35]** 
Pseudo R2 0.0634 0.1175 0.1014 0.0952 0.1248 0.1272 0.1541 0.1464 0.1255 0.1726 0.1798 0.1688 0.1770 0.2056 
Number of observations 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
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4.5.2. Sole proprietorships. 
 
Financial statements are not available for sole proprietorships, which limits the analysis of the 
determinants of the likelihood of failure to debt composition and judicial discretion. We model the 
likelihood of failure of proprietorships again as a Probit model. Results are shown in table 7.  
 
In specifications 1 and 2 we introduce Government debt/total debt and Secured bank debt/total debt 
respectively. We control for size by the number of employees. Government debt/total debt does clearly 
not affect the likelihood of failure, while natural persons that are more reliant on secured bank debt 
tend to have a lower probability of failure. Unfortunately we cannot verify how collateralization 
affects the failure rate, because of the data limitations mentioned before. Surprising is the finding that 
that sole proprietorships with more staff have a higher likelihood to exit the court-supervision stage as 
a going concern. This is a very robust finding of all specifications in table 7. This may suggest that 
courts are more lenient towards sole proprietorships with more employees30. To verify whether this is 
driven by local unemployment concerns, we add the unemployment rate of the judicial district during 
the year of plan confirmation in specification 3. The coefficient is negative as expected, but not 
significant, and the coefficient estimated for the number of employees remains robustly negative.  
 
In specification 4 we enrich specification 2 with court dummies for the three largest courts in our 
sample of proprietorships (the courts of Charleroi, Liège and Verviers). For proprietorships judicial 
discretion is found to play an important role. The coefficient for the court of Charleroi dummy (D-
court of Charleroi) is significant at the 5 % level, while the coefficient for the court of Liège dummy 
(D-court of Liège) comes very close to significance. These findings are consistent with the statistics on 
failure per bankruptcy court reported in table 2.  
 
Table 5 shows that the frequency of conversions during the pre-confirmation stage varies widely 
across courts. If judges chose systematically not to convert cases of unviable firms, they reveal a 
judicial aversion to filter between viable and unviable firms. In this line of reasoning, we regard the 
judges of Charleroi and Liège as ‘active’ screeners because of their high conversion rates. In 
specification 5 we enrich specification 4 with the Conversion rate during the pre-confirmation stage, 
while in specification 6 we substitute the conversion rate for the court dummies.  The results indicate 
that the court dummies are not longer significant after the introduction of the conversion rate, and that 
the conversion rate itself is strongly significant. If courts screen more actively during the pre-
confirmation stage, failure rates during the post-confirmation stage are lower. In unreported robustness 
tests we find the coefficient estimated for conversion rate is still significant in a sample without the 
cases of Charleroi and Liège.  
 
In specification 7 we enrich specification 4 with the examiner variables31. We find that more 
experienced examiners during the pre-confirmation period make for lower failure rates during the 
post-confirmation period. Note also that the introduction of the examiner variables strongly affect the 
                                               
30
 The number of employees does not affect the likelihood of failure in our sample of small corporations. 
31
 We do introduce D-auditor because only one auditor was appointed in our sample of 61 sole proprietorships. 
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dummy for the court of Liège, which is consistent with the earlier finding in table 5 that the judges of 
the court of Liège appoint more experienced examiners (see panel C of table 5). In specification 8 we 
omit the court dummies and find that both Examiner experience and examiner education have an effect 
on the likelihood of failure. In unreported robustness checks, we find that the significance of Examiner 
experience falters in a sample without the cases of Liège, although the sign remains negative32.  
 
Table 7: The likelihood of failure during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage for sole 
proprietorships.  
We estimate the likelihood of transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-supervised post-confirmation 
stage in our sample of 61 sole proprietorships. We use a probit model with binary dependent variable that equals 
one if the firm ends in bankruptcy-liquidation, and zero otherwise. The values in brackets are robust t-statistics 
based on the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance; * / **/ *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%. We refer to 
appendix A for a description of the explanatory variables.  
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec 3. Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 
Debt composition variables          
Government debt / total debt 0.2910 
[0.28] 
        
Secured bank debt / total 
debt 
 -0.6902 
[-1.23] 
-0.7470 
[-1.33] 
-0.8640 
[-1.48] 
-1.1707 
[-2.00]** 
-1.1804 
[-2.01]** 
-0.6725 
[-1.09] 
-0.4300 
[-0.74] 
-0.9620 
[-1.63] 
Court-level variables          
D-court of Charleroi    -1.0677 
[-2.02]** 
-0.4075 
[-0.57] 
 -1.0223 
[-1.80]* 
  
D-court of Liège    -0.6888 
[-1.52] 
-0.5521 
[-1.17] 
 -0.1786 
[-0.32] 
  
D-court of Verviers    0.1909 
[0.31] 
-0.0206 
[-0.03] 
 -0.0862 
[-0.10] 
  
Conversion rate during the 
pre-confirmation stage 
    -1.9403 
[-1.43] 
-2.5031 
[-2.67]*** 
  -2.4725 
[-2.29]** 
Examiner variables          
D-accountant       -0.3070 
[-0.48] 
0.0420 
[0.07] 
0.1718 
[0.29] 
D-other examiner education       1.4942 
[1.45] 
1.8040 
[2.18]** 
1.3701 
[1.86]* 
Examiner experience       -0.0650 
[-2.34]** 
-0.0705 
[-3.08]*** 
-0.0702 
[-2.78]*** 
Controls          
Number of employees -0.6861 
[-2.84]*** 
-0.6935 
[-3.01]*** 
-0.6996 
[-2.94]*** 
-0.8107 
[-3.30]*** 
-0.7692 
[-3.13]*** 
-0.7233 
[-3.04]*** 
-0.8333 
[-3.15]*** 
-0.8262 
[-3.57]*** 
-0.7973 
[-3.12]*** 
Unemployment rate   -0.0387 
[-1.34] 
      
Constant 0.1531 
[0.60] 
0.4586 
[1.63] 
1.0497 
[2.01]** 
0.8647 
[2.36]** 
1.5602 
[2.95]*** 
1.5654 
[3.38]*** 
1.0940 
[2.56]*** 
0.7329 
[2.19]** 
1.8599 
[3.31]*** 
Pseudo R2 0.1036 0.1214 0.1434 0.2003 0.2226 0.2061 0.2580 0.2085 0.2830 
Number of observations 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
 
 
In sum, more active screening by the judges and the appointment of more experienced examiners in 
the pre-confirmation stage leads to lower failure rates in the post-confirmation stage, although the 
latter effect is to some extent driven by the court of Liège. This implies that for proprietorships we 
                                               
32
 In unreported analysis (available on demand), we find that sole proprietorships with an examiner specialized in 
liquidations have a lower likelihood to fail. This effect however disappears in a sample without the cases of 
Liège. 
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cannot reject hypothesis 3 that judicial discretion affects firm failure. In addition we find that 
proprietorships with more employees are very robustly more likely to survive during the post-
confirmation period.  
 
4.6. The length of time spent in the court-supervised post-confirmation stage before transfer 
to bankruptcy-liquidation.  
 
The literature argues that the time spent in bankruptcy is a proxy for indirect bankruptcy costs (see e.g. 
Franks & Torous, 1989; Bris et al., 2006; Morrison, 2007). Bris et al. (2006) argue that the 
bankruptcy’s adverse impact on product and capital markets increases with the time spent in 
bankruptcy. Morrison (2007) more specifically refers to the delay in reallocating the distressed firm’s 
assets to a third party who can put them to a better use. Next to indirect costs, direct administrative 
costs also increase with case duration under bankruptcy. Bankruptcy costs equally increase with the 
time spent in the Belgian court-supervised post-confirmation stage for firms that ultimately end in 
bankruptcy-liquidation. In an efficient system, those failing firms should be identified and liquidated 
as soon as possible to minimize costs. Therefore, we hypothesized that more distressed firms are 
liquidated faster during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage (hypothesis 1.b). This hypothesis 
of filtering efficiency is tested using our sample of 44 small failed corporations3334. 
 
We use an accelerated failure-time regression model to analyze the time spent in the court-supervised 
post-confirmation stage before being transferred to bankruptcy-liquidation. The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the duration time until failure expressed as a linear function of covariates. This 
yields the linear model ln tj = xj β + zj , where xj is a vector of covariates, β  is a vector of regression 
coefficients, and zj is the error with density f(). The distributional form of the error term zj determines 
the regression model. Following Denis & Rodgers (2007), we assume that the error term follows the 
extreme-value (Gumbel) distribution resulting in an accelerated failure-time regression Weibull model. 
In table 8 we present coefficient estimates of β , with a positive β  indicating a longer period spent in 
the post-confirmation stage. 
 
In specification 1 of table 8 we include accounting variables as determinants of the time spent in the 
post-confirmation period. We find a positive and significant estimate for profitability (measured as 
EBITDA scaled by total assets) that turns out to be robust in all specifications: less distressed firms 
spent more time in the court-supervised post-confirmation stage, while more distressed firms are 
liquidated faster. This suggests that the system is relatively efficient. The time spent in the pre-
confirmation stage35, leverage and liquidity do not affect the time spent in the post-confirmation 
period. In specification 2 we control for industry conditions, but none of the industry variables 
contributes to the explanation. The negative sign for industry sales growth, that turns significant in 
                                               
33
 The size of Morrison’s sample varies across models and specifications, but consists of approx. 55 distressed 
small firms. 
34
 See appendix F for a survival analysis including also the 45 non-failed cases. 
35
 As a robustness check, we did add the time spent in the pre-confirmation stage to our dependent variable (the 
time spent in the court-supervised post-confirmation stage before failure) and re-estimated all specifications of 
table 8. We noted that our results and conclusions are robust. 
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some specifications, may be driven by higher liquidation values of sector-specific assets because of 
higher demand in industries with high sales growth, which leads to faster liquidations. 
 
Table 8: Determinants of time spent in the court-supervised post-confirmation stage before transfer to 
bankruptcy-liquidation 
 
We use an accelerated failure-time Weibull regression model to analyze the time spent in the court-supervised 
post-confirmation stage before transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation. A positive coefficient estimate indicates a 
longer period spent in the post-confirmation stage. The estimates are based on a subsample of 44 (out of 89) 
small corporations. The values in brackets are robust t-statistics; * / **/ *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%. We 
refer to appendix A for a description of the explanatory variables.  
 Spec. 1  Spec 2. Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 
Accounting data       
Profitability 0.5615 
[3.03]*** 
0.4707 
[2.74]*** 
0.2768 
[1.95]* 
0.3203 
[2.42]** 
0.3553 
[2.01]** 
0.3713 
[2.39]** 
Leverage 0.3628 
[1.42] 
0.2448 
[0.94] 
    
Liquidity 0.0816 
[0.26] 
-0.0072 
[-0.02] 
    
Variables on debt composition        
Government debt/total debt   0.4768 
[1.24] 
   
Secured debt/total debt    0.2313 
[0.61] 
  
Government debt/total assets     0.4320 
[1.80]* 
 
Secured bank debt/total assets     0.3898 
[1.62] 
 
Trade debt/total assets     -0.2591 
[-0.91] 
 
Collateral value/ secured bank 
debt (log) 
     -0.1972 
[-1.48] 
Controls       
Total assets (log) -0.0222 
[-0.32] 
0.0217 
[0.31] 
0.0370 
[0.54] 
0.0009 
[0.01] 
0.0147 
[0.23] 
0.0066 
[0.09] 
Time in pre-confirmation stage -0.0049 
[-0.13] 
     
Industry sales growth  -1.9136 
[-1.63] 
-2.0153 
[-1.73]* 
-2.0334 
[-1.91]* 
  
Industry profit margin  -0.3906 
[-0.41] 
    
Intercept 2.2963 
[3.30]*** 
2.3455 
[3.67]*** 
2.3565 
[5.21]*** 
2.6726 
[7.29]*** 
2.3593 
[4.45]*** 
2.6374 
[5.94]*** 
       
Scale 0.5317 0.5180 0.5196 0.5144 0.4954 0.5287 
Shape 1.8808 1.9305 1.9246 1.9439 2.0187 1.8915 
Log pseudolikelihood -41.8346 -41.0599 -40.7284 -41.3248 -39.2162 -41.6106 
Wald test 9.81* 21.20*** 21.08*** 16.37*** 30.39*** 9.79** 
Number of observations 44 44 44 44 44 44 
 
We drop leverage and liquidity in further specifications to avoid overspecification in a small sample. 
In specification 3 and 4 we add the debt composition variables Government debt/total debt and 
Secured bank debt/total debt. The positive coefficient of Government debt/total debt suggests that the 
government is not a very active actor in the filtering process: firms with more government debt linger 
on for a longer period of time before they are finally liquidated. This is confirmed in specification 5 
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where we find a significantly positive coefficient for Government debt/total assets variable. The 
positive coefficient for Secured bank debt/total debt is in line with our previous findings, although not 
significant, but we stress again that collateralization is a better measure for liquidation value.  
 
In specification 6 we add our measure of collateralization and find an opposite negative coefficient, 
again in line with our previous findings. In unreported robustness checks the coefficient of Collateral 
value/ secured bank debt is always found to be negative, while its significance depends on the 
specification: if collateralization is high, creditor resistance is high, which leads to faster liquidation of 
unviable firms.  
 
Finally, the shape parameter of the estimated Weibull models is larger than one, which implies an 
increasing hazard function in time. As time progresses, and the company needs to fully execute the 
plan, the probability of liquidation increases (see Bandopadhyaya (1994) for a Weibull analysis of 
Chapter 11 exits, including a discussion of the estimated shape parameter). 
 
4.7. Conclusion. 
 
Unlike Chapter 11 in the U.S., distressed firms in Belgium temporarily remain under court-supervision 
during plan execution. This court-supervised post-confirmation period takes a period of 24 months in 
most cases. Using a sample of small firms, we analyze bankruptcy-liquidation during this post-
confirmation period and the time spent under it before transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation, by explicitly 
testing 5 hypotheses.  
 
We find that more distressed firms are more likely to fail during the court-supervised post-
confirmation and do so more quickly (hypothesis 1.a and 1.b), which indicates that the Belgian 
procedure may be a relatively effective filter of viable firms.  
 
Secured banks with higher collateral values are more likely to fail (hypothesis 2.a), which is not 
surprising in the Belgian context. In Belgium, judges and unsecured creditors may confirm a plan 
without the explicit agreement of secured creditors, as is the case in the U.S., leaving the conflict 
between secured creditors and debtors unresolved. Moreover, and unlike in the U.S., secured creditors 
always regain their absolute rights 18 months after plan confirmation, if no agreement was reached 
during the pre-confirmation stage. Therefore, if secured creditors are not fully repaid within those 18 
months, they can freely seize and sell assets. This may lead well-collateralized creditors to induce 
more bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage.  
 
We find also that firms with more due government debt have a higher likelihood to fail during the 
court-supervised post-confirmation period (hypothesis 2.b), which is consistent with Canadian 
findings. This is not unexpected since the Belgian legal rules and reorganization practice require that 
prioritized government claims are fully repaid during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage.  
 
While judicial discretion does not affect small corporations, it clearly affects the failure of sole 
proprietorships during the post-confirmation period (hypothesis 3). Specifically, more active screening 
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by the judges and the appointment of more experienced examiners in the pre-confirmation stage leads 
to lower failure rates in the post-confirmation stage.  
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Appendix A: variable description. 
 
 Description of the variable 
Accounting data Accounting data obtained from the latest annual account prior to petition filing (pre-
bankruptcy information) 
Profitability Gross operating income (EBITDA) scaled by total assets 
Leverage Total liabilities/assets  
Liquidity Quick ratio (current assets –liquidity / current liabilities) 
 
 
Variables on debt composition  The amounts of debt are reported in the bankruptcy documents, and are measured at the 
moment of procedure initiation 
Government debt/total debt Government debt scaled by total debt (variable measured at the start of the procedure) 
Secured debt/total debt Secured bank debt scaled by total debt (variable measured at the start of the procedure) 
Government debt/total assets Government debt at the start of the procedure scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets  
Secured bank debt/total assets Secured bank debt at the start of the procedure scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets 
Trade debt/total assets Trade credit at the start of the procedure scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets 
Total assets / secured bank debt (log) Logarithmically transformed ratio of pre-bankruptcy assets scaled by secured bank debt at 
the start of the procedure (collateral proxy) 
Collateral value/ secured bank debt (log) Logarithmically transformed collateral value scaled by secured bank debt at the start of the 
procedure (detailed collateral proxy). The collateral value is measured as the sum of the 
book values of receivables, inventory, land & buildings, machinery, furniture and vehicles. 
Inventories are accounted only for half of its book value because half of the inventory 
proceeds in bankruptcy-liquidation are allocated to other creditors. See paper text for 
further details. 
 
 
Court-level variables  
D-court of Antwerpen Dummy variable assigned the value of one if the distressed firm filed a petition with the 
court of Antwerpen, and zero otherwise. 
D-court of Charleroi Dummy variable assigned the value of one if the distressed firm filed a petition with the 
court of Charleroi, and zero otherwise. 
D-court of Leuven Dummy variable assigned the value of one if the distressed firm filed a petition with the 
court of Leuven, and zero otherwise. 
D-court of Verviers Dummy variable assigned the value of one if the distressed firm filed a petition with the 
court of Verviers, and zero otherwise. 
Conversion rate during pre-confirmation stage The variable Conversion rate during the pre-confirmation stage is calculated for each of the 
17 bankruptcy courts involved in our sample study. The variable amounts to the fraction of 
conversions to bankruptcy-liquidation during the pre-confirmation stage scaled by the total 
number of bankruptcies (after conversion or dismissal) during the pre-confirmation stage1. 
A low rate of conversion suggests a court with on average passive judges, which leave the 
decision to transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation to the market, i.e. to the debtor or creditors. 
 
 
Examiner variables  
D-auditor Dummy variable assigned the value of one if the appointed examiner is an auditor, and zero 
otherwise. 
D-accountant Dummy variable assigned the value of one if the appointed examiner is an accountant, and 
zero otherwise. 
D-other examiner education Dummy variable assigned the value of one if the appointed examiner has another education 
than auditor, accountant or lawyer; i.e. bookkeepers in most cases.  
Examiner experience The examiner’s professional experience is measured by his number of past and current 
appointments as liquidator, auditor and member of the Board of Directors of Belgian firms. 
An appointment as liquidator might offer relevant expertise in reorganizing firms, as a 
liquidator sells viable business branches to a third, and liquidates remaining assets in a 
                                               
1
 We used the failure data of all firms that end in bankruptcy-liquidation during the pre-confirmation stage from 
January 1998 until May 2006 to construct the Conversion rate variable. The data are provided by Graydon 
Belgium.  
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piecemeal way. 
Examiner Experience in boards of other Belgian 
firms 
This variable measures the examiner’s number of past and current appointments as member 
of the Board of Directors of Belgian firms. 
  
Entrepreneurial variables  
Management experience Management experience measures all past and current positions on boards ever held (in the 
board of other Belgian firms) by members of the distressed firm’s board. 
Entrepreneurial Network This variable measures the positions on boards (in the board of other Belgian firms) at the 
moment of procedure initiation by members of the distressed firm’s board. (i.e. current 
positions) 
Prior bankruptcy The variable  Prior bankruptcy counts the earlier bankruptcies in which the board of 
directors of the distressed firm has been involved as a director2. 
D-Personal guarantee  This dummy variable takes the value of one when the entrepreneur provided a personal 
guarantee to the bank, and zero otherwise. 
  
Controls  
Total assets (log) The logarithmic variable of the pre-bankruptcy assets (as reported in the latest annual 
account prior to petition filing) 
Industry sales growth The industry sales growth is the industry average of the annual sales growth over the last 
three fiscal years before the distressed firm’s filing for bankruptcy-reorganization (based on 
3-digit Nace codes). 
Industry profit margin The industry profit margin is the operating profit margin for the last fiscal year before the 
distressed firm’s filing for bankruptcy-reorganization (based on 3-digit Nace codes). 
Number of employees The number of employees as reported in the latest annual account prior to petition filing 
Unemployment rate The unemployment rate of the judicial district during the year of plan confirmation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2
 If a firm goes bankrupt two years after management dismissal, we consider the dismissed manager responsible 
and count it as an involvement in a previous bankruptcy.  
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Appendix B: summary statistics on the explanatory variables in table 6. 
 
 Mean Median. Std. Dev. 
Accounting data    
Profitability -0.0711 0.0220 0.3479 
Leverage 1.2035 1.0539 0.4709 
Liquidity 0.4493 0.3950 0.3283 
    
Variables on debt composition     
Government debt/total debt 0.2610 0.2110 0.2124 
Secured debt/total debt 0.2577 0.2288 0.2510 
Government debt/total assets 0.2995 0.1994 0.3028 
Secured bank debt/total assets 0.2736 0.2053 0.3030 
Trade debt/total assets 0.4544 0.3919 0.3954 
Total assets / secured bank debt (log) 0.7115 0.5552 0.7826 
Collateral value/ secured bank debt (log) 0.3829 0.1583 0.7496 
    
Court-level variables     
D-court of Antwerp 0.1685 0 0.3765 
D-court of Charleroi 0.1461 0 0.3552 
D-court of Leuven 0.1461 0 0.3552 
Conversion rate during pre-confirmation stage 0.3403 0.2143 0.2462 
    
Examiner variables    
D-auditor 0.2135 0 0.4121 
D-accountant 0.1910 0 0.3953 
D-other examiner experience 0.0787 0 0.2707 
Examiner experience 8.4607 5 9.5216 
Examiner Experience in boards of other Belgian 
firms 
3.1910 2 4.3429 
    
Entrepreneurial variables    
Management experience 4.0449 2 5.1652 
Entrepreneurial Network 1.9663 1 3.0765 
Prior bankruptcy 0.5618 0 1.0220 
Debt personally guaranteed 0.1461 0 0.3552 
    
Controls    
Total assets (log) 6.1229 6.3333 1.3697 
Industry sales growth 0.0753 0.0655 0.0574 
Industry profit margin 0.1071 0.0681 0.0812 
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Appendix C: correlation matrix of variables in table 6. 
 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15 R16 R17 R18 R19 R20 R21 R22 
R1 1,000 -0,257 0,041 0,062 0,197 -0,232 0,232 -0,206 0,107 0,052 0,155 0,095 0,036 0,100 -0,040 -0,186 0,148 -0,038 -0,119 -0,143 -0,019 -0,085 
R2 -0,257 1,000 -0,358 0,230 0,093 0,093 -0,140 -0,023 -0,265 0,124 0,081 -0,147 0,176 0,114 0,221 -0,032 -0,090 0,058 0,017 0,050 -0,103 -0,026 
R3 0,041 -0,358 1,000 -0,423 0,002 -0,184 0,299 0,011 0,394 -0,016 0,001 0,012 -0,087 -0,224 -0,123 0,006 0,058 0,243 -0,145 -0,090 -0,163 0,043 
R4 0,062 0,230 -0,423 1,000 0,089 -0,237 -0,074 -0,262 -0,031 -0,145 -0,045 -0,005 -0,068 0,320 -0,089 0,212 -0,174 -0,137 0,006 0,086 0,133 0,013 
R5 0,197 0,093 0,002 0,089 1,000 -0,387 0,839 -0,346 -0,246 -0,126 -0,070 0,007 0,219 -0,008 0,069 -0,210 0,121 -0,006 -0,037 0,003 -0,209 0,013 
R6 -0,232 0,093 -0,184 -0,237 -0,387 1,000 -0,369 0,825 -0,383 0,145 -0,012 -0,132 0,026 -0,143 0,283 -0,050 -0,089 -0,028 0,103 -0,025 -0,106 -0,214 
R7 0,232 -0,140 0,299 -0,074 0,839 -0,369 1,000 -0,190 0,021 -0,271 -0,229 -0,027 0,193 -0,137 0,042 -0,122 0,061 0,136 -0,023 0,031 -0,292 -0,050 
R8 -0,206 -0,023 0,011 -0,262 -0,346 0,825 -0,190 1,000 -0,143 -0,050 -0,271 -0,078 0,043 -0,149 0,213 -0,071 -0,085 0,023 0,132 0,041 -0,193 -0,237 
R9 0,107 -0,265 0,394 -0,031 -0,246 -0,383 0,021 -0,143 1,000 -0,098 -0,066 0,015 -0,066 0,052 -0,214 0,148 -0,032 0,153 0,004 0,152 0,105 0,157 
R10 0,052 0,124 -0,016 -0,145 -0,126 0,145 -0,271 -0,050 -0,098 1,000 0,818 0,029 0,021 0,134 0,052 -0,002 0,164 0,018 -0,013 -0,023 0,082 -0,230 
R11 0,155 0,081 0,001 -0,045 -0,070 -0,012 -0,229 -0,271 -0,066 0,818 1,000 -0,073 0,043 0,168 0,066 0,022 0,071 0,057 -0,007 0,003 0,086 -0,160 
R12 0,095 -0,147 0,012 -0,005 0,007 -0,132 -0,027 -0,078 0,015 0,029 -0,073 1,000 -0,186 -0,186 -0,391 -0,015 0,697 -0,132 -0,291 -0,152 0,236 -0,141 
R13 0,036 0,176 -0,087 -0,068 0,219 0,026 0,193 0,043 -0,066 0,021 0,043 -0,186 1,000 -0,171 0,535 -0,138 -0,201 -0,121 0,124 -0,129 0,009 -0,052 
R14 0,100 0,114 -0,224 0,320 -0,008 -0,143 -0,137 -0,149 0,052 0,134 0,168 -0,186 -0,171 1,000 -0,315 0,017 -0,120 -0,121 0,034 0,203 0,072 -0,017 
R15 -0,040 0,221 -0,123 -0,089 0,069 0,283 0,042 0,213 -0,214 0,052 0,066 -0,391 0,535 -0,315 1,000 -0,174 -0,239 -0,132 0,179 -0,145 -0,077 0,004 
R16 -0,186 -0,032 0,006 0,212 -0,210 -0,050 -0,122 -0,071 0,148 -0,002 0,022 -0,015 -0,138 0,017 -0,174 1,000 -0,253 -0,152 0,001 0,085 0,196 0,001 
R17 0,148 -0,090 0,058 -0,174 0,121 -0,089 0,061 -0,085 -0,032 0,164 0,071 0,697 -0,201 -0,120 -0,239 -0,253 1,000 -0,142 -0,190 -0,035 0,066 -0,119 
R18 -0,038 0,058 0,243 -0,137 -0,006 -0,028 0,136 0,023 0,153 0,018 0,057 -0,132 -0,121 -0,121 -0,132 -0,152 -0,142 1,000 0,189 0,490 -0,121 -0,072 
R19 -0,119 0,017 -0,145 0,006 -0,037 0,103 -0,023 0,132 0,004 -0,013 -0,007 -0,291 0,124 0,034 0,179 0,001 -0,190 0,189 1,000 0,481 -0,063 -0,151 
R20 -0,143 0,050 -0,090 0,086 0,003 -0,025 0,031 0,041 0,152 -0,023 0,003 -0,152 -0,129 0,203 -0,145 0,085 -0,035 0,490 0,481 1,000 0,008 -0,145 
R21 -0,019 -0,103 -0,163 0,133 -0,209 -0,106 -0,292 -0,193 0,105 0,082 0,086 0,236 0,009 0,072 -0,077 0,196 0,066 -0,121 -0,063 0,008 1,000 0,297 
R22 -0,085 -0,026 0,043 0,013 0,013 -0,214 -0,050 -0,237 0,157 -0,230 -0,160 -0,141 -0,052 -0,017 0,004 0,001 -0,119 -0,072 -0,151 -0,145 0,297 1,000 
 
R1: Binary dependent variable (failure = 1) R11: Collateral value/ secured bank debt (log) R21: Industry sales growth 
R2: Profitability R12: D-court of Antwerp R22: Industry profit margin  
R3: Leverage R13: D-court of Charleroi  
R4: Liquidity R14: D-court of Leuven  
R5: Government debt/total debt R15: Conversion rate during pre-confirmation stage  
R6: Secured debt/total debt R16: D-auditor  
R7: Government debt/total assets R17: D-accountant  
R8: Secured bank debt/total assets R18: D-other examiner education  
R9: Trade debt/total assets R19: Examiner experience  
R10: Total assets / secured bank debt (log) R20 : Total assets (log)  
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Appendix D: summary statistics and correlation table of the variables in table 7. 
 
Summary statistics on the variables in table 7. 
 Mean Median St. dev. 
Debt composition variables    
Government debt / total debt 0.2674 0.2224 0.2407 
Secured bank debt / total debt 0.3727 0.3202 0.3053 
    
Court-level variables    
D-court of Charleroi 0.2131 0 0.4129 
D-court of Liège 0.1967 0 0.4008 
D-court of Verviers 0.1148 0 0.3214 
Conversion rate during the pre-confirmation stage 0.3759 0.3750 0.2103 
    
Examiner variables    
D-accountant 0.0984 0 0.3003 
D-other examiner education 0.0820 0 0.2766 
Examiner experience 7.2787 5 8.0356 
    
Controls    
Number of employees 0.3934 0 0.8222 
Unemployment rate (%) 14.92 15.20 6.1683 
 
Correlation matrix of the variables in table 7. 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 
R1 1,0000 -0,0105 -0,1570 -0,2717 -0,0744 0,0573 -0,3273 0,0054 0,0647 -0,2401 -0,3540 -0,1891 
R2 -0,0105 1,0000 -0,5116 0,1547 0,0849 0,1109 0,1319 -0,0428 -0,1300 -0,0172 0,1167 0,2134 
R3 -0,1570 -0,5116 1,0000 -0,0122 -0,0181 -0,0658 -0,1589 -0,1300 0,0239 0,1607 0,0254 -0,0094 
R4 -0,2717 0,1547 -0,0122 1,0000 -0,2575 -0,1874 0,7017 -0,1719 -0,1555 -0,1639 0,1907 0,6761 
R5 -0,0744 0,0849 -0,0181 -0,2575 1,0000 -0,1782 -0,0022 -0,1635 -0,1479 0,4329 -0,1376 0,3899 
R6 0,0573 0,1109 -0,0658 -0,1874 -0,1782 1,0000 -0,2855 -0,1189 0,6424 0,2649 0,1417 -0,1497 
R7 -0,3273 0,1319 -0,1589 0,7017 -0,0022 -0,2855 1,0000 0,1339 -0,2018 -0,1375 0,2143 0,4802 
R8 0,0054 -0,0428 -0,1300 -0,1719 -0,1635 -0,1189 0,1339 1,0000 -0,0987 -0,0254 -0,0243 -0,4056 
R9 0,0647 -0,1300 0,0239 -0,1555 -0,1479 0,6424 -0,2018 -0,0987 1,0000 0,4320 0,1490 -0,1118 
R10 -0,2401 -0,0172 0,1607 -0,1639 0,4329 0,2649 -0,1375 -0,0254 0,4320 1,0000 0,0714 0,1486 
R11 -0,3540 0,1167 0,0254 0,1907 -0,1376 0,1417 0,2143 -0,0243 0,1490 0,0714 1,0000 0,1216 
R12 -0,1891 0,2134 -0,0094 0,6761 0,3899 -0,1497 0,4802 -0,4056 -0,1118 0,1486 0,1216 1,0000 
 
R1: Binary dependent variable (failure = 1) R7: Conversion rate during pre-confirmation stage 
R2: Government debt/total debt R8: D-accountant 
R3: Secured debt/total debt R9: D-other examiner education 
R4: D-court of Charelroi R10: Examiner experience 
R5: D-court of Liège R11: Number of employees 
R6: D-court of Verviers R12: Unemployment rate 
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Appendix E: Summary statistics on quickly and slowly failing corporations in the court-supervised 
post-confirmation stage before transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation (44 failures). 
 
 Quick Failure 
(≤ median failure time) 
Slow Failure 
(> median failure time) 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. 
Accounting data       
Profitability -0.2025 -0.0644 0.3771 -0.1194 0.0265 0.4156 
Leverage 1.1725 1.0453 0.3986 1.2735 1.1767 0.4241 
Liquidity 0.4732 0.395 0.3901 0.4664 0.4 0.2970 
Variables on debt composition        
Government debt/total debt 0.2398 0.1984 0.1701 0.3663 0.3733 0.2096 
Secured debt/total debt 0.1797 0.0709 0.2351 0.2187 0.1909 0.2050 
Government debt/total assets 0.2652 0.2032 0.2243 0.4752 0.4287 0.3893 
Secured bank debt/total assets 0.1619 0.0406 0.2055 0.2597 0.1953 0.2967 
Controls       
Time in pre-confirmation stage 5.5045 5.7333 1.9803 7.3879 7.6167 2.0792 
Industry sales growth 0.0893 0.0915 0.0568 0.0592 0.0500 0.0496 
Industry profit margin 0.1057 0.0738 0.0674 0.0946 0.0680 0.0685 
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Appendix F: Robustness checks using survival analysis in our sample of small corporations. 
 
We employ an accelerated failure-time regression Weibull1 model to analyze the time spent in the 
court-supervised post-confirmation stage before transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation. Compared to our 
analysis in section 4.6 of this paper, we also include 45 distressed firms that were not transferred to 
bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage. The time to fail is 
censored for these 45 firms. Censoring occurred at 24 months for 35 cases without additional 
prolongation of 12 months, at 36 months for 8 firms with additional prolongation of 12 months, and at 
respectively 13 and 7 months for two firms with a court-supervised post-confirmation period of less 
than 24 months. 
 
Table 1 of appendix F : Accelerated failure-time regression Weibull model.  
We refer to appendix A for a description of the explanatory variables. The values in parenthesis are robust 
standard errors; * / ** / *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%.  
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 
Accounting data    
Profitability 0.9058 
[3.96]*** 
0.9150 
[3.97]*** 
0.9549 
[3.52]*** 
Liquidity -0.6916 
[-1.70]* 
-0.5524 
[-1.24] 
-0.8184 
[-1.96]* 
Variables on debt composition     
Government debt/total assets -1.0144 
[-2.95]*** 
-0.9865 
[-2.61]*** 
-0.8162 
[-2.58]*** 
Trade debt/total assets -0.4803 
[-1.62] 
-0.4428 
[-1.49] 
-0.6050 
[-2.41]** 
Collateral value/ secured bank debt (log) -0.4995 
[-4.38]*** 
-0.4983 
[-3.94]*** 
-0.4419 
[-4.00]*** 
Court-level variables    
D-court of Antwerp  -0.4373 
[-1.20] 
 
D-court of Charleroi  -0.1915 
[-0.57] 
 
D-court of Leuven  -0.1543 
[-0.47] 
 
Conversion rate during pre-confirmation 
stage 
  -0.1811 
[-0.39] 
Examiner variables    
D-auditor   0.6932 
[1.90]* 
D-accountant   -0.1247 
[-0.45] 
D-other examiner education   -0.0094 
[-0.02] 
Examiner experience    
Controls    
Total assets (log) -0.0774 
[-0.69] 
-0.0575 
[-0.52] 
-0.0338 
[-0.32] 
    
Intercept 5.0866 
[5.54]*** 
5.0003 
[5.66]*** 
4.6015 
[5.32]*** 
    
Scale 0.2911 0.3023 0.3511 
Shape 1.3379 1.3530 1.4207 
Log pseudolikelihood -94.0453 -93.1082 -89.5479 
Wald test 59.74*** 71.80*** 90.50 
Number of observations 89 89 89 
Number of failures 44 44 44 
 
                                               
1
 Other parametric survival models were tested, but the accelerated failure-time Weibull regression model is 
preferred to any other model because of its smallest AIC value and largest log likelihood. 
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Specification 1 is our baseline specification, and specification 2 and 3 respectively add court dummies 
and variables on judicial discretion. We find a positive and significant estimate for profitability that is 
very robust in all specifications. Firms with more government debt are liquidated faster, equally as 
those firms that provided much collateral relative to outstanding bank debt. Judicial discretion and 
court-driven variables in general do not affect the time to fail. Our findings based on survival analysis 
are consistent with our previous probit findings of section 4.5.1.  
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